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PREFACE
This thesis has been submitted to the Department of Management Engineering
at the Technical university of Denmark (DTU), in partial fulfilment of the
requirement for acquiring the PhD degree. The work has been supervised
by Henrik Klinge Jacobsen (DTU) and Nina Juul (DTU). The PhD study
has been funded by the Danish Council of Strategic research as part of the
interdisciplinary research project BioChain and was conducted from August
2013 to March 2018. The thesis consists of two parts. The first part introduces
the thesis background and motivation. It gives an overview and discussion of
the theory and methods applied, followed by a summary and discussion of the
achieved results. The second part is a collection of the five research papers that
have been written during the PhD study.
Lise Skovsgaard Nielsen
March, 2018
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ENGLISH SUMMARY
Recently, climate change issues have gained more importance on the
international agenda, increasing the willingness to decrease GreenHouse
Gas (GHG)-emissions. The European Union (EU) targets GHG-emissions
with country goals for CO2-emissions, Renewable Energy production, and
Energy savings. Denmark is far ahead with development of renewable energy
production primarily through wind power, which is an inflexible type of power
production. Biogas is a renewable fuel that could function as regulating power,
and when based on manure, it potentially has a reducing effect on GHG-
emissions.
Biogas has been produced and developed in Denmark since the 1970’s;
however, the development has been rather slow until 2012, when regulation
was changed, thereby increasing profitability for biogas producers. The focus
for this dissertation has been to evaluate the private economic consequences
for the biogas value chain under this new regulation.
This dissertation will examine the private economic challenges regarding
value chains, the feasibility depends on economic support. The game theoretic
implications are analysed, when support in one part of the value chain is
contingent on actions in other parts of the chain. It is also examined how
regulatory restrictions such as monopoly regulation can affect choices made
in other parts of the value chain. It is shown that regulation affects the value
chain decision in several ways regarding input types, the level of output, and
final applications of the output.
The overall research question for this thesis concerns the private economic
profitability in the biogas value chain with focus on regulation, risk and
ownership structures. The questions are treated in four journal papers based
on a combination of microeconomics and policy analyses. A socio-economic
analysis regarding the value of biogas in the energy system is performed
through energy systems modelling in a fifth journal paper.
Most new biogas plants and several old plants chose to upgrade biogas,
even though model results imply that direct use in a Combined Heat- and
Power plant (CHP) might be at least as profitable as upgrading. Cooperative
game theory is applied together with private economic modelling and policy
v
analyses in order to explain this development.
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are applied, based on microe-
conomic theory, to extract the main risk factors facing the biogas value chain
and to explain the private economic incentives behind the choices made by
investors regarding inputs, scale and output.
This dissertation has contributed several results regarding the interaction
between public regulation, private incentives, and profitability of the value
chain. Specific contributions are analyses considering the interaction of flexible
regulation with regard to biogas inputs, and risk for producers with suggestions
for policy design. In addition, the potential value of biogas in the energy system
is analysed in comparison to CO2-damage cost. A contribution is furthermore,
the application of cooperative game theory on the value chain, illustrating how
choices made regarding value chain design and participation can be explained
by strategic behaviour and possible profit allocation.
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DANISH SUMMARY
I de senere år er klimaforandringer blevet mere nærværende på den
internationale dagsorden, og viljen til at reducere drivhusgasemissionerne
er steget. EU har adresseret drivhusgasemissionerne med landemål for CO2-
reduktionskrav, produktionsmål for vedvarende energi og energibesparelser.
Danmark er langt i udviklingen af vedvarende energi, primært gennem
den ufleksible vindkraftproduktion. Biogas er vedvarende, kan potentielt
fungere som reguleringskraft, og baseret på gylle kan biogas potentielt have en
reducerende effekt på drivhusgasemissionerne.
Biogas er produceret og udviklet i Danmark siden 1970’erne. Udviklingen
har dog været langsom indtil 2012, hvor reguleringen blev ændret, hvormed
rentabiliteten blev øget for biogasproducenterne. Fokus for denne afhandling
har været at evaluere de privatøkonomiske konsekvenser for biogasværdikæ-
den i henhold til denne nye regulering.
Gennem denne afhandling undersøges privatøkonomiske udfordringer
vedrørende værdikæder, som er afhængige af økonomisk støtte. Spilteoretiske
implikationer analyseres, når støtte i en del af værdikæden er betinget af
handlinger i andre dele af kæden. Det undersøges også, hvordan lovgiv-
ningsmæssige begrænsninger, såsom monopolregulering, kan påvirke valg i
andre dele af værdikæden. Det er påvist, at regulering påvirker værdikædens
udformning på flere områder: vedrørende inputtyper, produktudbyttet og de
endelige anvendelser af produktet.
Det overordnede forskningsspørgsmål for denne afhandling handler
om den privatøkonomiske rentabilitet af biogasværdikæden med fokus på
regulering, risiko og ejerskabsstrukturer. Spørgsmålene behandles i fire
artikler baseret på en kombination af mikroøkonomi og politikanalyse. En
socioøkonomisk analyse af værdien af biogas i energisystemet udføres gennem
energisystemmodellering i en femte artikel.
De fleste nye biogasanlæg og flere gamle anlæg har valgt at opgradere bio-
gas, selvom modelresultater indikerer, at direkte anvendelse i et kraftvarmean-
læg kan være mindst lige så rentabelt som at opgradere. Kooperativ spilteori
anvendes sammen med privat økonomisk modellering og politisk analyse for
at forklare denne udvikling.
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Både kvantitative og kvalitative analyser anvendes på baggrund af
mikroøkonomisk teori for at forklare de privatøkonomiske incitamenter
bag investorernes valg vedrørende input, skala og output samt udpege
de vigtigste risikofaktorer, som biogasværdikæden står overfor. Denne
afhandling har bidraget med resultater vedrørende samspillet mellem offentlig
regulering, private incitamenter og rentabilitet af værdikæden. Specifikke
bidrag er forslag til politisk design og analyser af samspillet mellem
fleksibel regulering med hensyn til biogas input og risiko for producenterne.
Desuden analyseres den potentielle værdi af biogas i energisystemet i
sammenligning med CO2-udledningsskadesomkostninger. Et yderligere
bidrag er anvendelsen af kooperativ spilteori i forhold til værdikæden, der
illustrerer, hvordan valg vedrørende værdikæde design og deltagelse kan
forklares af forhandlingsstyrke og mulig fortjeneste.
viii
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PART I
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
DANISH BIOGAS REGULATION
1

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Climate change has in recent years gained in importance on the international
agenda, and actual changes in the climate have become more and more evident
for most people. Large investments have been made in sustainable energy
production as replacements for fossil energy usage, and new technologies are
developed along with political targets for greenhouse gasses (GHG)-reduction
and renewable energy production. Biogas production has the advantage of
turning waste products with large GHG-emissions (from N2O and CH4) into a
renewable fuel, and thereby replace CO2-emissions from fossil fuels and reduce
GHG-emissions, when laughing gas and methane is converted into CO2.
With the Energy Agreement in 2012 [27], biogas was one of the renewable
fuels that was targeted even more than before; and a biogas taskforce was
initiated in order to kick-start a higher production of biogas and identify
the more important challenges for biogas production. The taskforce should
then consider whether further initiatives are necessary, to achieve the decided
goals. The focus of this thesis is similar; however, the approach is with a more
theoretical viewpoint.
The aim of this thesis is to get a better understanding of the private economic
challenges facing the biogas value chain with a microeconomic focus regarding
regulation, scale, risk and profit allocation. The approach is with regulatory
glasses to investigate and evaluate the options (as well as the challenges) faced
by either the biogas plant or the value chain.
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1.1 Research focus
There is a long tradition for biogas production in Denmark, mostly connected to
the extensive agricultural sector, where manure have been degassed. However,
biogas production is expensive, and it has not proven feasible to produce
biogas in Denmark without a high level of support.
The objective of this PhD study is to evaluate current regulation
surrounding the biogas value chain1, to identify economic challenges for the
biogas producer, and potentially suggest possible solutions taking overall
political goals into consideration. Attention is given to the entire value chain;
however, the focus will be on micro-economic incentive and policy regulation.
In particular where regulation can interfere with economic efficiency related
to e.g. economy of scale, input- and output options, or profit allocation. The
following questions are addressed in the PhD:
1. Both the energy- and agricultural sector are highly regulated — nationally
as well as internationally. How does existing regulation affect the biogas
production and can a more efficient production be achieved by changing
regulation, while still keeping biogas production profitable?
2. The biogas value chain encompasses a great variety of ownership structures,
input- and output markets; some with perfect competition, some with
monopoly. How does this mix of market- and ownership structures
influence the biogas value chain?
3. Risk is a recurring issue in relation to biogas production in terms of risk
on input cost and availability, output demand variation and price, and
particularly on changes in regulation. Which risk factors are most influential
on the biogas value chain, and how may this be addressed?
Biogas production contributes with several positive externalities in the
form of reduced smell, improved usage of the nutrients from manure and
CO2-reduction; furthermore, biogas production can solve waste treatment
challenges and deliver renewable energy to the energy systems. I have not
tried to estimate a value of these externalities; instead I have focused on the
private economic profit optimisation for the biogas plant or value chain, in
order to explain some of the mechanisms and decisions we see in Danish biogas
production. Finally, I have studied how biogas would be applied in the socio-
economic best way in the energy system, given estimates on CO2-reduction
from biogas and CO2-damage costs found in the literature.
The microeconomic analyses regarding biogas regulation is concentrated on
the effect of a given regulation and an assessment of the tools related to targets:
more than an attempt to design the optimal regulation. The biogas value chain
is complicated and involves many stakeholders [81]; and, private economic
1The value chain concept applied in this study can be understood as a supply chain or more
generally be described as a set of activities; performed by a group of production entities in order to
deliver a product or service for the market, for a further description see section 3.1
4
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
analyses are focused on the understanding of current developments for Danish
biogas value chains, rather than to find the optimal value chain design.
1.2 Research context
Biogas production has developed significantly in Denmark since the start of
biogas production in the late 1970s [81]. The development in biogas production
was slow until a significant change in biogas regulation was agreed upon with
the Energy Agreement in 2012 [27]. The Energy Agreement [27] focused in
general on the fulfilment of the European 2020-goals, and the movement of
Danish energy consumption towards fossil independence by 2050. Regarding
biogas production, a biogas taskforce was established in order to aid the
development of Danish biogas production. Greater support was agreed
upon, and probably most importantly, biogas support was directed towards
applications, such as direct use in industry and biogas upgrading, in addition to
the existing support of biogas for direct use in local heat and power production
(CHP). Poeschl, Ward, and Owende [103] identified Biomethane for utilisation
in the transport sector as the most promising application of biogas in the future
Germany. Similar conclusion have been made by the Biogas Taskforce [37]; an
earlier analysis from the Biogas Taskforce in february 2014 [20] concludes that
upgrading is most feasible from a private economic viewpoint, while direct
consumption in a local CHP is most feasible from a socio-economic viewpoint
at least in the short run. Since the Energy Agreement was ratified by EU in 2014
[46] biogas production has increased significantly and the projection is that it
will increase even further–maybe even exceed the most optimistic projection
presented in figure 1.1 of 20 PJ by 2020. From the figure, it is clear that most of
the additional biogas is upgraded to biomethane and transported through the
natural gas grid.
Danish biogas has been examined both socio-economically[65, 83, 32, 34,
66, 67, 20, 97, 36, 124] as well as from a private economic perspective [101, 17,
81, 66, 20]. The positive externalities have also been highlighted, see e.g. [59,
69, 80]. The analysis concern economic feasibility, biogas applications and e.g.
compare upgrading to direct application in a CHP private economically and
socio-economically see e.g. [20, 67]. citetJacobsen2014 further find that GHG-
emission reductions are relatively cheap through biogas production compared
to carbon reductions through biogas in Germany.
Other countries such as Germany, Austria and Sweden are also far in their
development of biogas production [59]; and some of those do also upgrade
biogas for the gas grid, such as e.g. the Netherlands [57], Italy [43] and Germany.
Anaerobic biogas production is characterised by a vast diversity in potential
inputs and applications; and even though there are parallels between substrate
inputs, applications and regulation in Denmark and other European countries,
5
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Figure 1.1: Development in Danish biogas production and consumption, data
are actual data until 2016 and then projected data on the basis of planned
investments in biogas plants and upgrading facilities; Source:[55]
the complexity of the value chains will typically entail a degree of country
specifics, which can complicate cross-country comparisons.
1.3 Contributions and outline
The papers presented below deal with the research questions in various ways.
They include plant- or energy system modelling together with costs of biogas
and the role of biogas with regard to CO2-reduction in various ways.
Paper A: “Optimised biogas production from the co-digestion of sugar beet
with pig slurry: Integrating energy, GHG and economic accounting”. Nine
cases are compared in this paper, with regard to the effects on private economic
profit, GHG-emissions and the energy account. The cases include three plant
sizes and three input variations over the mix of pig slurry and sugar beet. The
overall conclusion was that economic feasibility is negatively correlated with
sugar beet input, while the energy account and GHG reduction is positively
correlated with sugar beet input.
Paper B: “Economies of scale in biogas production and the significance of
flexible regulation”. In this paper, the results from paper A were investigated
6
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Paper A Paper B Paper C Paper D Paper E
Economic incentives and
value chain design
x x x
Energy- and
environmental regulation
x x (x) x
Risk x x
Plant- and energy system
modelling
x x x
Cost of biogas x x x
GHG-emissions x x x
Table 1.1: Overall themes of the papers
further, now with focus on private economy, regulation and risk. The primary
result confirm results from the literature, finding that there is economy of
scale in biogas in Denmark. Even though transport cost can have a significant
influence on the result, it does not seem to outweigh the positive scale effects
from capital expenditures. The most significant factor is cost related to the
co-substrate, sugar beet, compared to the biogas yield generated from applying
this co-substrate.
Paper C: “The implications of economic instruments on biogas value
chains – a case study comparison between Norway and Denmark”. In this
paper, structural conditions, political goals and policies are compared between
Norway and Denmark, and the primary result is that the viability of a value
chain is highly dependent on structural conditions and the regulation applied
directly on and around the biogas plant.
Paper D: “The impact of CO2-costs on biogas usage”. In this paper, we
apply the energy system model, Balmorel, in order to investigate how the socio-
economic optimal biogas use changes, when estimates for the socio-economic
damage costs from CO2-emissions are changed. The overall conclusion is
that the socio-economic damage costs should be significantly higher than the
current CO2-quota price in the European ETS-system if biogas should be socio-
economically feasible to use in the energy system; assuming that CO2-reduction
is the most valuable positive externality from biogas.
Paper E: “Recent trends in biogas value chains explained using cooperative
game theory”. In paper E, two optimal value chain designs are found using
a plant level optimization model, and three profit allocation mechanisms are
applied on these value chains. The results from the profit allocation and plant
level optimization indicate several explanations as to why it can be difficult
to get livestock farmers involved with biogas production if they do not invest
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in the plant themselves, and why so many biogas plants choose to upgrade to
biomethane even when the optimal choice of value chain design seem to be
local CHP production.
The remainder of this thesis is divided into two parts. Part I contains
a background chapter, where relevant background information is briefly
presented; a chapter on the theory and afterwards the methods applied in this
thesis; a chapter on results and discussions; and, finally, concluding remarks
and outlook. Part II contains the five papers briefly presented above.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In the following sections, I expand my presentation of the context within which
Danish biogas is consumed and producers operate.
2.1 Basics about biogas
Biogas is the term for renewable gas produced from an organic feed-stock,
including both degassed manure, waste or waste water through anaerobic
digestion or gasification of an organic material such as e.g. wood. It may
even include hydrogen from electrolysis based on renewable electricity. All
are renewable gasses with a number of properties. Throughout this thesis
I primarily apply two terms:
• Biogas; defined as biogas produced through anaerobic digestion, mainly on
wet substrates such as manure, waste water and other organic co-substrates.
Biogas consists of approximately 65% methane and the rest is CO2 plus a bit
of H2S and H2; this gives a higher heating value (HHV) of approximately
25.9MJ/NM3
• Biomethane; defined as upgraded biogas cleaned from H2S and where most
CO2 is either removed; or H2 is added through methanation converting
the CO2 and H2 into CH4 and O2. Biomethane in this sense consists of
approximately 98% methane and the rest is typically CO2 together with a bit
of H2; the higher heating value of biomethane is approximately 39MJ/NM3,
which is somewhat lower than the average higher heating value for natural
gas in the Danish gas system of approximately 43.8MJ/NM3
9
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Biogas produced through anaerobic digestion can be produced on the basis
of any organic material if you are patient enough. However, commercial
productions prefer wet material and may add water in the pre-treatment
process depending on the input substrates. Anaerobic digestion can operate
within mesophilic temperatures around 35 ◦C and thermophilic temperatures
around 55◦C , where optimal retention time is both dependent on the input
mix and production temperature. The exact specifications rely on efficiency
demands; for example, if production should be within a given time frame and
somewhat consistent; economic feasibility, e.g. for capacity, output prices and
transport distances for feedstock; and regulation; examples are input- and
output restrictions, support or taxation.
Sewage sludge
16%
Agriculture
80%
Industrial
4%
Sewage sludge Agriculture Industrial
Figure 2.1: Primary feedstocks in Danish biogas production Source: [22]
Biogas production also yields a residual digestate containing a mix of the
digested inputs. Depending on the input this digestate can be de-watered and
composted, deposited as waste; or, if the inputs are sufficiently unpolluted, it
can be reused as an improved fertiliser on agricultural soil. The advantage of
the latter is that nutrients are recycled and the digestate serves as a valuable
commodity instead of a waste product.
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The biogas yield can vary over the year due to changes in input and the
quality of the inputs; however, it is complicated to change the yield over a short
time period. First of all, digestion lasts for a longer time (up to two months), if
you want to change output in a week, the output depends on what you entered
into the digester yesterday. Secondly, due to the delicacy of the anaerobic core
bacteria in the digester, the bacteria risk dying with too much change in the
input mix. Finally, there still is a lack of knowledge concerning when a given
yield is gained from a given substrate1.
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Figure 2.2: Danish biogas in relation to energy consumption and potential
Sources: Fuel consumption estimates [18], Biogas production estimates[55],
Biogas potentials ( [35, 7] p. 49 and p. 4)
Biogas is expensive to store locally; therefore, most biogas plants only
have storages that can contain less than or up to one day of production.
Consequently, biogas is produced steadily and should also be consumed
steadily. Biogas is therefore perfect for a constant producing industrial
consumer or for upgrading, where the natural gas system can serve as an
almost infinite storage. When it comes to CHP-production, biogas is more
suitable as a baseload fuel and less relevant for seasonal determined production
or temporal fluctuations.
1a model have been developed through the Biochain project, which specifically address this
issue see e.g. [56].
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Figure 2.3: Primary application of Biogas in Denmark by 2015. Not all
applications are clearly acunted for; also, other can in principle both include
transport and flaring [18].
In figure 2.2 I present the Danish biogas production for 2015 together with
expected production for 2020[55]. When this production is compared to Danish
fuel consumption for the total gross energy consumption (all consumption,
[18]) or even just the heat- and power sector (ESY,[18]) it becomes clear that
biogas plays a very insignificant role in Danish energy consumption. Biogas
could potentially play a larger role if the total potential was exploited (RE-gas
potential[35, 7]). In fact, if all biogas was produced and upgraded with the
addition of H2 from electrolysis, biomethane could in principle replace the
natural gas consumption in 2020. Recent unpublicised data imply that Danish
biogas production may exceed 20PJ by 2020; however, we will not be even close
to the expected natural gas consumption.
Data indicate that the Danish Energy Authority does not expect all biogas to
be applied in the heat- and power sector by 2020, even though this is how biogas
and biomethane predominantly have been applied, see figure 2.3. Overall I
conclude that biogas and biomethane can function as a supplement in the future
energy system, and maybe even substitute current natural gas consumption.
2.2 Energy– and agricultural markets
Biogas producers operate between several sectors, both with regard to inputs
and output. In figure 2.4, the relevant sectors are presented and how they relate
in the Danish biogas setting. In this section, I will present Danish agriculture
and which markets the agricultural sector operates on, as most biogas in
12
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Denmark is produced on the basis of agricultural residues, and the agricultural
sector receives most of the digestate after digestion (see also figure 2.1). I will
also present the electricity–, the heat– and the natural gas markets as heat- and
power producers consume most of the biogas, while the natural gas price and
market affect the biogas price and opportunities.
PlantAgriculturalSector
Waste Treat-
ment
Waste Water
Treatment
Energy Sector
Agricultural
Sector
INPUT PRODUCTION OUTPUT
Figure 2.4: Sectors contributing to the biogas value chain
Danish agriculture
Danish agricultural production has a significant share of Danish commodity
production, and includes a large variety of livestock farmers where pig- and
dairy farmers comprising the largest part. The production is efficient, capital
intensive and exceeds the Danish consumption substantially. Agricultural
producers operate on international markets with a high level of competition
and price volatility. These conditions can have several implications for the
biogas production.
The agricultural production is capital intensive, due to high prices on
agricultural soils and a highly industrialised production. This means a
significant debt which can complicate investments in a biogas plant through a
decreased willingness to risk on capital; even though it may seem profitable
and the best way to obtain a reasonable profit from the biogas value chain, as
presented in paper E. Mineral fertilizers are currently rather cheap compared
to other cost factors in agricultural production, and even though digestate
seems to have a positive effect on production compared to manure, this may
be marginal compared to the alternative cost for mineral fertilizers. Organic
farmers do not use mineral fertilizer as conventional farmers do, so to them,
digestate represents an extra value. However, even though organic farming is
increasing, it still represents a small share compared to conventional farming.
Quality and reputation of quality is important, maybe in particular when
you operate on international markets. Actors in the agricultural sector are
13
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therefore careful with regard to risking their reputation. Specifically, the
Danish dairy sector has been reluctant to allow fodder produced on soil where
digestate was spread, if this digestate contained organic waste from household
separation[112].
Danish energy markets
The Danish energy system is founded in combined heat- and power
production (CHP); central plants mostly fuelled by coal and wast together
with decentral plants mostly fuelled by natural gas. Danish energy production
as well as consumption is rapidly developing towards more renewable
energy, with a large wind power capacity supplying more than 35% of
Danish electricity consumption[23]. The increasing proportion of renewable
electricity production through wind– and solar power increases the price
volatility of electricity compared to earlier, when the primary electricity
supplier were power plants that could ramp up and down, following the
demand. Electricity prices are varying significantly through the day and year;
even though the Danish energy system is well connected to neighbouring
countries through inter-connectors; in particular Norwegian hydro power can
help moderate the price peaks.
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Figure 2.5: Danish gas and electricity prices for 2016 together with Vinderup
heat price
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Figure 2.5 depicts the day to day price variation for respectively electricity,
heat and natural gas. The heat price, is the yearly regulated heat price
for Vinderup district heating area, which is situated close to the applied
geographical position of the model biogas plant used in most of my papers.
District heating areas are natural monopolies and regulated as such following
the cost of service regulation (hvile-i-sig-selv in Danish). The heat price usually
does not vary within the year; however, as also indicated by figure 3 in paper
E it can vary significantly over years and from area to area. In 2016, heat prices
in Denmark varied from 20-171e/MWh [41] between heated areas.
The Danish gas grid is large and can supply major areas of Denmark; it
is furthermore well connected to Germany and Sweden. Nowadays, the gas
market is developing towards a more liquid market with increasing intra-
day trading[40, 39]. Gas has traditionally mostly been traded through longer
contracts, and price variations are typically yearly or seasonal. One reason
for the low intra-day price variations is the nature of the gas system. Gas
is directly storable and the gas grid function is a temporary storage through
the line pack, where the available capacity is determined by volume and the
controlled pressure in the grid. Therefore, gas , in contrast to electricity, has to
be consumed almost instantly after it is injected into the grid. Gas consumption
is currently decreasing, among other things, due to a decrease in the CHP-
consumption as the consequence of looser CHP-regulation. Lower electricity
prices have reduced the profitability of local CHP production, putting a
pressure on regulators to loosen co-production requirements (for heat– and
power) and allow for heat-only production from electric heat pumps and heat
boilers or the currently very popular biomass-based heat boilers.
For biogas producers the potential consequence of the described develop-
ment in the energy markets is that district heat producers are more reluctant to use
biogas in heat- and power production due to the potentially higher heat costs.
Furthermore, the less volatile gas market and "grid storage" through line pack
can seem to be a better fit for the almost constant biogas production.
The current decrease in gas consumption may in time increase transport
costs in the gas grids, as they are also a monopoly following the cost of service
regulation. So, with a system where capital expenditures are a considerable
part of total costs, a volume decrease will, all else being equal, tend to increase
cost per Nm3.
2.3 Danish and European energy– and environmental policy
Both European and Danish energy– and environmental policy is extensive
and complicated, based on targets for GHG-reduction goals in general,
and specifically, with regard to the energy–, transport– and agricultural
sectors. Furthermore, there are targets for renewable energy production and
15
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sustainability at the EU– as well as at the national level. On top of this, other
EU regulations exist which try to restrict national countries from favouring
own products compared to products from other European countries.
Below I will present the overall regulation, with regard to GHG-emissions,
and renewable energy together with waste and waste water, which all affect
biogas production.
Danish and European environmental policy
Danish regulation with regard to water environment is based on the
European Water Directive [48] and the agricultural policy known as the
European fertilizer decree [47]; both operate together with by overall principle
that most potable water in Denmark should be untreated ground water
pumped up from the subsoil. This means hard restrictions on water released
into the environment, water from agricultural fields. And therefore also
fertilizers dispersed on the fields. In Denmark, the water environment is
regulated through nutrition accounts based on the bulletin on livestock [30]
and water area plans (Vandområdeplaner (2015-2021)[29]).
Biogas production is not directly connected to water environment
regulation; however, when manure is digested through biogas production,
nitrogen is sometimes more easily absorbed by plants, and potentially less
nitrogen is released into the water environment[80]. Furthermore, the
phosphorus release differs from one manure type to another, so in areas with
harsh restrictions on phosphorus discharge, can central biogas plants, mixing
the manure, be a way to allow for more animals per hectare than would
otherwise be allowed. With the Green Growth agreement in 2009, harder
restrictions were set on nitrogen discharge, and a target was set that 50% of all
manure should be digested through biogas production by 2020[26]. However,
later versions of the agreement have decreased the restrictions on nitrogen
discharge[16], reducing the value of biogas digestion from the livestock farmers
point of view, and the 50% target is no longer official policy.
In Denmark, there is a long tradition for waste incineration in CHP-plants.
Separation of organic waste and waste residues in private households is
relatively recent in Denmark; however, it is increasing, and with the latest
resource strategy [28] a target has been set at 50% waste recycling by 2022.
This is a development that will probably be expanded with the European
Circular economy package [44], and with the increase in source separation
the usage of organic household waste may also increase in biogas production.
Currently, organic household waste only accounts for approximately 1% of
total biomass input, but this may change with new regulation underway. The
bulletin regarding sludge [88] is under revision to ease the usage of organic
household waste while still assuring that soil pollution will not increase at the
same time.
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GHG-emission is one of the larger environmental challenges, dealt with
at the global, European and national level. At the Paris climate conference
(COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal,
legally binding global climate deal. The EU-countries have together committed
the European Union to reduce GHG-emissions by at least 40%, compared
to 1990 emissions. The common European commitment originates from an
already initiated common European goal on GHG-emission reduction as a
part of the 2020 goals from 2010, on a 20% reduction in GHG-emissions, a 20%
renewable energy share of final energy consumption and a 20% increase in
energy efficiency [45].
Each country within the EU contribute to the GHG-emission reduction with
a sub-target that depends on the ability of each country to reduce emissions,
both in terms of natural– and economic resources. EU policy with regard to
GHG-emission reduction is comprised of two parts: one part that is covered
by the European CO2-quota system also known as EU-ETS, and another part
that is covered by separate national goals targeting specific emitters that will
not naturally form a part of EU-ETS. Emitters participating in the EU-ETS are
large energy– and industrial producers. The agricultural– and transport sectors
have historically been targeted in various ways outside the EU-ETS; however,
as industry and energy production have become increasingly more efficient
in GHG-emission reduction, do these sectors stand out to be targeted more
efficiently.
Danish and European energy policy
European Energy policy is largely coloured by the GHG-reduction agenda
combined with an urge to increase the security of energy supply, as many
European countries are dependent on energy from outside their own boarders
and outside Europe (more specifically Russia and the middle east); this does,
also, to some extent apply to Denmark. Therefore the 2020-goals are targeting
CO2-reduction, renewable energy production and energy savings.
In Denmark there is no natural access to hydro-power production and as
hours of direct sun are limited compared to countries in the southern part
of Europe has solar power only just started to become profitable with the
large reduction in production costs. Wind on the other hand is a large natural
resource in Denmark, and wind power has been supported and expanded
for a long time. Before the expansion of wind energy, Denmark was highly
dependent on fuel based heat and power production. In 1978 a significant
supply of oil and gas was found in the North Sea, and in 1979 the decision was
made to put down a large and widespread natural gas grid [96]; in order to take
advantage of the new gas supply. During the 1980’s a focus on energy savings
pushed forward a development of heat- and power production with both
central and decentral plants. Central plants were to a high degree supplied with
17
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coal and waste for waste incineration, while decentral plants were mostly based
on natural gas [96]. This means that Denmark today has a highly developed
natural gas grid and a large supply of local heat distribution grids.
When biogas production started in approximately the same period as
decentral heat– and power plants were built, it was natural that biogas would
be used in local heat and power production; in particular, as biogas has also
been applied for fuelling power production[58] in other European countries.
Danish heat– and power production has historically been heavily regulated
by a co-production requirement for heat– and power, fuel constraints
conditioned on geography, and cost-of-service regulation on heat production.
Furthermore, fossil fuels, used for heat production, are highly taxed, along with
CO2-taxes; however, fuels used to run electricity production are untaxed. In
return, electricity is highly taxed depending on how it is consumed; this has an
impact on the efficiency of electricity consumption, hereunder for heat-pumps
or electrolysis for upgrading of biogas to biomethane2. Heat production is a
monopoly following the cost-of-service regulation with a focus on keeping heat
prices down.
As the share of wind power production has increased, electricity based on
co-production has become less profitable. This has been solved by a temporary
support fee for CHP produced electricity (treleds-tariffen), and a loosening
of the co-production requirement and fuel constraints, which have helped
the current energy system to adjust to a new reality. It has; however, also
allowed for a new investment wave in biomass-based heat production, which
may not be sustainable in the long run, and, in the meantime, has reduced the
competitiveness of biogas as a fuel in heat- and power production.
Biogas regulation
There are large varieties in the European biogas value chains. In Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands, most of the input substrates for biogas are
found in the agricultural sector [63]. In Norway, Sweden and Finland, most
biogas is based on organic waste and sewage sludge [62, 98]; while in UK,
Italy, Spain and France, most biogas originates from landfills [43]. In some
countries, biogas production is driven by investment support and direct– or
indirect support on the input; for example, Norway and to some extent Sweden.
These countries together with Finland, do nevertheless also support the usage
of biogas for transport. Most countries support biogas one way or another as
output for transport, electricity production or other applications [76, 43, 66, 12].
In Denmark, biogas is primarily supported through feed-in tariffs or –
premiums, sometimes assisted by temporary investment funds. The last
investment fund was set up with the Energy Agreement in 2012 [27]. A
2Regulation regarding methanation as in: "upgrading of biogas by adding hydrogen from
electrolysis" is further presented in appendix A in paper E
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2016
Direct use Udgraded
CHP Heat Industry &
transport
All uses
Unit e/MWh e/GJ e/GJ e/GJ
Feed-in tariff 108.6
Feed-in premium 59.6 5.23 10.86
NG price dependent 45.0 4.5 4.5 4.5
Temporary 10.7 1.07 1.07 1.07
Total 164.3 5.58 10.8 16.43
Tax on gas for heating 0 0 0 9.6
Table 2.1: Direct– and indirect support for biogas in 2016, sources:[21, 115]
fundamental requirement for Danish biogas support is that the production
is sustainable. This basically means that biogas should be based on waste
substrates. Specifically, there is a limit on how much energy crops (e.g. maize
and sugar beet) can be added as co-substrate. By 2018 the limit will be a
maximum of 12% energy crops as co–substrate; prior to this, was 25% [19].
Until 2012, the Danish regulation followed some of the same principles
as used elsewhere in Europe, with a feed-in tariff or –premium for produced
electricity [43, 76, 12]. Since the Energy reform in 2012 [27], regulation has
changed so that biogas upgraded to biomethane and sold on the gas market
(through the gas grid) is put on the same regulatory footing as biogas used
locally for heat and power production, while biogas used directly for industry,
transport or heat production receive a lower support. One advantage of the
Danish regulation is that support does not decrease with scale as it has done,
for example, in Germany and Austria [33, 126]. There are no taxes on biogas
used for heat production in contrast to biomethane, which is taxed the same
way as natural gas.
The support tariffs for 2016 can be seen in table 2.1. The support has been
approved by the EU and will last until 2023, when new regulations should be
decided, and then approved by the EU. A part of the support will be phased
out from 2016 to 2020 (the temporary fee) and another part of the support
depends negatively on the natural gas price, which thereby reduces the risk of
price variations for natural gas.
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Summmary
Biogas can be produced from almost any type of waste preferably wet
substrates. The technology is in principle simple and low-tech, on the other
hand, delicate where a few wrong steps can break the whole process down.
Biogas should be consumed constantly following production, and change in
production takes time. In Denmark; if biogas is upgraded to biomethane it can
be injected to the large natural gas grid and be stored infinitely.
This thesis is written in a transition period where both the energy system
and the application of biogas is changing. The classic application of biogas is for
heat- and/or power production. It could be argued that biogas is too valuable
for this application as biomass, and that wind is in fact a cheaper substitute for
respectively heat and power production. Biogas or biomethane may instead be
utilised in industry and the transport sector, where cheap renewable substitutes
are less easy to find. Such a transition to biogas consumption may need
incentives for industry to change, and it would also demand a significant
increase in gas fuelled vehicles, as they were almost non-existent in Denmark
just a few years back.
I focus on the choice between direct consumption in a local CHP and
upgrading. How upgraded biogas (biomethane) is applied is not a fundamental
theme of this thesis. Currently, it seems that biomethane is applied in heat-
and power production, this; however, may change, and I hope my work will
contribute to the understanding of how changes in regulation can affect past,
present and future developments.
Biogas is connecting several sectors; in particular, the agricultural, waste
and energy sectors. These sectors all affect the environment concerning water
quality and regarding carbon emissions, and are therefore also regulated in
this respect. Biogas can have a positive effect on water quality and reduce
carbon emissions; currently, this is acknowledged; unfortunately, only to
a small degree encouraged. Instead most incentives are focused on the
renewable energy production in the form of large subsidies for renewable
power production such as Wind and solar power.
Together, with many other EU countries Denmark has traditionally focused
the biogas support on biogas based electricity, whereas Danish regulation, in
contrast to in other countries, has been supplemented with a sustainability
demand, meaning that only a smaller share of the input substrates could be
energy crops if the biogas should be supported. Since 2014 has upgraded
biogas also been supported significantly, aiding the biogas production and
consumption into its own transition period.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework for this thesis is based on micro-economic theory
with specific focus on industrial– and environmental economics. The standard
assumptions from micro-economic theory of perfect information, perfect
foresight and perfect markets do not hold when examining real world markets
such as biogas. Therefore as the work in this dissertation focusses on applied
theory, the theoretical topics circles around imperfect markets, lack of foresight,
imperfect– and asymmetric information.
In this chapter a group of key concepts are defined, compared and discussed.
The concepts and their implications are taken into consideration throughout
the papers, some as background knowledge while others are investigated
empirically through economic models or the following analyses.
3.1 Definition of key concepts
It can be difficult to make a clear definition of a market [122], so I will apply a
broad definition stating that a market is where goods and close substitutes are traded
among more than two parties1 within a geographical area, where the geographical
expansion depends on transport options and –costs.
The biogas value chain is affected by markets with varying degrees of
competition 2 and monopolies. In the following pages I will difine how I
will use the value chain concept in this thesis. This is followed by a short
1Meaning it is not a bilateral trade.
2Such as some agricultural markets, the electricity market and straw market.
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introduction to a group of key concepts regarding the perfect market, economy
of scale, market failures and ways of internalising these failures.
Value chain
Plant
Substrate
Farmer
Livestock
Farmer
Plant
Farmer
Energy
Con-
verter
EndUse
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR BIOGAS VALUE CHAIN ENERGY SYSTEM
Figure 3.1: The biogas value chain
Figure 3.1 illustrates the primary parts of the biogas value chain within
this thesis. The potential owners within the closed dotted square are those
necessary to include in order to receive support for Danish Biogas.
The value chain can more generally be described as a set of activities
performed by a group of production entities in order to deliver a product
or service for the market. The concept applied in this thesis focusses on the
value added from each production entity, where the value added is defined as
additional measurable economic value of i products, while Q is quantity, C are
costs and P is the price. Prices are not always easily defined in the value chain,
but in principle the exchange from one entity to the next in the chain will be
associated with a price.
V alueAdded =
∑
i∈I
PiQi −
∑
i∈I
Ci ∀i ∈ I (3.1)
Each entity is considered autonomous and can produce one or more
products. The focus in my thesis is on private economy: sometimes calculated
for one entity, sometimes calculated or optimised for a chain of entities; these
will be more specifically defined in each paper.
The value chain concept can also be considered as a decision support tool
within a firm as described by Porter [104]; or even more widely in the form
of Global Value Chains (GVC)[31, 50, 11], where, for example environmental,
poverty and gender issues can be taken into consideration [11]. This thesis uses
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only the narrow economic definition described above and does not consider
any of the broader concepts from Porter or on Global Value Chains.
Perfect markets
A market with perfect competition entails several prerequisites.
• It involves a large number of buyers and sellers that are each so small
compared to the market that they are considered as price takers
• Perfect information, where all market participants knows all production
and demand functions
• perfect foresight
• none, or at least negligible transport and transactions costs
Very few, or more correctly, no markets fulfil this completely: some agricultural
markets, the stock market, and electricity markets are often considered as
markets with close to perfect competition [122].
Most markets are more or less affected by market failures, so price and
quantity are typically not perfectly optimal. Below, I present three types of
market failures affecting the biogas value chain.
• externalities can be defined as non-priced goods or bads, whose effect
on the social costs function is excluded from the optimisation of a given
action (e.g. production of a good). Externalities can be exemplified
as pollution or as reduction of pollution, an externality from degassed
manure is the conversion of GHG-emissions (from N2O and CH4) into
the less potent CO2-emissions. This positive externality constitutes at the
same time (as many other externalities) another market failure, as it is a
public goods3[84, 54, 122].
• asymmetric– and lack of information means that production– and consump-
tion choices are made on the basis of incomplete information, and thereby
risk is included in the calculation which essentially increases transaction
costs. This is included in the thesis as the rationale behind public regula-
tion, but the definition or correct internalisation of these externalities is
not the main focus of the thesis.
• market power is when one or a few market players can affect the price(s)
in the market, and they therefore are not price takers.
Imperfect markets
A monopoly is the extreme case of market power with only one supplier for
the market. The monopolist is not a price taker, and optimises price or quantity
so Marginal Revenue equals Marginal Costs, which result in higher prices than
in the competitive market. Oligopoly is the intermediate between perfect
3Public goods are characterised as goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
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competition and monopoly and price setting can be explained by Bertrand
(oligopolistic price competition) or Cournot (oligopolistic quantity competition)
where the result is a function of the number of suppliers to the market N. n = 1
gives the monopoly price, while n → ∞ approaches the perfect competitive
price see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [84] chapter 12 or [122].
A high degree of market power for one or few suppliers/consumers can be
the result of several things such as e.g. high transport costs, limited access to
resources, lack of transparency or increasing return to scale.
Bilateral monopolies4 can also occur; for example, in value chains where
two parts of the value chain are specialised in order to serve each other, and in
those cases it can be difficult to find efficient prices. The Myerson-Satterhwaite
theorem states that it is impossible to achieve ex. post efficiency in bilateral
trade in cases of private information [92]. Private information is often an issue
in biogas, as e.g. a CHP cannot control the cost characteristics of the biogas
plant, and the biogas plant cannot monitor and verify the probable demand
for CHP outputs. Blair, Kaserman, and Romano [8] find disagreement in
the literature with regard to finding an optimal solution for the quantity and
price between bilateral monopolies. They end up concluding that the social
optimal solution can be found only with joint profit optimisation, and that
the price between the parties is a way to share the maximized profit. Vertical
integration5 can be a way to ensure joint profit optimisation and this will be
discussed further below.
Another type of monopoly occurs when the long-run average costs curve
continue to decline when the entire market is covered: these are called natural
monopolies and appear when the production function involves an increasing
return to scale. Infrastructural investments such as railways, roads and energy
transmission are often natural monopolies. This type of infrastructure is often
publicly owned and/or monopoly regulated in order to reduce rent seeking
behaviour with excessive prices. The challenge is that the regulator does not
know the true production costs, and is therefore challenged to discern the
product price. A common monopoly regulation form for utilities in Denmark
is "cost-of-service"-regulation in Danish "hvile-i-sig-selv" and the principle is
that the utility should get the costs covered and nothing else. These utilities are
usually consumer owned, owned by the municipality, the state or something
similar in order to discourage the desire for rent seeking. The utilities are often
monitored by the competition authorities 6 through benchmarking and similar
monitoring. Other regulatory forms are e.g. Cost-plus (costs covered plus a
little profit) or Yardstick regulation (a maximum price set from benchmarks).
4E.g. when a producer has a sole supplier, who only serve this producer.
5When parts of a value chain are merged, in the biogas value chain this could be a vertical
integration between the biogas plant and energy converter: basically meaning that they get the
same owner
6(In the Danish energy case by DERA (Danish Energy Regulatory Authority).
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None of the regulation forms are optimal due to asymmetric information, it is;
however, out of scope for this thesis to discuss any further.
Return to scale
Return to scale refers to how production costs change as the production is
scaled up and down. Constant return to scale follows the assumption, that
production can be scaled up and down in size without affecting production
costs. A common production function applied in micro-economics is the Cobb-
Douglas function and an example of this is presented in equation 3.2. Here
would α+ β = 1 would result in constant return to scale.
Q =AKαLβ ∀α, β ≥ 0 (3.2)
Q is quantity, A, α and β are constants, K is capital input and L is labour input.
Decreasing return to scale would be when α+ β < 1, while α+ β > 1 results in
increasing return to scale also referred to as economy of scale, see [84] chapter 5.
Economy of scale often appears when there is a high degree of fixed costs; for
example, in cases including large infrastructural investments such as in the case
of district heating, where capital expenditures (capex) are a significant part of
the cost function. There are plenty of examples for economy of scale e.g. when
gas pipes are laid down, the highest costs concern the immersion of the pipes,
while the diameter of the pipes is less cost-determinant, it is therefore easy
to double production (in this case capacity through the diameter) without
doubling investment costs. There is in general a tendency towards large
investments that have lower cost per capacity units than smaller investment;
this also counts for biogas investments.
Environmental economics
Several issues are described and discussed within environmental eco-
nomics, and many of these overlap with industrial economics since both theo-
retical areas are founded in micro-economics. Here I will focus on estimation
of externalities and internalisation of externalities.
To estimate the economic value of an externality is complicated as
externalities in nature are unpriced goods and bads. It has not been the scope of
this thesis to perform any estimations on environmental benefits, therefore apart from
this short text below, I will not go into any further details on the estimation of
the economic value of externalities. The purpose of estimating the economic
value can be seen for example in thesocio economic analysis of biogas: to
determine the environmental value of a biogas plant, the production of biogas,
and treatment of manure see e.g. [66, 124, 34]. To estimate the economic value
of an externality can also be a tool for internalising this externality.
Estimates relate to the costs of restoration after an environmental damage
(if possible), adaptation costs or Social Costs of damage. An approach, often
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applied in socio economic analysis and other comparative studies, is to use an
already existing alternative price for a given action. A common example of this
is an approximation of CO2-externality costs to be the CO2-quota price from
the EU-ETS market. The basic assumption behind this is either that the amount
of CO2-quotas have been decided on the basis of the CO2-damage costs or that
an alternative to a given project on CO2-reduction could be to buy CO2-quotas.
In paper D we apply external source estimates of GHG/damage costs. The
cost estimations rely on, respectively, SCC-estimation methods (Social Costs of
Carbon) and projections for CO2-quota prices.
A significant part of environmental economics focusses on the internalisa-
tion of externalities, where an overall principle is that the regulatory tool should
be placed as close to the source as possible. Environmental regulation theory dis-
tinguishes between two types of regulation: Incentive Regulation and Command
And Control regulation, (CAC). Command and control regulation is characterised
as permissions, standards, injunctions or prohibitions; examples within agricul-
ture are limits for fertilisation and number of livestock per hectare. Within the
energy sector, examples include fuel restrictions in the heat– and power sector
combined with co-generation demands or standards for filters on smokestacks,
for example, for heat and power plants. Non-tradable quotas or emission
permissions for e.g. for NOx is also CAC-regulation. Command and control
regulation is an effective tool to remove specific types of pollution, such as
when Danish CHPs were prohibited to emit sulphur dioxide. It is also effi-
cient to ensure a given technological level within a sector, and is for example
abundantly applied within energy saving.
It can, however, due to asymmetric information, be difficult for a regulator
to figure out, where it would be very costly to reduce emissions, and where
emissions could be reduced rather easily. In these cases incentive regulation can
prove to be more efficient.
Incentive regulation entails both taxes and tradable qoutas with regard
to pollution reduction — both tools are currently applied to reduce carbon
emissions. The advantage of incentive regulation is that the polluter is
incentivised to reveal her actual abatement costs under the assumption that
she chooses the cheapest option between abatement (reduce emissions) or
to pay the carbon tax/buy a quota (pollution). There is a large and exciting
literature on this issue, for example, see [84, 53] for a nice introduction and
Hanley, Shogren, and White [54] and Baumol and Oates [4], Baumol and Oates
[5] and Sandmo [113] will provide a more in depth presentation; hereunder, an
introduction to the concept of the double dividend7. For this thesis are taxes and
qoutas taken as given, and the fact that the EU-ETS suffers from oversupply of
7The notion that internalisation of externalities through green taxes can give two dividends,
first the externality is internalised, second, other taxes with high deadweight losses can be removed,
creating another dividend.
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CO2-quotas is applied as background knowledge.
Another way of reducing pollution is to promote alternatives to pollution.
With regard to GHG-reduction this can be to incentivise production of
renewable energy or degassing of manure (manure treatment). Also in this case
incentive regulation can include price mechanisms and quantitative tools. Green
certificates in Sweden and Norway on the electricity system is an example of
the application of a quantitative tool[3]. Green certificates can also be applied
as a price mechanism[2]; green certificates are for example also released for
upgraded biogas in Denmark; however, this certificate only serves as a potential
extra income, as a small feed-in tariff. Danish biogas in general focuses on
price mechanisms in the form of feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums.
Risk and uncertainty
The perfect market is characterised by perfect information and perfect
foresight, meaning that all market participants have all the necessary
information regarding cost and benefits for a given product at present time
and in the future. Risk is not an issue under these conditions, since everything
is known to all parties; however, these are not realistic conditions. The relevant
consideration is therefore what and how much is unknown or put differently
where the risk and how severe it is.
Theory on expected profit presented by e.g. Mas-Colell [84] p. 207,
considers risk by comparing different profit outcomes combined with the
likelihood of reaching each of the potential profit outcomes. Expected profit
then is the sum of potential profits times the likelihood that this outcome will
occur. A simple version of this is presented in eq 3.3 below:
piexpected = α · pilow + (1− α) · pihigh ∀α ∈ [0; 1] (3.3)
Where α represents the risk that the set of parameters will result in low
profits pilow with a given investment, 1 − α represents the chance of pihigh.
The preferences for risk can also be added to the equation in the form of
ρ ∈ [0; 1]. The risk neutral stakeholder would weigh each possible outcome
equally, which in this case would mean that ρ = 0.5 was multiplied with
each possible outcome. Risk averse investors would weigh the bad outcome
higher than the positive outcome; and thereby understand the expected profit
of investments with high risk lower in the profit calculation.
When risk relates to future outcomes, risk can be reduced by reclaiming
investment costs as fast as possible. This can be done by applying a short
depreciation period and/ or to add a risk premium to the interest rate. It is often
assumed that private investors are risk averse, while public investors such as
municipalities, the state and somewhat publicly owned utilities are assumed
to be more risk neutral. Socio-economic investment calculations therefore tend
to have longer depreciation rates than private economic calculations. Similarly,
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interests rates are typically higher in private economic calculations compared to
for socio economic calculations. Both have significant importance for calculating
whether an investment seems profitable or not, in particularly when risk is
included in the calculation.
Risk does not always relate to the future, it can also relate to asymmetric
information between market participants. Two standard terms within micro-
economics are Moral Hazard, that relates to how market participants ensure
that their counterparts act in everyone’s best interest [84]. Examples of this
could in the biogas value chain relate to how the biogas plant secures enough
dry matter content in the manure delivered by the livestock farmers. The other
standard term is adverse selection and relates to which "type" the counterparts
are. Within this thesis adverse selection is particularly interesting in relation to
profit allocation. For example, when production costs form part in the profit
allocation mechanism, and knowledge of good alternatives for the participants
increases bargaining power.
Game theory
Game theory is applied within several areas of micro-economic theory
hereunder industrial and environmental economics as well as cost-and-profit
allocation theory. Game theory can be applied to explain and predict strategic
behaviour and through this to avoid inefficient outcomes.
Game theory was first presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [125]
considering zero-sum games between two and more than two players: their
work developed into non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game
theory. Non-cooperative game theory is founded on the hypotheses of the
rational and self interested agent that optimises for himself, assuming that his
counterparts are just as self interested as himself. John Nash [94] extended
the zero-sum games into non-constant sum games and developed the theory
within non-cooperative game theory by introducing dominant strategies in
order to single out the expected outcome of a given game. A classic example of
a non-cooperative game is the prisoners dilemma formalised by Alfred Tucker8,
where the socially optimal solution (seen from the prisoners viewpoint) would
appeared to be that if nobody talked to the police, both would receive a small
punishment. But the dominant strategy for both parties is to talk to the police
which results in a Nash Equlibrium (NE) where both criminals are incarcerated
for a long time [84, 51]. There is abundant evidence for the prisoners dilemma;
however, criminals do not always tell, and a game theoretic explanation for
8Two criminals are being interrogated separately, knowing that the other criminal is also
interrogated. If he tells the police, the criminal in question will suffer a harsh punishment. If
nobody talks to the police, both will get a small punishment. If the criminal in question tell about
the other criminal, the first go free, unless the other criminal also talked to the police, then both
will be punished with a discount see e.q. [51, 122]
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this is that criminals often work together again and again, which makes the
situation a repeated game.
According to the theory on repeated games, a dominant strategy in a one-
shot game can be transformed into a socially better strategy for all players,
if the game is repeated. This requires that players are informed on 1) which
strategy to choose and 2) that other players will retaliate against deviating
players in the following rounds. This line of thought has to a great extent been
applied in theory on collusion strategies between officially competing firms that
collude to keep prices up in the market. Empirical data show several cases
where collusion agreements have been kept only on oral agreements: all founded
in the risk of retaliation from other collusion members.
Several types of games are applied within game theory, and there is a clear
distinction between static (one stage games), such as the prisoners dilemma,
and sequential (multi stage) games. In static games, choices are made by
the players simultaneously, while choices are made stepwise in sequential
games such as the ultimatum game9. Non-cooperative game theory follows
the hypothesis that in an "ultimatum"-game with multiple rounds and perfect
information one Nash Equilibrium can be found in the first round by the use of
backward induction, meaning that the results from potential future rounds are
included in the suggestions made in the first round.
Empirical studies, however, find that untrained players will not naturally
apply backward induction but tend to concentrate on the first round and
respond independently of the options in the following rounds [64]. Another
assumption in non-cooperative game theory is that players are perfectly rational,
meaning that they will not reject an offer which is better or as good as what they
would alternatively achieve by rejecting, even if the offer is a zero share of the
pie. J. Johnson [64] and other empirical studies [86] find that this assumption
can be difficult to back up, as players tend to retaliate by rejecting the offer,
if they are offered less than what they perceive as fair; even if this result in
an even lower gain. J. Johnson [64] also find that players can be taught to
apply backward induction and that these players tend to adapt their strategy
depending on which type of players they are playing against (perfect rational
or retaliating players). Backward induction is one of the strategic tools we apply
in paper E as part of the decision making for the best choice of value chain
design.
Cooperative game theory is also known as Coalitional game theory and
was also first described by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [125], when they
investigated a zero-sum game with more than two players. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern [125] found that a coalition between two or more players could
9A game where two agents split for example an amount of money or a pie, the first agent
decides the division of the pie and the other agent decide whether to reject or accept; this game can
also be extended, so that if the second agent rejects, she can suggest a new division and so forth.
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result in a better outcome than if they played by themselves; and that a coalition
would be stable if this additional gain was distributed among all members
in such way that all members would gain more from staying in the coalition
than by leaving it. Lemaire [77] argues that to find this distribution is the
same as to solve the cost allocation problem; he further points out that terms
like the core10 and the nucleolus 11 had already been described long before Von
Neumann and Morgenstern. Tijs [121] points out the advantage of applying
game theory within cost-and-profit allocation theory as a mean to include the
strategic aspects into the considerations, they further stress that theoretical
studies are unable to determine what is the best allocation form, as this in the
end depend on preferences.
Nash [95] define a cooperative game as a game where individuals are able to
agree on a joint plan of action and that this plan is enforceable. An overall challenge
for cooperative games is that it is difficult to find one unique solution to a game
and that it often is pointless to set up a strict set of rules for the game set-up or
as Nash [95] puts it:
"Rather than solve the two-person cooperative game by analysing the bargaining
process, one can attack the problem axiomatically by stating general properties that
"any reasonable solution" should possess. By specifying enough such properties one
excludes all but one solution." — John Nash
This approach is very similar to the evaluation criteria applied within cost-
and-profit allocation theory [9, 60]. Within cost-and-profit allocation theory are
applied axioms in line with the axioms presented within classic cooperative
game theory (for an example, see [95]); and also social criteria such as degrees
of equality or fairness [60], notions which are also connected to cooperative
game theory in recent years [85]. In paper E we focus on the fairness criteria
Equality and Individual Rationality, this is explained further in section 3.3.
Ownership structures in the value chain and vertical integration
The economic worth of each step in the value chain is not always clear to
estimate. Some intermediate products may be priced in a transparent market,
others may be priced bilaterally between the partners in the value chain. A
solution to difficult price estimation can be vertical integration, where parts of
the value chain are merged, which thereby potentially decreases the need for
pricing in the value chain.
Vertical integration can be considered as a problem if it limits competition
and leads to deadweight losses through power abuse; literature on these
problems are extensive (see e.g. [122, 78, 105, 106]), and large parts of the
European energy markets are therefore regulated in order to reduce existing
10Allocations within the core are stable, as the core only contain those allocations where no set of players
in the coalition are all better off if they break the coalition to form another coalition.
11Is an allocation mechanism that per definition is within the core.
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vertical integration [74]. It is however, also argued that vertical integration can
increase efficiency in value chains by avoiding sub-optimisation (see e.g. [119,
13]).
Biogas value chains in Denmark and Norway are in paper C compared
with regard to regulation and structural conditions. The degree of vertical
integration in the paper, disregarded with the assumption that the exact
ownership structure is irrelevant for that analysis.
The level of integration can, however, play a role in the design of the
value chain, and it may not always be possible to integrate each entity of the
value chain vertically. There is in Denmark a large variation in the ownership
structures of the biogas value chains. This can be due to lack of capital, so for
example farmers who wanted to build a biogas plant were unable to invest in
the entire value chain; or for example a CHP, was not allowed to invest in a
biogas plant due to monopoly regulation.
The main theme of paper E is to understand some of the potential effects on
the value chain when there is an underlying interdependence between owners
in order to receive support. Vertical integration could be an option to avoid
conflicts on profit allocation; however, as mentioned above, this would not
clarify the challenges when vertical integration is not an option. The approach
in paper E is to consider an optimal value chain design assuming joint profit
maximisation, then consider a number of profit allocation mechanisms for a
potential cooperative. When potential profits and profit allocations are found,
are these results evaluated, taking strategic considerations into account, to find
the likely effects on the value chain design.
Horizontal integration - cooperatives - cost and profit allocation
Horizontal integration can be an option, as an alternative for two firms to
compete. A merger can bring scale advantages, and if the merged firm is
adequately large, it can become a price setter instead of a price taker. The
economy is full of horizontal integration, and in order to avoid too large firms
with monopoly behaviour, countries and regions such as the EU often have
limitations on mergers. The United States has historically had a particularly
harsh regulation in this field.
An alternative to mergers are cooperatives, where a group of smaller
producers cooperate on parts of the value chain. Danish agriculture has a
long tradition for this with slaughterhouse and dairy production; cooperatives
owned by the farmers delivering livestock and milk for processing and sale as a
unified vendor [9]. Such cooperatives often include various producer types and
with asymmetric information can it be challenging to find the optimal cost-and-
profit allocation that ensures optimal production and still keeps the relevant
producers in the cooperative. Cooperative game theory and in particular cost-
and-profit allocation theory deals with these challenges. This will be presented
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further in section 3.3.
3.2 Internalisation of externalities
A focus in environmental economics regarding energy is on the extensive usage
of fossil fuels with the well known externality of GHG-emissions increasing
world wide climate change. Several policy instruments have been investigated
and applied in order to reduce the use of fossil fuels and to increase the use of
alternative fuels. Fossil fuels are e.g. taxed or large fossil fuel consumers have
imposed quotas on CO2-emissions. Furthermore, renewable energy sources
(RES) are supported through support schemes with incentives for the targeted
producers. My work regarding biogas policy is founded in environmental
economic theory presented by for example [113, 10, 120, 54, 4, 5] and applied
environmental– and energy economics [130, 73, 72, 99, 75, 38, 3, 3] on the one
hand and biogas specific literature on the other. A literature study on biogas
regulation has been performed in paper C; here I only mention a few examples.
Raven and Gregersen [109] made a comparative assessment between biogas
development in the Netherlands and Denmark, pinpointing among other
things the importance of long-term support and the following reduced risk for
investors; Lantz, Svensson, Björnsson, and Börjesson [76] analyse the regulatory
landscape for biogas in Sweden and acknowledge the complexity of biogas
production, which complicates the regulatory analysis. Others apply existing
regulation in the analyses and assess the results from a private economic
perspective such as e.g. Delzeit and Kellner [33] or from a socio-economic
perspective such as e.g. Jacobsen, Laugesen, and Dubgaard [66].
Biogas production is to a high degree affected by regulation directly pointed
towards the biogas production itself as well as regulation directed towards
the adjacent sectors or sectors that are part of the biogas value chain. The
focus in this thesis has been to obtain a better understanding of the policy effect on
profitability in the value chain and which policy instruments are best to reach a policy
target. For this the economics of biogas regulation and risk have been addressed
throughout the papers in this dissertation, following the same approaches as
briefly presented above.
Support schemes and risk
Danish biogas regulation consists of both feed-in tariffs and feed-in
premiums. The feed-in tariff is a subsidy for a given product instead of a price;
in the case of biogas CHP’s can entirely be fuelled by biogas (directly fed into
the CHP) choose freely between a feed-in tariff or –premium. The advantage
of the feed-in tariff is that it eliminates risk, as the producer knows exactly
what income she receives for each kWh produced. Instead, the regulator takes
the risk of price changes by receiving the electricity (or any other commodity),
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to sell on the market. The feed-in premium consists of an additional subsidy
added to the market price: the feed-in premium is applied in the case of CHP’s
producing on both biogas and natural gas and when gas is upgraded. In
the case of feed-in premiums, the producers are carrying the risk of price
changes, and the advantage of this is that those (the producers), who can react
on price changes, will be those who have the advantage of reacting. The amount
of produced biogas can only be changed slowly (over weeks) and local storage
is expensive. Therefore, when electricity is produced entirely on the basis of
biogas it can be difficult to respond to any price signals from the fast changing
electricity market. It would therefore make little sense to incentivise the price
responses from CHP’s fuelled entirely on biogas; hence, the feed-in tariff12.
Gas prices are not as volatile as the electricity prices (see 2.5); historically gas
prices have varied with the seasons, a pattern that is less significant now, but
it will overall be easier to predict price changes in gas and react accordingly.
This could be an argument for the use of feed-in premiums for biomethane,
however, biogas producers are usually aiming for total usage of all capacity,
both due to high investment costs and production efficiency. Therefore, they
may not react to price signals from the market. Instead, they may agree on a
fixed price for the biomethane with a gas shipper in order to reduce risk.
An argument for the use of feed-in tariffs compared to feed-in premiums is
that the regulator can, to a higher degree, be considered as risk neutral, where
biogas producers more often could be expected to be risk averse, and thereby
set higher value on secure investments compared to risk neutral agents, as
described in section 3.1. Kitzing and Weber [73] show that in the case of wind
power, where production is volatile and difficult to control, support via feed-in
premiums will have to be higher than total support given in the form of feed-in
tariffs (tariff cost minus electricity income) to reach the same result. This is
due to the additional risk imposed on the wind power producer in the case of
feed-in premiums.
Though gas prices are less volatile from hour to hour, prices still vary over
years. Figure 3 in paper E presents a significant price span, where average
prices were approximately 31 Euro/MWh in 2013 and 15 Euro/MWh in 2016.
The Danish biogas feed-in tariff is to some extent taking this into consideration
as some of the feed-in tariff is determined by the natural gas price from the
year before.
12CHP’s fuelled on both natural gas and biogas will to a larger degree be able to react on price
signals, as natural gas can supplement production during price peaks or extra heat demand: these
production plants only receive a feed-in premium.
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3.3 Allocation theory applied on the value chain
The Danish biogas value chain is characterised by that one part of the value
chain receives support; contingent on that a set of restrictions should have
been obeyed in other parts of the value chain. This can become a challenge, if
different agents own parts of the value chain.
As an outsider, trying to understand the significance of the biogas
regulation, it can be challenging to deduce all aspects, when the allocation of
profits are unknown and data on the internal prices within the value chain are
scarce. The approach has predominantly been to consider a larger part of the
value chain as one corporate entity and let the profit allocation within the value
chain be an unknown factor.
In paper E we decided to take a step deeper into the considerations made
within the value chain. In this case we divided the owners into two subgroups
containing a) the necessary owners to obtain support and b) the unnecessary
owners, as presented in figure 3.1.
Several consideration were made in the preparation of the analysis made in
paper E. One option was to investigate vertical integration as a theme, however,
a challenge with this approach was that the ownership structures in current
biogas value chains vary significantly and the exact structure is affected by
issues such as capital constraints and monopoly regulation. This means that
Vertical integration might not even be an option in some value chains, while it
already has happened in other chains. Finally, this kind of analysis may not say
much about strategies within the chain – only try to eliminate sub-optimisation.
Another path could be to consider the challenges between bilateral
monopolies, this was indirectly included in the analyses. The cornerstones
of the analysis became profit allocation theory and strategic measures from
gamethory; in particularly cooperative game theory became relevant for the
analysis.
Profit allocation schemes without initial integration
Cost- and profit allocation theory can be considered as an alternative to
horizontal integration and includes both strategic considerations as formalised
in cooperative game theory [95, 60] and more pragmatic considerations as e.g.
formulated by Bogetoft and Olesen [9]. Unique optimums are not in focus
within this theory, instead are allocations mechanisms designed to satisfy a set
of axioms [95] or fairness criteria [9, 60] obeying general criteria for a typical
cooperative such as e.g. equality[60] and more pragmatic/specific criteria
referring to specific cooperatives [9]. Bogetoft and Olesen [9] presents a long list
of potentially relevant criteria depending on the type of cooperative hereunder
including how to avoid the risk of defection from some owners; others present
the fairness criteria at a more general level see e.g. [121, 60].
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Two fairness criteria; equality and individual rationality, are considered in
most cooperative game theoretic literature related to (cost) allocation see e.g.
[121, 9, 49, 114, 87, 60], and the allocation mechanisms applied in paper E are
in particular evaluated according to these fairness criteria.
Equality can be interpreted in many ways. Denmark has a long tradition for
cooperative movements in the agricultural sector, and "one man—one vote"
was a general principle in these cooperatives. Non-cooperative game theory
follows the hypothesis that the rational agent in a one shot ultimatum game (see
also section 3.1) would offer the other agent a zero share of the pie, which the
rational agent would accept. Several empirical studies show that most people
does not take the entire cake, and if they do the other part would retaliate and
not accept the offer. McCain [86] presents this as an argument for including
social norms and reciprocity motives into the cooperative game theory and
thereby get closer to the empirical findings. Hougaard [60] argues that equality
in some form, e.g. direct equality or maximin equality, can be found in most
large religions and thereby social norms.
Another important element of homo economicus is individual rationality: "Does
it make sense to join in? Or is there a better alternative?". The vague version of
this is that the individual gain for each owner of a given allocation mechanism
should at least not be negative. This is formulated in eq 3.4
pialloco ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O (3.4)
Where pialloco refer to the profit for owner o, with a given allocation
mechanism. It may however not be enough to comply with eq 3.4 in order
to ensure stable collaboration. Truett and Truett [123] argues that one specific
price between two parties can be found and the bargaining power between the
two parties contribute in determining this price. The bargaining power can
depend on the level of information between the parties in the value chain [107]
or a maybe more important factor is how dependent each participant is on the
collaboration. This dependency can be approximated from the best alternative
for each participant.
The best alternative (often referred to as the stand-alone profit) is highly
relevant with regard to profit allocation. Due to Individual Rationality is an
allocation mechanism unstable if the profit allocated to a coalition part is below
her stand-alone profit. Furthermore, a profit allocation is stable if it is within
the core, where the core is the set of allocations where profits are more beneficial for
all group members compared to stand-alone profits or profits in another coalition[9].
Fairness criteria can be applied to rank the allocation mechanisms. Some
fairness criteria can be considered as must haves, while others may be considered
as nice to have. Allocation mechanisms that includes most of the important
criteria in the best matter can be ranked as better than other mechanisms. The
importance of each criteria is subjective and depend on the allocation problem.
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The purpose of using the payment schemes and the fairness criteria in
paper E is to understand the current development in biogas production, by
considering potential profit allocations and through the best alternatives to get
a pictures of the potential bargaining power of the actors in the value chain.
Payment schemes
Within the allocation– and cooperative game theoretic literature are several
(cost) allocation mechanisms presented and tested both theoretically, e.g. [121,
114, 87, 86, 60] and empirically [85, 49, 79, 93] The proportional allocation
mechanism is an example of an allocation where profits are allocated in
accordance with cost [60]; this could be in proportion to total costs, capital
costs or other. Other payment schemes focus more directly on the egalitarian
principle such as the egalitarian method, where profit is divided equally
between all parties in the cooperative [121, 77, 85]. The Shapley rule is designed
from the cooperative gains, that each part has contributed with [77, 85, 49].
While the nucleolus payment scheme includes Incentive Rationality (IR) in
the profit allocation, as it depend on the alternative profit of the marginal
participant [85, 114, 49].
Most of these allocation mechanisms are designed as alternatives for
horizontal integration of homogeneous producer types with slightly different
properties and where each co-owner to a large extent is replaceable. Examples
of this outside the biogas value chain could be a cooperation of wood suppliers
[49] or a collaboration among liquefied natural gas suppliers [85]. Within the
biogas value chain it could be the cooperative between the Madsen brothers13
[82] or a suppliers association between the livestock farmers, which would be
considered as one part of the value chain but would in itself be a cooperation
of farmers. In such a cooperative the producers would be homogeneous with
slightly different properties, such as distance from the plant, type of manure
and content of dry matter in the manure. A good allocation scheme for such
cooperatives would probably include incentives to deliver a high dry matter
content.
The value chain presented in figure 3.1 represent rather heterogeneous
parties: Livestock farmers as one group, the plant and the energy converter
and the closest alternative to cooperation is vertical integration. This means that
the allocation mechanisms described above may not be applied in the same
way, as the effect from defection is another for the value chain. This became a
challenge in paper E, when it should be decided which allocation mechanisms
to be select. It is possible to apply well known allocation mechanisms including
an element of equality, however if IR should be taken into account such as
13Three brothers each own a farm, and together they own a biogas plant and an upgrading
facility
36
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
it is in the nucleolus, it became necessary to alter the allocation mechanism
significantly.
Applied mechanisms and discussion
The three allocation mechanisms presented below are not expected to be the exact
allocation mechanisms applied in real world value chains, however, it is considered
as likely that chosen allocation mechanisms will include an element of equality
(each owner is important), proportionality (if you risk much, you should gain
much) and an element of individual rationality (if your alternatives are good,
you have better bargaining power). The application of all three allocation
mechanisms therefore give a sample space within which real world allocations
are likely to be. The allocation results were therefore not applied as final results
but made a sample space of potential profit gains for each owner in the chain
formed part of an initial conclusion together with expectations to bargaining
power. This together provided an opening for a discussion and understanding
of the current development in the Danish biogas sector.
The Full Equality method can also be referred to as direct equality or e.g.
the egalitarian method. Profits with this profit allocation method will be shared
equally between the owners; irrespective of their contribution to the profit. The
constraint for the full equality allocation is represented below:
piEgo =
1
| O |
∑
o′∈O
piEgo′ ∀o ∈ O (3.5)
Here the profit piEgo of each owner o, will be a an equal share of the total profit
for all owners
∑
piEgo′ .
Advantages of this allocation method are that it is easy to calculate and
comprehend, while the need for input data is rather limited; moreover it
will be formulated the same way independently of whether the owners
are homogeneous in the sense as a cooperative of livestock farmers or
heterogeneous as a cooperative of different value chain actors.
The disadvantages of this method could be, that it does not take the fairness
criteria Individual Rationality into the calculation and even though the need of
data is limited, there will be a risk of over reporting of costs (adverse selection).
Furthermore, it is not self-evident that the fairness criteria equality is fulfilled.
If all owners in the value chain share the same cost-level this mechanism could
be considered fairly equal. However, if one owner is the primary cost bearer,
she would also bear the highest risk using this mechanism, which may not be
considered fair.
The proportionality mechanism is not as simple as full equality; instead it
takes the cost burden into consideration by allocating the profits according to
each of the owners costs, e.g. total costs, CAPEX or OPEX. Which costs, profits
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are allocated according to, could be determined by the dominating cost factor,
risk or something else.
The proportionality allocation is presented below:
piPropo = αC
∗
o ∀o ∈ O (3.6)
Where α is the percentage of the cost C∗o that can be covered for each of the
non-substrate owners.
The advantage of the proportionality mechanism is that it is rather simple
to calculate, and the data need is not substantially higher, than in the case of
full Equality. A disadvantage of the mechanism is that it suffers somewhat
from adverse selection, since owners have an incentive to boost their own
costs in order the achieve a higher share of total profits. Another advantage of
the method is that it does take the risk of costs into consideration; this at the
same time means, that the method does not reflect, when all parts of the value
chain are necessary to gain support. Furthermore, incentive rationality is not
represented in the allocation mechanism.
The Individual rationality mechanism is inspired by the nucleolus
allocation mechanism. In the traditional nucleolus all combinations of
participating owners and their alternative profits are utilised in the allocation,
and profit for each owner is found by maximising the distance, λ from the
obtained profit, piNuo to the alternative profit, piALTo for all relevant subsets, S of
the participating owners, o, see [9]. This is represented in equation 3.7:
∑
o∈S
piNuo −
∑
o∈S
piALTo ≥ λ ∀S ⊂ O \ ∅ (3.7)
The owners in the traditional nucleolus are of the same type, see e.g. [49],
and the operability of the collaboration would therefore not be relying on each
owner individually. The Individual rationality mechanism is a simplification
of the nucleolus and is applied for a group of owners under the assumption
that the group of owners, cannot be reduced, and if one owner opt out, the
remaining owners will form a smaller cooperation.
For the individual rationality mechanism the distance is maximised from the
obtained profit to the alternative profit the owner would get by not participating.
All subsets of the chain is left out of the calculation; giving the constraint for
the individual rationality cost allocation:
piIRo − piALTo ≥ λ ∀o ∈ O (3.8)
The advantage of this allocation mechanism is that the obtained solution
will be within the core, meaning that all owners are better of when they are
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participating in the value chain, compared to be by themselves. The principle
can seem more fair as it is likely to yield a more equal allocation than the
proportional principle. On the downside however, costs are not taken into
consideration and the risk of adverse selection is even higher than for the
proportional mechanism, since the need of data is high and the allocation
mechanism gives incentives for dishonest reporting on the best alternative.
The purpose of the analysis was to understand the strategic considerations
related to profit allocation and the following choices made by the owners,
before (ex ante) and after (ex post) investments are made in the value chain.
In paper E we find the best alternatives for the important parties in the value
chain — both before investments and ex post. The potential profits from
different value chain designs, profit allocations together with ex ante- and ex
post considerations are then compared. Conclusions on probable strategic
choices are then drawn through the application of backward induction14.
14A method from game theory, where a player in time t takes possible outcomes in time t+1
into consideration for her choices in time t
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RESEARCH METHODS
Methods applied in this thesis, have been used in order to get a better
understanding of the economic incentives affecting the optimising agents
surrounding and at the biogas plant. For this, I have both used sheer case
based calculations as well as optimisation models.
Perspectives Methods Paper
A
Paper B Paper
C
Paper
D
Paper E
Quantitative
models
Excel simulations x x x
Optimisation x x
Sensitivity x x x
Policy
instru-
ments
Quantitative
implementation
x x x x
Qualitative
assessment
x x x
Comparative
analyses
x x x
Value
Chain
extent
Plant level x x x
Value chain x x
Profit allocation x
Table 4.1: Methods and perspectives applied in the papers
As presented in table 4.1 quantitative models are applied as a basis for
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analyses in all papers, often combined with sensitivity analyses for the most
critical parameters. A large part of my work has been to analyse the effect of
current regulation implemented in my models; and compare results with the
reality in order to suggest policy changes.
In the sections below, I present my approach regarding the quantitative
models and the inclusion of the surrounding regulation. Some regulation is
included as cost, income or a restriction for the model; other regulation will
have to be considered specifically throughout the analyses.
4.1 Quantitative models
Most of the papers in this thesis are based on the theory of microeconomic
optimisation, some analyses have been case-based excel simulations, while
others were based on an investment- and production optimising model
presented below. In paper D, a socio-economic analysis is performed with
an energy systems model.
Calculating
Optimizing
Private economic Socio economic
Excel case based
Paper A,B,C
Plant optimization
Paper D,E
Energy system optimization
Paper D
Figure 4.1: Quantitative models
One year is considered in all quantitative models, where investments are
distributed along the expected lifetime of the investment following an annuity,
using the equation 4.1.
CCapexx = P =
r ∗ PV
1− (1 + r)−n (4.1)
Where P corresponds to the periodic payment, which in our models are
considered as the yearly payment also described as CAPEX. PV represent the
present value of the investment, at the beginning of the period, while r is the
yearly interest rate and n corresponds to the number of payment periods, in this
case the expected technical lifetime of the investment. The private economic
analyses are all calculated for an average year in line with e.g. [100, 131, 52,
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33], while the socio-economic analysis performed in the energy systems model
Balmorel is calculated for the year 2025. The argument for using 2025, is that
we wanted to investigate the nearer future, and still include new investments
in the modelling.
For both the private economic– and socio-economic analyses we have used
the national recommendations for socio-economic analyses [24] with regard
to the interest rate. Biogas production is fairly capital intensive, so results are
quite influenced by assumptions regarding interest rate and lifetime. There are
good arguments for using higher or lower interest rates and shorter lifetime,
however, actual feasibility has been of less focus in this thesis, instead, I have
mostly considered comparative feasibility, and for this prevails the argument
of consistency by using the national recommendations.
Case simulations of profit in excel
In the papers A, B and C analyses are performed with a comparative focus,
where few things are changed and everything else is being equal. Profits are not
maximised, however, transport costs are minimised given scale and input mix
in all models. In paper A and B, nine cases are compared, only with variations
in size and input mix, where the objective of the model in these papers is to
analyse the effects from these variations in inputmix and scale. The economic
model is basically presented by the equations 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
piplant = INCplant − Cplant (4.2)
Where pi is the profit, INC is the income and C are costs. Income is described
by:
INCplant =
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈K
inci,k ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ K (4.3)
Where I = output = gas, digestate and K = types of income = commodity
price, subsidy, certificate price..... Costs are described by:
Cplant =
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
cj,l +
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
ci,l ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J , l ∈ L (4.4)
Where J = input = manure, co-substrates, I = output = gas, digestate and L
= types of costs = transport, OPEX and Capex for pre-treatment, plant, storages,
after-treatment and so on.
In paper C two biogas value chains are compared for both Norway and
Denmark. Here, the unified profit of the most relevant parties in the biogas
value chains are compared, in order to include the most relevant regulation
and still keep the story clear. This basically changes e.g. 4.2 to eg. 4.5.
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pivalue chain = INCvalue chain − Cvalue chain (4.5)
In this case scale, costs and input mix are kept almost constant, while
regulation and structural conditions vary.
Optimisation models
Two optimisation models are applied in this thesis, the plant level model
presented in [68] using integer programming and the energy systems model
Balmorel [110] using linear programming.
Plant level model
The plant level model is a biogas plant optimisation model that optimises the
profit of the biogas plant or a pre-defined part of the biogas value chain.
Max pi = INC − C (4.6)
S.t. Cost and Income (4.7)
The plant level model optimises profits for the entire value chain. This
includes transport costs, storage, pretreatment, temporary storages, the biogas
plant, after storages, after treatment in the form of cleaning as well as end
uses in what is referred to as energy conversion in the papers. Energy
conversion refer to upgrading (hereunder several technologies), Heat- and
power production (CHP) or heat production. I contributed among other things
to decisions regarding which relevant energy converters to include, regulatory
constraints, taxes and subsidies. The time resolution in the model divided in
such way that the input side is weekly while the output side is hourly.
The development of the plant level model was initiated in the beginning of
the Biochain project, where data was collected while main inputs- and outputs
were decided. The foundation for the economic model applied in the plant
level model was the economic model which I prepared for the excel-model
applied in paper A and B, and the initial data set was also the same as for the
excel-model. Based on the results from paper A and B it was decided that the
plant level model should include economy of scale, this was included through
the application of integer programming.
The plant level model is applied in paper E, where a pre-defined part of the
value chain is optimised using cost prices between each part of the value chain.
Profits are then allocated through various methods presented in section 3.3, by
using a profit allocation add-on developed for the plant level model. The plant
level model is also applied in paper D in order to find a representative biogas
cost to use as input in Balmorel.
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Balmorel
The energy system model, Balmorel [110, 129] is applied in paper D. Here
the objective is to analyse the socio-economic optimal use of raw biogas and
biomethane in the Danish energy system, given the calculated biogas cost and
climate gas emissions in CO2-equivalents, estimated in [128, 127]. Balmorel
is a technology rich, bottom-up, partial equilibrium model in which one can
analyse the effect of various changes in the energy system and choose to
optimise investments, given assumptions on future energy demand. Balmorel
is adoptable to any choice of geography, however, it is mostly applied in the
Nordic and Baltic countries. An advantage of the model is that the existing
capacities are well represented on a detailed level; furthermore the model is
flexible and can be extended with several add-ons. For this paper the model
was operated in investment mode (BB2)and the model was given the possibility
to utilise different fuels in one conversion technology with the add-on called
combtech. This was relevant in relation to paper D, as upgraded biogas could
then be applied in natural gas turbines reflecting the real energy system. In the
version of Balmorel that we applied are profits not maximised, instead total
system costs are minimised given the exogenous final energy demand, fuel availability,
emissions1 and a lot of other restrictions.
TIMES-DK and EnergyPLAN are some of the immediate alternatives to
Balmorel. Some of the overall characteristics of the three models are presented
in table 4.2. The table is taken from [15] table 3-5 and combined with
updated knowledge, and for the TIMES-DK has the general properties from
TIMES/MARKAL been fitted the properties for TIMES-DK.
One significant difference between Balmorel and EnergyPLAN is the
lack of investment optimisation in the EnergyPLAN model, this was a clear
disadvantage for our analysis in paper D where we specifically wanted to go
forward in time to allow the model to take new investments into consideration
in the optimisation.
TIMES-DK would have been applicable to perform an analysis with both
investment and operational optimisation. A potential disadvantage of the model
would be the 32 time-slices which are currently designed for TIMES-DK that
follows a specific profile matching analysis for the Danish electricity system.
These specific time-slices could be less applicable for the investigation of short
term storage and thereby the potential flexibility advantages from gas fired
CHP’s. This flexibility advantage could be relevant to capture in relation to
biomethane in a future system with even more inflexible wind- and solar power
compared to today. We were furthermore under the impression that biogas
would be better represented in Balmorel compared to TIMES-DK at the point
in time, where this paper was initiated. TIMES-DK on the other hand would
1If emission costs are associated or an emission cap has been defined
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Type Balmorel EnergyPLAN TIMES/MARKAL
Type Simulation Yes Yes Yes
Scenario Yes Yes Yes
Bottom-up Yes Yes Yes
Operations opt. Yes Yes Yes
Investment opt. Yes - Yes
Types of analy-
sis
Timeframe Max 50 years 1 year Max 50 years
Time-step hourly hourly Using time slices
Energy sectors
considered
Electricity Yes Yes Yes
Heat Yes Yes Yes
Transport - Yes Yes
Table 4.2: Model comparison
probably give a better representation of the industry and transport sectors
which are relevant with regard to gas consumption - in particularly within
green transport.
A determining argument for applying Balmorel were the available add-ons.
In our case the already described combtech add-on, which fitted well with
our wish to analyse how natural gas consumption could be replaced with
Biomethane under the right circumstances. There is furthermore a large degree
of flexibility in programming of the model, it was for example possible to
tailor the code for our analyses by creating a combined target for biogas and
Biomethane.
Socio-economics in Balmorel
Balmorel performs an economic optimisation with a simplistic representation
of a socio-economic analysis. The socio-economic optimisation is a cost-based
analysis, where national taxes and subsidies are omitted. Costs used in the
model are mainly expected market prices (excluding taxes and subsidies). In
the recommendations for socio-economic analyses in Denmark, these market
prices are usually increased with the net-tax factor and additional public
spending are increased even further with a tax deadweight loss factor. The basic
idea behind the net-tax factor is that resources used in the given project could
alternatively have been used on other projects, where the costs on average
would have been taxed by the net-tax factor. If the given projects end up with
a public net deficit, this deficit should be weighed with costs of increasing a tax
somewhere else in the public economy - corresponding to the tax deadweight
loss factor [24]. The basic assumption for Balmorel is that the entire system
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optimises as if it was owned by one benevolent system manager, with the
purpose of minimising total system costs under a given set of restrictions.
A private economic analysis in Balmorel includes taxes and support
schemes providing the model with the actual prices that each technology
faces and thereby actual costs for the varying producers competing in the
system. Balmorel still entail the total system optimisation approach and will
therefore not capture any sub optimisations from the real world - however it
will give a picture of how well technologies compete among each other. A
private economic analysis is e.g. relevant if you want to investigate the impact
of a given regulation in relation to a specific technology. The focus in paper D
was however to consider the externality of reduced CO2-emission, which was
why we applied the socio-economic version of the model.
Model discussions in a broader sense
The benefit of optimisation models is the received assistance from the
model to find the best available solution for the optimising agent. This is
in particular practical, when there are many variables to combine in a range of
ways. A challenge with single objective optimising models such as e.g. linear–
optimisation models, is that the model usually find one optimal (corner point)
solution, which may be highly sensitive to few changes in the input data; this
was e.g. shown in paper E. Models do not have to be linear, however, each time
the linearity is abandoned, the complexity of the model increases, which again
increases calculation time. An example is the plant level model, where integer
programming is introduced in order to implement economy of scale for plant
investments, but most of the model is kept linear, in order to keep calculation
time down. A method to test the robustness of the results is to perform proper
sensitivity analyses around the solution.
Optimisation models are relevant for a great variety of analyses: to find the
best choice out of many options, and through sensitivity analyses to analyse
the effect of parameter changes; however, with this kind of models you have
to perform additional analyses, if you want test the robustness of your results
as this will only appear if you change your inputs or restrict your model. If
on the other hand you are interested in a group of specific cases it can be just
as effective with a far less complicated case-based simulation model, which
has been the case in the papers A, B and C. The Danish case in paper C was,
however, chosen based on an optimised input mix found in the plant model.
In the choice between a plant level model and an energy system model
it has been considered, which analyses should be made. The energy system
models can incorporate a high degree of opportunities for the energy usage, but,
when biogas only counts for a small part of the entire energy system, it becomes
difficult to see the effect on output if input changes. Furthermore, it becomes
necessary to simplify the input options in order not to drown in additional
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calculations and data needs. For most of the papers in this dissertation, focus
has been on the biogas plant as the center of the value chain and with this focus
only few analyses seemed to fit an energy system model. One example could
be an analysis of the advantage of upgrading, where biomethane produced in
one part of the country, can be consumed in the other part of the country. This
would be difficult to capture in a plant level model.
The choice between static and dynamic models is another consideration,
where a dynamic model in this case is defined as containing the possibility to
include a rolling horizon. The models applied in this thesis have primarily been
in a static form. The advantage of a dynamic model at plant level could be the
option of allowing for new investments in e.g. pretreatment capacity, adapting
to price changes on inputs. Calculation time is an issue which modellers
always consider when the model is designed; and calculation time tend to
increase significantly when the model goes from static to dynamic. In our case
it was concluded that the benefits from a dynamic model could not outperform
the lower calculation time from the static model —supplied with sensitivity
analysis. Similar conclusions were made in the considerations on including
stochastics on electricity– and natural gas prices in the plant level model. In
this case a risk analysis convinced us not to include stochastics, as gas– and
electricity prices comprise a relatively small part of the biogas income due to
the high level of support.
It is possible to apply the energy systems model Balmorel in a dynamic form
with rolling horizon, it has not been deemed relevant though. The dynamic
part of the model can show when a given investment will be most profitable,
given variable input prices and demands throughout a set of years. This was
not the main focus in paper D, which is why the dynamic functionality was not
applied. In general it has not been considered relevant to apply more dynamics
in the analyses performed for this thesis.
4.2 Data: challenges and choices
Emphasis has been on finding data that reflect the actual cases worked on
for illustrative reasons, and data that are within the range of what is found
elsewhere in the literature.
In Denmark there are data from official sources2 on energy demand and
prices on electricity, natural gas and other fuels. Even heat prices are officially
presented through public statistics to make up for the lack of an actual heat
market [41]. Furthermore, there are data for a large variety of technologies with
regard to investment cost and operational expenditures as well as data on sizes
2Official sources are here defined as open public sources such as Danish Energy Agency,
Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, Energinet, SKAT, Environmental Protection Agency and
similar
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Data type Sources Uncertainty Decision
Energy
prices
Electricity
(h)a
Nord Pool
spot
low (DK)b
Focus on actual data sources when
available
Heat (y) DERA low(lo)
Fuel prices Gas (d) Gaspoint
nordic and
DEA
low(DK)
Other fuels
(biomass,
coal etc.)
DEA low to
medium(DK)
With no direct source we apply a
common applied source for
consistency with other scientific
work
Biomass
input
manure,
straw etc.
Seges high(lo) Best available data, see also in text
Investment
and
production
costs
Energy
converterc
Technology
cata-
logue[25]
medium(int) This source is considered as fairly
secure and updated; it is applied
for all available technologies
Biogas
plant
Biogas
taskforced
medium
high (DK)
By applying almost the same data
as the Biogas taskforce we ensured
consistency with other work
Pre-
treatment
Seges high (lo) Best available data, see also in text
Carbon,
current
and
projections
EU-ETS
prices
DEA medium(int)
to high
DEA has access to actual
spot-prices and provide
consistency nationally and
internationally in their prognosis
Cost
estimates
Bergh and
Botzen [6]
high(int) Review paper applied by climate
scientists gave a large spectrum of
possible costs, we applied the
highest and one of the lower
estimates to provide a range
a(h) means hourly data, (d) means daily, (y) means yearly and so forth
b (int) means international data, (DK) means Danish or national, (lo) means local
csuch as upgrading technologies, CHP, Heatboiler...
d see also the section on investment and operational costs
Table 4.3: Data sources, degree of uncertainty and decision
and efficiencies. All these data have been applied in various ways throughout
this thesis, and when available have these sources been preferred. These data
have typically also applied by other scientists which increases transparency
and the opportunities to compare data.
In table 4.3 I present most of the general data, I have applied in my papers
together with the primary source, how uncertain I perceive the data and my
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primary argument for applying this source. More exhaustive presentations are
provided in the papers; here I focus on three overall data types and three types
of data sources. These are data from applicants applying for investment grants
for biogas plants, Biochain project partners and Danish reports and statistics.
It is not as easy to find standardised data on biogas production, in particular
are prices and availability of inputs highly depended on local conditions,
therefore are most data related to biogas production found within Danish
literature and even with focus on specific areas. Data in the papers both rely on
raw data from the Biogas Taskforce, their reports and our own calculations on
the basis of reports and papers. These data have been compared to data from
other sources, when possible.
Investment and operational costs
Data from official sources have in general been preferred to data from
specific stakeholders, in order to make our results as comparable as possible.
Furthermore, when possible we have tried to apply several sources and
compare data.
Plant production costs are based on OPEX and CAPEX reported by plants
that applied for funds from the temporarily earmarked investment fund; set
up for biogas plant investments as a part of the Danish Energy Agreement
in 2012 [27]. Data was treated and compared to the calculations made by the
Biogas Taskforce report on biogas usage in the heat and power sector[35]. To
linearise data we have applied the same break points as in [68]. These data may
be biased by the applicants, however the utilised data only include data from
plants who actually received support, and thereby are considered as realistic
by the evaluation board. An advantage of the data is that they have been
applied by the biogas Tastforce and other scientists as eq. [67]. This increases
the consistency in results between us, and others.
For the value chain calculations we have furthermore included production
costs for biomass input, for this it was not possible to obtain data from official
sources. Instead we relied on our partner in the Biochain project: SEGES
which is an agricultural consultancy also working with biogas production.
SEGES developed a model to calculate biomass production costs together with
pre-treatment costs. These data were collected and treated by people with
experience within this area which increases the validity of the data.
Data on output production costs and efficiencies could to some extent be
found in the official technology catalogue [25], in other cases we had to find
other sources for specific data, this is further described in the relevant papers.
The exact usage of data has varied a bit through the papers I therefore refer to
them for further explanations.
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Figure 4.2: OPEX and CAPEX for the biogas plant is based on a fitted trendline.
Prices on goods with no official market
Another data challenge throughout this thesis concern prices on inputs and
some outputs due to the lack of official markets for many of the inputs. Manure
which is the primary input in agricultural biogas production contains a low value
compared to the volume. This limits the distance from where it can be obtained
to approximately 15-20 kilometres, which often gives the plant and farmers
an almost monopolistic relationship between each other. Usually farmers are
receiving the digestate afterwards. This has a somewhat additional value to
the farmers as it smells less, it is easier to bring to the fields and the plants
may have a better uptake of the nutrients from the digestate [80]. The actual
additional value is difficult to estimate. And in order to add as few unknowns
as possible we chose not to add more potential value than from the nutrients,
this value was estimated following the suggested prices and average fertiliser
content presented in [7], the value found was similar to other estimates found
see e.g. [102].
Biogas production is to some extent a by-product of other production based
on the waste products from agriculture and industry. Earlier, waste products
from particularly the agricultural industry was easy to obtain for the biogas
plants and plants were even paid to receive the waste. Today, with more
biogas plants wanting to receive the waste, it seems that biogas plants pay
to receive the substrates [81]; biogas plants are reluctant to reveal the actual
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Data type Sources Uncertainty Decision
Specific
input data
Biogas
Yield
Various
sources
hereunder
project
partners
high The sources varies and are
specified in the papers, yields
were often cross checked with
other sources, and sensitivity
analysis were made in cases of
additional uncertainty
Transport
costs
SEGESa medium Costs were calculated from one
specific location which was
emphasised in all papers
Fertiliser
value
Birkmose,
Hjort-
Gregersen,
and
Stefanek
[7] p.52
high One specific value was applied in
most analysis to provide
consistency and calculated with
focus on best alternative costs for
mineral fertilisers. Positive
externalities were not included
Values
from
biogas
Carbon
reduction
Wenzel and
Hamelin
[127]b
high The newest and to our knowledge
the most thorough analysis made
on this estimate
Biogas
price
Plant
model and
[101]
high Best available data, see also in text
Biogas
certificate
PlanEnergi
[101]
high Best available data, see also in text
combined with the certificate price
Regulation Taxes and
subsidies
Skat.dk,
DEA and
Energinet
low Most data could be found on the
relevant homepages
CAC DEA,DERA
and other
ministerial
home-
pages
medium Focus on actual data sometimes
found with help from relevant
actors in the specific area
a Transport costs were calculated from one specific location for a biogas plant (Maabjerg Biogas)
who was involved with the Biochain project and provided us with updated data on biomasses and
manure types within a radius from Maabjerg biogas in 10 kilometres steps. We then calculated
transport costs following a principle of average distance from the biogas plant and to the suppliers.
This is further described in the supplementary material for A
b Data from [127, 128] were combined with own calculations in order to find one specific estimate
for carbon emission reductions as a consequence of biogas production
Table 4.4: Specific estimates, data sources, degree of uncertainty and decision
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prices though, so we have had to rely on data from other sources such as
the Biogas Taskforce that was initiated along with the Energy Agreement in
2012 [27]. A conversation with an agricultural contractor for example proved
to me how cost and value on straw vary significantly depending on quality,
time constraints, geography and field size. As a consequence of this we have
tried to focus on production costs using estimates from SEGES combined with
qualitative considerations, more specifically explained in the individual papers.
Similar considerations have been made with regard to the biogas price.
We have assumed that biomethane would receive a value of the natural gas
price plus a green certificate price; total costs should then be covered by this
income besides support and potential digestate income. As there is no open
market for green certificates has the best estimate been the EU-ETS price, as this
is what the green certificate in principle could be traded for, see also paper B.
It is even harder to get a clear estimate on a price for biogas applied directly. I
could have dug deeper into various sources such as the biogas applications or
by sending out questionnaires to biogas producers; this would have led my
work in another direction, and would not necessarily have given me better
answers to my research questions. Instead I decided in most cases to focus
on cost prices found by applying the plant level model (presented in Jensen,
Münster, and Pisinger [68]) and the incentives and options for a larger part of
the value chain. The exact choices made regarding price– and cost estimates
have varied from paper to paper, depending on the case set-up. These choices
are presented separately in the papers.
Specific estimates
Throughout all papers the search for data have been a time consuming task.
Some data could be reused through the papers, while others were needed
specifically for the given paper. The overall approach have been to look for
data in open source statistics and reports form e.g. the Biogas Taskforce. I
have furthermore contacted specialists within the Biochain project 3 and from
outside the project 4. I have then interviewed them regarding the data, I needed
to get an overall picture of the investigated area. Knowledge from this have in
most cases been backed-up by written data sources that I have referred to in the
papers. This approach have proven to be very efficient to get into new areas,
however, it does not ensure that all elements have been covered for a given
issue. This uncertainty have been dealt with by double-checks and sensitivity
analysis for determining parameters.
3e.g. Lone Abildgaard, Michael Støckler or Jin Mi Trioli
4e.g. Søren Tafdrup (DEA), Bruno Sander (Biogasbranchen) and governmental agencies within
tax and environment
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Sensitivity analyses
As data are hard to find or can be hard to predict it has proven useful to
apply sensitivity analyses with regard to those parameters, identified as most
critical.
In paper B on economy of scale, a case study was employed to form a
general picture on the potential for scale effects in biogas production. It is
always difficult to generalize on the basis of a case study as some factors and
assumptions will be case specific and subject to insecurity. This was taken into
consideration throughout the qualitative analyses. Furthermore, a sensitivity
analysis was performed, in order to get a picture of the importance of specific
factors such as yield and transport costs. The method chosen for the sensitivity
analyses was a constant symmetric variation to compare the significance of risk
regarding the investigated factors. The sensitivity analysis was conducted with
regard to the profit where the factors in question were halved and increased
by 50%. The 50% was chosen from the perspective of achieving substantial
alterations in the results; and in the same time sustain symmetry. We were
aware that the probability of variation would vary depending of the factors,
this was then assessed qualitatively afterwards.
Another kind of sensitivity analysis was also performed in paper B, where
it was investigated whether variations in the yield would have different effect
on the profit for a plant that upgrades biogas compared to a plant that delivers
biogas directly to a CHP plant. This analysis was performed to investigate the
effect of two different support schemes for biogas.
In paper D sensitivity analyses are performed on the CO2-cost in order to
evaluate the socio economic value of biogas with varying CO2-costs. These
analyses were also utilised to see under which CO2-costs it would be socio
economically beneficial to use biogas.
In E the value of sensitivity analyses became clear as the optimal solution
changed significantly with only few modifications of the input prices. It was
then chosen to do some extra sensitivity analyses, where only one parameter
changed; and where gas-, electricity- and heat prices was from the same year
(2013, 2015 and 2016)- simulating three different possible realities for a plant.
The following analysis was based on two potential value chains with two
potential realities, in order to generalise the results and get a clearer picture of
which risks the biogas value chain faces.
4.3 Inclusion of regulation in the analyses
Both direct and indirect regulation can have a significant influence on the
economics for the biogas value chain, and as presented in section 3.1 and
2.3 are both command and control– (CAC) as well as incentive regulation
(IncReg) applied. Policy instruments are therefore when I found it relevant
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implemented quantitatively in the applied models if possible; and assessed
qualitatively in the paper analyses when necessary. In table 4.5 most of the
regulatory instruments considered in this thesis are listed. The instruments
have been categorised with regards to type (IncReg or CAC), (direct or indirect),
which part of the value chain they affect (green for agriculture, black for plant
and blue for energy sector, ) and whether they have been implemented in the
quantitative models (marked with bold) or considered qualitatively (marked
with regular types).
Direct Indirect
Incentive
regulation
Support schemes Tax exemptions for biomass andfuels for electricity production
Taxation of inputs Taxation of fossil fuels
Green certificates CO2-quotas
Command
and
control
Input restrictions Nutrient restrictions (farmers)
Planning regulation Waste on fields restrictions
Wobbe index Monopoly regulation (heat)
Table 4.5: Categorisation of regulation
Quantitative implementation of incentive based regulation
Incentive based regulation is mostly implemented quantitatively in the
private economic models as additional income or cost; embracing the
underlying assumption that biogas plants or value chains maximise profits
including the support provided and applied taxes. The specific implementation
of each policy instrument is described in the papers.
A common challenge for biogas value chains is that one end of the value
chain can be supplied with support, while conditions for support (e.g. that
biogas is based on waste products) can be addressed in another part of the
value chain that may not necessarily be the same owner. As already mentioned,
Danish biogas support is focused on output as biomethane or electricity based
on biogas; similar regulation can be found in e.g. Germany, Italy and Austria
[Walla2008a, 33, 100]. While in Norway indirect support is given in the
beginning of the value chain, under the condition that waste is being treated see
e.g. paper C. How support provided at one point in the value chain transmits
into profits in the different entities of the value can be difficult to estimate.
Several approaches have been applied throughout this thesis. In paper B it
was assumed that approximately all support is handed over to the biogas plant
combined with a qualitative discussion on how likely this assumption was.
This method demands a qualified idea of how support is in fact divided, if
55
PART I. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF DANISH BIOGAS REGULATION
the division of support is an important part of the analysis. An alternative
approach applied in paper C is to consider the entire value chain, which may
be just as relevant if focus for the analysis is directed towards the entire value
chain. My final approach has been to consider the allocation of total profits, by
first optimising profits for the entire value chain, and then consider various
allocations of this profit, this was focus in paper E and is further described in
section 3.3.
Implementation of command and control regulation
Through the papers command and control regulation has been implemented
quantitatively where it was possible and relevant as e.g. input restrictions on
energy crops; in other cases the regulation has been considered qualitatively
sometimes together with sensitivity analyses.
The significance of cost-of-service regulation on heat is complicated to
include quantitatively and is therefore primarily considered qualitatively. It is
known from tried cases that agreed-on prices between the biogas plant and a
local CHP have been judged to be reduced, with reference to the cost-of-service
regulation[42]. However, there is little public information on how this affects
biogas prices in general. In this dissertation, this issue has been dealt with
through sensitivity analyses as an additional risk and discussed as a potential
determining parameter in the qualitative analysis of the results in paper E.
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Biogas production can potentially contribute with a large variety of positive
externalities, but the production has so far not been economically viable unless
it was considerably supported. The new regulation decided upon in 2012
paved the way for biogas upgrading, which increased the opportunities for
biogas plants and future applications of biogas.
Value of biogasProfitability of biogas
Regulation
GHG-
emission 
reduction
Risk
Profit 
allocation
Profit allocation
Figure 5.1: Questions to be answered
My motivation for this thesis was to get a better understanding of Danish biogas
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value chains in order to identify any potentials to steer current regulation in a more
efficient direction. My approach has been to investigate how current regulation
affect the value chain with regard to profits, risks, opportunities and strategic
behaviour.
In chapter 1, I presented three overall research questions that I had decided
to address throughout my thesis. Some of these questions have been the theme
of an entire paper, some have been a part of the underlying mindset throughout
my work, and maybe received less focus as I grew wiser. A common feature
of the questions is that focus is on the private economic profitability of biogas
production:
1. How does existing regulation affect the biogas production and can a more
efficient production be achieved by changing regulation, while still keeping
biogas production profitable?
2. How does this mix of market- and ownership structures influence the biogas
value chain?
3. Which risk factors are most influential on the biogas value chain, and how
may this be addressed?
These questions do not deal with the big elephant in the room: "Why should
we support biogas production"? I do not claim to answer this question in my
dissertation. However, in paper D, we investigate the socio-economic value of
biogas for the energy system, when marginal damage costs of GHG-emissions
are included. And by that I contribute to a part of this question.
5.1 Summarized contributions of the dissertation
With this dissertation I have contributed with several results regarding the
interaction of public regulation, private incentives and profitability of the
biogas value chain.
Specific contributions consist of the initial design of the economic model
which is the cornerstone of the models applied in the analyses hereunder the
value chain optimising plant level model described in section 4.1. These models
have been developed and updated to lay the ground basis for the analyses
made, considering the interaction of flexible regulation with regard to biogas
inputs and risk for producers, with suggestions for policy design, analyses of the
potential value of biogas in the energy system in comparison to CO2-damage cost and
the application of cooperative game theory on the value chain.
Contributions regarding policy design based on analyses on private
economic profits in the value chain, show the significance of flexibility in both
incentive based as well as command and control regulation; this both apply regarding
inputs and outputs in the biogas value chain. The Danish focus on biogas output
reflected in high subsidies on energy output, emphasise a value chain focus
on input substrates (prices and potential yield) and incentivises a reduced
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biogas leakage, reduced flaring at plant level; however, also reduced own use
of biogas in the production.
I identified several cases where inflexible regulation, regarding types of
input, and following usage of the output can reduce the profitability of the
production and thereby potentially increase the need for support. Profitability
can also be reduced when biogas is consumed directly in a monopoly regulated
CHP with an inflexible consumption pattern and a regulator who might push
the biogas price downwards.
My Contributions regarding profit allocation and strategic behaviour in
the biogas value chain was analysed using cooperative game theory. The
work illustrate how strategic choices made regarding value chain design and
participation can be explained by the application of game theory.
These results further revealed that regulation affects the value chain design
and therefore a strategic explanation of why biogas plants choose to upgrade,
while farmers can be reluctant to participate unless they are co-owners in the
biogas plant.
A policy implication from this work is that policy makers should be aware
of the final goal, when regulation is designed, and that sheer output support
can be expected to result in more biogas. They should, however, also be aware
that the amount of energy produced can be dampened by substrate restrictions
and for example monopoly regulation on the energy side. Regulation, directly
targeting GHG-reduction may potentially result in the same level of GHG-
reduction, at a lower cost in support.
Contributions in relation to the value of biogas are found in the approach
of investigating the socio-economic costs of biogas in the energy system, when
GHG-emission damage costs are varied.
5.2 Results from paper A-E
Paper A: “Optimised biogas production from the co-digestion of sugar beet
with pig slurry: Integrating energy, GHG and economic accounting”. Nine
cases are compared in this paper, with regard to the effects on private economic
profit, GHG-emissions and the energy account. The cases include three plant
sizes and three mix of pig slurry and sugar beet. The results presented in
figure 5.2 show that economic feasibility is negatively correlated with sugar
beet input, as net-income only is positive when no sugar beet is added1. The
energy account and GHG-reduction, on the other hand, is positively correlated
with sugar beet input, meaning that net-energy consumption and net-carbon
emissions are negative. Furthermore; we found a tendency to economy of scale,
at least while sugar beet is not added. The result when sugar beet is added
1PSSB-0: means a substrate input of 100% manure and no sugar beet, PSSB-12.5, means 12.5%
sugar beet, while PSSB-25, means 25% sugar beet.
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Figure 5.2: Comparative overview of net energy balance (MJ/Mg), net GHG
balance (kg CO2eq/Mg), and Net Income (V/Mg) per Mg ww of input to the
biogas plant; Source: Paper A
are less conclusive. In this paper, the overall focus of the thesis is targeted
regarding profitability of biogas, when scale, input and therefore also yield
changes.
Paper B: “Economies of scale in biogas production and the significance
of flexible regulation”. In this paper, the research questions regarding risk
and regulation are targeted. The nine cases from paper A are investigated
further, now with focus on private economy taking scale, regulation and risk
into consideration. The first result is a confirmation of similar analyses on
economy of scale in biogas [33, 126]. We can find economy of scale in biogas in
Denmark, and even though transport costs can have a significant influence on
the result, they do not outweigh the positive scale effects from capex, at least
when substrates are not extraordinarily far from production. The scale effect is;
however, outweighed by upgrading costs and transport costs, when sugar beet
is added as co-substrate; while the price of sugar beet eliminate all profits in
the value chain; at least when we apply the biogas yield estimated for paper A.
An overall conclusion for this paper was that biogas yields are important
for profits, and a biogas plant should have flexibility to switch co-substrates.
Several sensitivity analyses were performed within the paper, concluding that
the most significant factor for profits is the biogas yield; the importance of
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2016 NO NO→DK DK DK→NO
Production (GWh) 43 32 36 36
Input
Cost 16.469 31.223 4.121 4.121
Revenue, manure 7.756 0 0 16.154
Revenue, Waste 80.798 0 0 0
Transport Cost 10.831 3.924 8.475 21.208
Conversion Cost 34.758 42.313 43.490 38.566
Output
Cost 9.490 2.676 13.372 29.295
Revenue, digestate 0 6.107 8.411 0
Revenue, biogas 39.200 69.717 81.302 24.566
Total in Euro/GWh produced 56.207 -4.312 20.256 -52.471
Table 5.1: Case results in Euro per GWh produced, the table include costs and
revenue for each of the four cases, showing that the value chains only achieves
a positive net-income in the home countries
substrate prices and transport costs was less influential. The risk on biogas
demand was further investigated; and we found risks regarding seasonal
volumes, as well as long-term structural volume risk. Furthermore; we found
that risk in relation to scale and volume favour upgrading, as the risk on
volume variations increase with scale, when the biogas plant becomes the sole
supplier of a local CHP.
Paper C: “The implications of economic instruments on biogas value chains
– a case study comparison between Norway and Denmark”. In this paper,
the research question regarding regulation is targeted by the comparison
of structural conditions, political goals and policies between Norway and
Denmark. We found that the viability of a value chain is highly dependent
on structural conditions and the regulation applied directly on and around the
biogas plant. Results are found by comparing an agricultural based value
chain in Denmark, where support is focused on the output product biogas,
and move this value chain to Norway, where support is focused on inputs and
investments; and at the same time transport costs more than doubles. We find
that the viable value chain becomes infeasible, when moved. A Norwegian
value chain was in parallel moved to Denmark. Results from paper C and
presented in table 5.1 show that even though the value chain was assumed to
receive Danish biomethane support; the Norwegian value chain would not
be viable in Denmark. The Norwegian value chain was based on waste and
manure and producing gas for transport.
We further found that both countries have policy goals regarding GHG-
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emission reduction and usage of manure in biogas production; however, the
goals are not completely aligned with regulation. While Norway seems to focus
regulation on primarily input and production; is Danish biogas regulation
targeting GHG-emission reductions through the substitution of fossil fuels in
the energy sector. This variation in focus is probably caused by differences
in the energy systems. Policy implications from the paper were that the
countries might learn from each other. Norway may want to support usage of
biogas more directly, while Denmark may want to support GHG-mitigation
from manure. Both countries could improve regulation and awareness of the
potentials of using organic household waste (OW) as input substrate and still
find ways to apply the digestate on agricultural soil.
Scenario CO2-cost Natural gas Biomethane Biogas
High CO2-quota price 23.1 8.0 11.8 9.7
Low CO2-damage cost estimate, Dice 30.3 8.4 11.3 9.2
High CO2-damage cost estimate, Bergh 99.2 12.4 6.0 3.8
Table 5.2: CO2-costs for the high CO2-cost scenarios, e2015/ton; source: paper
D
Paper D: “The impact of CO2-costs on biogas usage”. In this paper, we
address the socio-economic value of biogas with regard to GHG-emissions.
We apply the energy system model, Balmorel, in order to investigate how
the socio-economically optimal demand for biogas changes, when estimates
for the socio-economic damage costs from CO2-emissions are changed. The
overall conclusion is that, for biogas to be socio-economic feasible to employ
in the energy system, should socio-economic damage costs be significantly
higher than current and expected future CO2-quota prices in the European
ETS-system. This conclusion rely on the assumption that CO2-reduction is the
most valuable positive externality from biogas. The applied quota-prices and
damage cost estimates are presented in table 5.2.
Modelling results from working with the paper are 1) the additional feature
added to Balmorel, which allows for a joint target for fuel usage and 2)
an update of the combtech-application that allows one technology to apply
different fuels (in this case biomethane and natural gas). Other results are
for example that direct use of biogas in CHP’s was preferred to biomethane
due to lower production costs; however, biogas and biomethane consumption
increased so much in the case of very high CO2-damage costs that biogas and
biomethane was used for both baseload and regulating power2. This is difficult
2Regulating power is a term for electricity production, which can be regulated up and down
following the system demand; gas fuelled power production can for example be applied as
regulating power.
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to do with direct use of biogas due to storage restrictions, which was why
we had to limit investments for this type of fuel consumption. Furthermore,
total fuel consumption grew in the case of high CO2-costs as shown in figure 7
in paper D; at the same time electricity exports increased, indicating that
biomethane could also be used for regulating power or even baseload in
neighboring countries in the high cost case.
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Figure 5.3: The percentage of the total profit for each owner in the base scenario
and when natural gas prices are high (NG high); Source: paper E
Paper E: “Recent trends in biogas value chains explained using cooperative
game theory”. In paper E, all three research questions for the thesis are
approached, though with a focus on ownership structures and how strategic
behaviour can affect the final value chain set-up. Three profit allocation
mechanisms are applied on two optimal value chain designs, found by using
a plant level optimisation model. The results indicate several explanations of
why it can be difficult to get livestock farmers involved with biogas production
if they do not invest in the plant themselves; and why so many biogas plants
choose to upgrade to biomethane, even when the optimal choice of value chain
design could seem to be local CHP production. More specifically results show
that upgrading would be preferred to CHP production when natural gas prices
are expected to be high, while CHP is preferred, when natural gas prices are
expected to be low. The optimal mix of input substrates is estimated to be
approximately 70% manure and 30% deep litter.
The three tested profit allocation mechanisms are full equality (FE),
where profits are distributed equally, proportionality (PR), where profits are
distributed by costs, and Incentive rationality (IR), where alternative profits
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are taken into consideration. Results are displayed in figure 5.3, showing that
livestock farmers could obtain a high share of profits with two of the allocation
mechanisms. However, due to alternative incomes and the preferences of the
other owners, it is likely that the chosen profit allocation would be proportional
or something in that direction; leaving the farmers with a relatively small profit
share.
In the paper we also find that it is likely, a plant owner would prefer
upgrading; even though the profit allocation and expected profits could
indicate, a plant owner preference for direct use in a CHP. This can be explained
by strategic behaviour, as the plant owner, in the case of upgrading, has an
improved bargaining power due to better alternatives. The disconnection of
monopoly regulation from district heating, further increases the chance for her
to reach the preferred profit allocation mechanism (in this case proportionality).
5.3 Discussion of results
Results in this thesis is founded in micro-economic literature within industrial
economics regarding risk, markets and economy of scale presented in e.g. [122,
84]; game theory combined with allocation theory see e.g. [60, 51, 125, 95] and
environmental economics see e.g. [54, 4, 5] all of which are further described
in section 3.1. Results are based on data found in primarily Danish Biogas
literature such as [55, 35, 67, 20, 97, 36] and from our partners in the Biochain
project. This is further described in section 4.2
My contribution appear in analyses on the effect on Danish biogas
production from current biogas regulation and the interaction with energy,
GHG and agricultural regulation. How does this affect economic feasibility
and risks? Which strategic actions could be expected from this interaction?
The effect of Danish biogas regulation
The application of various support mechanisms for renewable energy have
previously been compared [1, 72] and assessed [75, 2, 3, 108]. Biogas regulation
in other countries have also been investigated and reflected on, Lantz, Svensson,
Björnsson, and Börjesson [76] for example find that the regulatory landscape for
biogas in Sweden is complicated, while identifying both barriers and incentives.
They concluded that the existing policy in Sweden was not enough to exploit
the full potential in of biogas production. Carrosio [14] studied policies and
organisational models for biogas plants in Italy. His conclusion was that the
intentions of the policies are thwarted and recommended a diversification in
the use of biogas and reorganisation of the political incentives. Brudermann,
Mitterhuber, and Posch [12] considers biogas in Austria and emphasise the
importance of favourable economic and political conditions on a long term
basis. The above mentioned literature focus on biogas regulation in one country;
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however, comparative studies have also been made, such as Raven and Gregersen
[109] who made a comparative assessment between biogas developments in
the Netherlands and Denmark. They underline the importance of formal rules;
and concludes that subsidy grants and investment grants played a role in
both countries. They further emphasise that long-term support mechanisms,
such as in Denmark, have proved to be successful compared to the ad hoc
support in the Netherlands. Another comparison has been made by Jacobsen,
Laugesen, and Dubgaard [67] who compare Denmark and Germany showing
that socio-economic GHG-reduction costs are significantly lower with Danish
biogas policy, compared to German policy.
In paper C we compare the new Danish support system, with the
fundamentally different Norwegian system. The approach is to compare biogas
value chains in Norway and Denmark, two countries which are similar in
many aspects except in agriculture, waste treatment and energy supply. These
differences were taken into consideration when typical value chains, country
goals and regulation was compared. This type of analysis combined with
the quantitative test of value chain exchange between the countries is to our
knowledge new.
The overall conclusion in paper C is that regulation affects the value chain
design, input types and end products. It also affects how biogas is applied. We
find that an input focused support system opens up for more flaring and self-
consumption at the plant, while output based support incentivices as little
self-consumption as possible in order to receive support for all biogas. This is
illustrated by the data presented in figure 3, in paper C, where more than 40%
of Norwegian biogas is consumed for "other applications", which primarily
is flaring and self-consumption. Differences in input substrates between the
two countries was also explained by structural differences and command and
control regulation. For example is organic household waste (OW) almost not
applied in Danish biogas production due to reticence in Danish regulation on
source separation combined with complicated regulation for the application
of household waste on agricultural soils. While organic household waste is a
primary input substrate for Norwegian biogas production.
Policy implications from paper C suggest that it may be possible to reduce
overall biogas support and still find a viable value chain, if livestock farmers are
supported when manure is used for biogas. This is; however, much dependent
on the co-substrate price, potential additional income or investment support.
If support is changed it may increase the value of participating for farmers and
thereby their willingness to participate. This was discussed in paper E. On
the other hand, it may reduce total biogas production, if the output support is
reduced.
The upgrading of biogas to biomethane and injection into the gas grid is a
relatively new application of biogas, and so is support for this technology. Not
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only in Denmark but also in other countries, the investigation of opportunities,
strategic, environmental and energy system effects has only just been initiated.
Contributions from my thesis will hopefully help to understand both the
strategic aspects of this change in regulation and changes in risks for the biogas
producer.
A positive feature of Danish biogas regulation compared to output focused
regulation in other countries see e.g. [126, 33], is that the support in Denmark
is non-discriminatory towards large scale production as support does not
decrease with scale. Economy of scale for biogas production have already been
studied and demonstrated for Denmark [97] and in other countries [33, 126];
focus in these papers has, however, been on biogas applied in CHP’s. With
the inclusion of biogas for upgrading in paper B I have been able to find that
biogas directly used in CHP’s is limited by heat demand and therefore biogas
plants were de facto limited in scale before it became possible to upgrade biogas
and still receive support. We further found that the heat demand restriction
sets a stricter limit on changes in biogas yields due to e.g. seasonal variations
in input. This comparison between upgrading and direct application was to
our knowledge not considered previously.
The impact of risk on profitability
The impact of risk on profitability regarding support systems has been
investigated thoroughly by Kitzing [70] and in [71] with comparison between
feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums. Raven and Gregersen [109] also nicely
illustrated the challenges with regulatory risk in their comparison between
Danish and Dutch biogas regulation. Risk is primarily discussed in paper B,
where risks comparisons were made between biogas used directly in heat– and
power production and upgrading. Three types of risks were investigated: 1)
the risk of not gaining a proper biogas price due to lack of negotiating power,
2) the lack of demand during summer periods (with less heat demand) and
3) if yields are improved. When biogas is upgraded; will additional yields
only demand an upgrading capacity that is large enough to handle the extra
biogas, while biogas applied in a CHP’s is restricted on the heat demand. This
is illustrated in figure 5.4, where profits for the upgrading plant increase with
scale if yields prove to be higher than anticipated (see the 150%-case). The
opposite result is found in the case of direct use, as additional yields will not
pay off for a large scale plant.
Risk was evaluated quantitatively through sensitivity analyses with a
constant variation and qualitatively by an individual assessment of the
probability of a given scenario. It was found that plant profitability can
be affected significantly by the kind of co-substrate that are included in the
production. The most significant effect is when yields are not as high as
expected, and if substrate costs and transport distances furthermore proves to
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity - net income effect with changes in biogas yield
depending on the choice of direct usage in CHP or upgrading - with 85.5%
manure and 12.5% Sugar beet as input; Source: Paper B
be substantial. In this case, the sheer choice of co-substrate can define the profitability
of a biogas plant; given off course the support structure. If support is focused on
the input side as in Norway, the yield is less important as presented in paper
C, and expensive substrates would probably not be considered at all.
The conclusion in paper B was that biogas producers will seek to reduce risks on
input costs and quantities of co-substrates, indicating that a flexible regulation with
as few regulatory restrictions as possible would be beneficial, in order to reduce
transport costs and ease flexibility in changing of input. The relevance of this
was confirmed by the calculations of alternative profits in paper E, where the
2nd best choice of co-substrate proved to have a significant effect on profits,
and if the co-substrate was changed after investments, profits would be reduced
even further due to sunk costs and new investments for pre-treatment.
Strategic considerations on the basis of profit allocation in the value
chain
Negotiating power is explored in paper E, where three profit allocation
mechanisms, alternative incomes, and the implications on profits in the value
chain are combined with potential profits for two value chains and under
different price scenarios. The conclusions are, that livestock farmers are
expected to gain the least share of the profit due to low bargaining power;
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and that plant owners will prefer a value chain ending with an upgrading plant
in order to increase own bargaining power.
We have found that this approach broaden the perspective of the strategic
considerations made by the essential parties in the biogas value chain and
help to understand the empirical evidence we found. To our knowledge, the
approach has not yet been applied to a biogas value chain analysis; in fact, the
best example we could find for an applied analysis was the study of Hubert
and Ikonnikova [61], which considers the bargaining power in the Eurasian gas
transit market. Hubert and Ikonnikova [61] apply allocation mechanisms as
an indicator of bargaining power, whereas we consider the results as possible
outcomes of a negotiation. The likelihood of these outcomes depends on the
bargaining power of each participant, which is assessed through the potential
alternatives before and after investments—assuming individual rationality.
Zemo and Termansen [132] apply a discrete choice experiment study
of Danish farmers to examine farmers’ willingness to participate in a
unique, manure-based collective biogas investment. They find that farmers’
participation is mainly motivated by a moderate number of partner farmers,
short distance between the farm and the plant, contract options to sell biogas,
an option to cancel the partnership, and free startup consultancy. This study goes
more in depth with farmers’ part of the value chain to find what motivates
farmers to participate. A basis prerequisite for participation is that the farmers
are co-investors. This prerequisite goes well in hand with the conclusions form
paper E, where farmers risk a small share of profits if they are not co-owners of
the plant.
Three issues can be discussed: 1) It could be questioned if some of these
results could not have been found from a sheer risk analysis, and the answer
is that it might. In fact I did investigate for example the relationship between
the plant and the energy converter in paper B. I argue, however, that the
issue with bargaining power becomes more clear when alternative profits and
profit allocation mechanisms are included in the analysis. 2) An underlying
assumption for the above-mentioned conclusion is that the cooperative of
livestock farmers can be divided. If the livestock farmers stick together, the
plant owner and energy converter would have to accept a higher profit for the
livestock farmers. The considered case would probably mostly be a challenge,
when some of the livestock farmers are co-owners of the plant, and therefore
partly would be plant owners. To them, a higher share of profit to the plant
would mean a higher share to them, and this would divide their interests from
those who are not co-owners. It is probable in Danish agriculture, that some
livestock farmers would be more than able to invest in a biogas plant, while
others would not. 3) The discussions on the bargaining power between the
plant owner and energy converter are a simplification of reality, and there
are still investments in biogas plants feeding into a local CHP. There are also
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cooperatives that own the entire value chain and still choose to upgrade. Other
issues such as heat demand in a given area, risk preparedness compared to
risk aversion and expectations on future gas prices are off course also affecting
the choices of the investors. My contribution to the debate regarding upgrading
versus direct consumption has been to add strategic thinking into understanding of the
decisions made, given the current regulation.
GHG-emission reductions from biogas production and usage
The reduction of GHG-emissions in comparison with renewable energy
production have been treated in the literature in several ways. Amundsen and
Mortensen [2] for example analyse the effect on Danish renewable electricity
capacity from high carbon restriction and green certificates, they find that
hard restrictions can in fact reduce renewable capacity in Denmark, Jacobsen,
Laugesen, and Dubgaard [67] considers the socio-economic cost of carbon
reduction through biogas production and compare it to reduction costs for
biogas in Germany. The take on the analysis depend on which elements have
been considered as important to investigate. Carbon reduction effects from
manure treatment and the crowding out of fossil fuels in biogas production,
is one of positive externalities that are typically included in the valuation of
biogas. A common method to calculate net-emission from a value chain is
to consider emissions from the production in a value chain and subtract the
"saved" losses as when e.g. coal is replaced by biogas see e.g. [128, 127], this
method can complicate comparison between cases in different studies, and
an advantage of the approach in paper A is that the nine cases, which are
compared only differs on few parameters. This makes the comparison more
transparent for the drawn conclusions; which are that, the more sugar beet
added to the biogas production, the higher the GHG-reduction, while negative
scale effects are marginal for this result.
The approach in paper D is to apply the energy system model Balmorel to
analyse the effect of carbon emission prices. Biogas has been applied in other
analyses on systems optimisation—in particular on the issue of waste as a fuel
[90, 89, 91]. Biogas is often one fuel out of many and seldom turn out to be
the preferred fuel as seen in e.g. [90] and the national biomass value chain
model [111]. In our analysis, we apply two main assumptions, we assume
that biogas and biomethane have a negative CO2-emission, as the only fuels
in the energy system, and that the negative emissions are the same for both
fuels. Furthermore; we assume that the system has access to all necessary
quantities of biogas and biomethane. A potential weakness of the paper is that
we do not attempt to calculate the negative emission from biogas production
ourselves, and we do not distinguish between GHG-emissions from biogas and
biomethane. This may reduce the strength of the results; however, we do not
consider this to be very different from the other estimates used in the model.
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The results still show the direction of conclusion namely that GHG-emission
damage costs should be very high, before biogas becomes socio-economically
attractive; despite of large GHG-emission reductions. The biogas potential
is furthermore a challenge for the results, as the resource potential is not
modelled.
In paper C we note that Denmark may have both goals for GHG-emission
reduction and security of energy supply. It has not been the scope of this
thesis to explore the relative weight of the goals. However, when considering
the highly output focused biogas regulation in Denmark it could seem that
security of energy supply have high priority. With the current development
in the global climate this priority may shift, and while a priority change of
goals may not change the regulation of wind– and solar power; it can have
an effect on the biogas policy. As one priority may emphasise the value of
GHG-emission reduction, while another priority may focus on properties of
biogas and biomethane in relation to the fossil free energy-system and overall
consumption in the future.
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In the later years, climate change issues have climbed up on the international
agenda increasing the willingness to decrease greenhouse gasses (GHG)-
emissions. EU target GHG-emissions with country goals for CO2-emissions,
Renewable Energy production, and Energy savings. Denmark is far with
the development in renewable energy production primarily through wind
power production, which is an inflexible type of power production. Biogas
is renewable, could potentially function as regulating power, and based on
manure it potentially has a reducing effect on GHG-emission.
Biogas has been produced and developed in Denmark since the 1970’s;
it is primary based on agricultural products, and the digestate from biogas
production is commonly used as fertilizers on the fields, this is why focus
for this thesis is on agricultural based production. The biogas value chain
is characterised by sectors that are highly regulated and operates on a wide
spectrum of markets i.e. ranging from monopolies to very competitive markets.
Until recently the development in biogas production has been slow; with
the Energy Agreement in 2012 [27]; however, biogas support was increased
and support was expanded to other applications. Probably more importantly;
support for biomethane was put on the same footing as biogas applied directly
in heat– and power production. This thesis was started shortly after the Energy
Agreement and before the regulatory change was ratified; and the main theme
of this dissertation has been to evaluate the private economic consequences
for the biogas value chain under this new regulation
The overall research question is regarding private economic profitability in
the biogas value chain with focus on how existing regulation together with market–
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and ownership structures affect the biogas value chain and which risk factors are most
influential on feasibility and value chain choices. The questions are treated in four
journal papers based on a combination of micro-economics and model based
policy analyses. Furthermore; a Socio-economic analysis regarding the value of
biogas in the energy system is performed through energy systems modelling
in a fifth journal paper.
Since 2012, the biogas production has more than doubled see figure 1.1,
and the development has been in the direction of large new plants, that
upgrade to biomethane. Analyses throughout this thesis help explaining
this phenomenon, mostly considered in paper B and –E. For example, by the
application of cooperative game theory to include the strategic considerations,
which could be made by the plant owner. When she is faced with the
opportunity to upgrade, and the alternative is a monopoly regulated CHP
with good alternatives in the form of an untaxed biomass heat-boiler.
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses based on micro-economic theory
are applied in the thesis, to extract the main risk factors facing the biogas
value chain. And to explain the private economic incentives behind the choices
made by investors regarding inputs, scale and output. The game theoretic
implications are also analysed, when support in one part of the value chain
is contingent on actions in other parts of the chain. All in all it is shown that
regulation affect the value chain decision in several ways: regarding input
types, the level of output, and final applications of the output.
The support level for biogas is high in Denmark; compared to the decreasing
support tariffs for both wind— and solar energy. It may therefore be relevant
to learn from regulation in other countries, as presented in paper C. Denmark;
could potentially learn from Norway by applying input support, and at the
same time reduce output support. If this should be considered; however, one
should be aware that pure input support incentivises less biogas production.
The best solution will depend on the overall goal for biogas support, whether
it is GHG-emission reduction or fossil fuel replacement.
Outlook
Future analyses regarding economic feasibility of alternative input and output support
mixes, could be performed by application of the plant level model (see explanation in
paper E). Analyses from the biogas taskforce indicate that biogas should be
applied in the transport sector or for industry [20]. Future analyses could build
on the results found in paper D and examine the socio-economic value of biogas applied
in industry and transport. Latest statistics indicate little biogas consumption in
industry and transport. It could therefore also be relevant to analyse how subsidy
and tax systems could support this development. Given that biogas might not be
supported with high subsidies in the future, could other tools also be investigated,
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such as blending demands for biofuels combined with sustainability certified biogas
certificates.
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Figure 6.1: The graph displays the consumption pattern for biogas in Balmorel,
when there are no consumption restrictions, the graph show tendencies for
both seasonal– and regulating consumption; Source: Paper D
Other relevant applications of biogas could be with regard to biomethane
as regulating power. In paper D we found indications for regulating system
usage of biogas see figure 6.1; and this could be further investigated. Biogas
upgraded through power to gas (PtG) technology 1, could alternatively be
applied as downgrading technology. In paper E we found methanation to be
the preferred upgrading technology when gas prices are high. Biogas could
thereby both add flexibility during deficit and surplus of electricity; however it still
need to be examined whether biogas would be able to supply this flexibility to the energy
system in a socio-economically feasible way, and if so, how this should be aided through
the tax—and support system
This dissertation has contributed with several results regarding the
interaction between public regulation, private incentives, and profitability of
the value chain. Specific contributions are analyses considering the interaction
of flexible regulation with regard to biogas inputs, and risk for producers with
suggestions for policy design. In addition, the potential value of biogas in the
energy system is analysed in comparison to CO2-damage cost. A contribution
is furthermore the application of cooperative game theory on the value chain,
1when H2 from electrolysis is added to biogas, converting surplus CO2 into CH4 and O2.
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illustrating how choices made regarding value chain design and participation
can be explained by bargaining power and possible profit allocation.
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a b s t r a c t
Several countries have established a number of increased targets for energy production from renewable
sources. Biogas production, which will play a key role in future energy systems largely based on
renewable sources, is expected to grow signiﬁcantly in the next few decades. To achieve these ambitious
targets, the biogas production chain has to be optimised to obtain economic viability and environmental
sustainability while making use of a diversiﬁed range of feedstock materials, including agricultural
residues, agro-industrial residues and, to some extent, dedicated energy crops. In this study, we inte-
grated energetic, GHG and economic analysis to optimise biogas production from the co-digestion of pig
slurry (PS) and sugar beet pulp silage (SB). We found that utilising SB as a co-substrate improves the
energy and GHG balances, mostly because of increased energy production. However, utilising SB nega-
tively affects the proﬁtability of biogas production, because of the increased costs involved in feedstock
supply. The scale of the processing plant is neutral in terms of proﬁtability when SB is added. The results
indicate that medium-to large-sized biogas plants, using low shares of SB co-substrate, may be the
preferred solution.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Anaerobic digestion (AD) is one of the most efﬁcient
technologies for extracting clean and renewable energy from
biomass with high water content [1]. In addition, AD is useful for
recycling nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) from animal manure,
which is in great need worldwide [2,3], and it is also considered to
be the most effective technology for reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions frommanure management and at a low cost [4,5].
AD is fully integrated into Denmark's long-term strategy to be in-
dependent of fossil fuels before 2050 [6,7]. In accordance with this
strategy, 50% of all animal slurry must be used in AD by 2020 [8],
and 60% of organic waste from public services (up from the current
level of 17%) will be collected and utilised for biogas production by
2018 [9]. In 2050, biogas plants are expected to be processing about
42 PJ of biomass, corresponding to >7% of all energy input for
Denmark, while 16e22% of all biomass will be routed to energy
production [10].
Abbreviations: AD, anaerobic digestion; BMP, biochemical methane potential;
CHP, combined heat and power; CSTR, continuous stirred tank reactor; EF, emission
factor; GHG, greenhouse gases; HRT, hydraulic retention time; PS, pig slurry; SB,
sugar beet pulp silage; TC, total cost; TI, total income; TNI, total net income; TS,
total solids; VS, volatile solids; VSD, degradable volatile solids; VSND, non-degrad-
able volatile solids; ww, wet weight.
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The AD of animal manure is in focus for two reasons: 1) large
amounts of manure are available in Denmark [11] and 2) it allows
for the better management of N and P nutrients at the regional
level. In Denmark, manure is currently collected in the form of
slurry, with a water content of about 95% and an organic matter
content of ca. 4% [12]. Owing to this highwater content, manure can
only be used at the present time for biogas production, though
hydrothermal liquefaction may represent an alternative to anaer-
obic biogas production in the future. Manure has a low biogas
production potential [13], meaning that its digestion needs to be
boosted by a more energetic co-substrate [14]. Suitable co-
substrates include other agricultural residues, organic industrial
by-products (e.g. from the food industry) and dedicated bioenergy
crops.
The amounts of biogas to be produced and the portfolio of
biomass materials to be used represent important logistical and
management challenges, the combination of which hinders envi-
ronmentally sustainable and economic viable biogas production in
the country. Environmental and energetic issues related to biogas
production are depicted rather comprehensively in the available
literature, focusing for example on the digestion and/or co-
digestion of manure (e.g. Hamelin et al. [15]; De Vries et al. [16];
Lansche &Mueller [17]), municipal organic waste (e.g. Møller et al.
[18]; Bernstad et al. [19]; Boldrin et al. [20]; Levis & Barlaz [21]),
industrial co-products (e.g. Berglund & B€orjesson [22]; Tufvesson
et al. [23]), sewage sludge (e.g Tarantini et al. [24]; Lederer &
Rechberger [25]; Nakakubo et al. [26]), energy crops and/or crop-
ping systems (Amon et al. [27]; Gerin et al. [28]; Jury et al. [29];
Schumacher et al. [30]; Blengini et al. [31]; Buratti et al. [32];
Gonzalez-García et al. [33]). These studies indicate that biogas
production from residual biomass is generally environmentally
beneﬁcial, but the modelling of biogas from energy crops somehow
seems more complex, as it must consider carefully local conditions
regarding crop cultivation and the supply chain [34]. The economic
viability and optimisation of biogas production has also been
investigated in a number of studies (e.g. Walla & Schneeberger
[35]; Power &Murphy [36]; Gebrezgabher et al. [37]; Karellas et al.
[38]; Stürmer et al. [39]; Brown et al. [40]; Delzeit & Kellner [41];
Møller & Martinsen [42]; Riva et al. [43]; Schievano et al. [44]),
indicating that the proﬁtability of biogas production is generally
related to factors such as the plant size, the cost of feedstock, initial
investment, costs for storage and transportation and biogas yield.
The integration of environmental and economic assessments
was only attempted in a few cases. Most of these studies e e.g.
Murphy et al. [45], Ayoub et al. [46], Ayoub et al. [47], Luo et al. [48],
Santibanez-Aguilar et al. [49], Hennig & Gawor [50] e, however,
focus on the use of dedicated energy crops and their conversion in
complex and centralised bioreﬁnery systems used for fuel pro-
duction. Biogas production from residual materials is investigated,
for example, in Yabe [51]. These studies nonetheless are static in
nature, as the assessments are carried out at the scenario level.
When looking at the co-digestion of residual biomass and energy
crops, no studies were found to have attempted to optimise biogas
production by dynamically modelling individual sub-parts of the
biogas chain.
Therefore, the objective of the study presented herein is to
develop a joint value-chain, energy and environmental model, to be
used for optimising biogas chain production. This model is meant to
provide advice to managers and decision makers in the form of a
holistic evaluation of risks and beneﬁts in producing biogas using
sugar beet pulp silage (SB). This objective is achieved by 1) devel-
oping detailed economic, GHG emission, energy and mass models
for the biogas chain, 2) integrating these models into a single
framework capable of describing the relationships between econ-
omy, energy and emissions, while taking into consideration scaling
effects, 3) applying the model to optimise the use of beet roots in
manure co-digestion and 4) identifying the optimal scale of the
biogas plant.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. The biogas production chain
As shown in Fig. 1, the biogas production chain assessed herein
consists of ﬁve main process units, including:
 Raw material input: cultivation and harvesting stages
 Pre-treatment: washing, slicing and ensiling
 Transportation: transportation to the biogas plant and trans-
portation to the farm
 Energy production: mixing tank, anaerobic digester, post-
digestion plant and combined-heat-and-power (CHP) plant or
gas upgrade for the gas transmission net
 Digestate process and fertiliser unit: after-storage and ﬁeld
stages
SB is ﬁrst cultivated and then harvested between September and
mid- or late November [52]. While harvesting, the root is separated
from the beet top and left on the ﬁeld. Beet roots carry a signiﬁcant
amount of soil, and so a cleaning step is thus required. Cleaning is
normally performed at the farm level, but centralised cleaning can
occur in some cases. The soil removed from the root is returned to
the ﬁeld. SB harvested in November are then stored in clamps
covered with straw [52]. In February, the roots are chopped ﬁnely
into beet pulp and moved into silos for 18 months (i.e. until
September next year). Ensiling leads to the degradation of some
organic pools, so that total solids (TS) and volatile solids (VS) con-
tents change, while GHG are emitted. When needed, SB is collected
and then mixed with pig slurry (PS) to a known ratio, and the
mixture is then pumped into an AD reactor. PS is the main sub-
strate, whereas SB is the co-substrate providing different beneﬁts to
the process: it contains abundant trace elements for microbial
growth, it has a strong buffer capacity, thereby helping to maintain
pH neutrality, and it is a good diluter for toxic compounds poten-
tially contained in the manure. In the present study, the co-
digestion of three mass-based ratios of PS and SB in the feedstock
is analysed:
 PSSB-0: 100% PS, 0% SB
 PSSB-12.5: 87.5% PS, 12.5% SB
 PSSB-25: 75% PS, 25% SB
The additional use of SB (i.e. a 50/50 ratio) was attempted in
preliminary tests; however, the AD operationwas unstablewith the
accumulation of VFAs and a drop in pH level.
The main product of the digestion process is biogas (i.e. a mix of
CO2, CH4 and other trace gases), which can be used for electricity
and/or heat production, or fed to the natural gas grid. Depending on
the ﬁnal recipient and the energy conversion technology employed,
biogas may need to be upgraded to remove most of its CO2 and
other trace compounds. The by-product of the digestion process is a
type of slurry called “digestate,”which is typically partly dewatered
and further stabilised by means of aerobic composting. The ﬁnally
cured digestate may be stored further until its ﬁnal application to
agricultural land as a fertiliser and soil amendment agent. The
calculations herein considered a ﬁeld-application scenario where
digestate is applied in early spring, prior to seeding a spring cereal
crop.
In the biogas production chain, the economy of scale can be a
signiﬁcant factor affecting the proﬁtability of a project. In fact,
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while production costs per unit of biomass handledmay be reduced
in large facilities, transportation costs may increase signiﬁcantly,
due to the larger size of the catchment area for the biomass. To
assess the scale effect, economic analysis was thus performed on
three facilities: small (i.e. using 110,000 Mg of biomass per year),
medium (i.e. 320,000 Mg/year) and large (i.e. 500,000 Mg/year).
The size of the plant is assumed not to have an effect on mass and
energy balances.
2.2. The mass balance model
We based mass balance calculations on both the literature and
experimental data. Input and outputs from individual processes in
the biogas chain were modelled by tracking digestible (VSD) and
non-digestible (VSND) components of VS. In the model, we deﬁned
lignin as VSND, as it is non-degradable in an anaerobic environment
[13]. The remaining VS (i.e. total VS minus lignin) was deﬁned as
VSD. The basis for the mass balance calculation was 1000 kg of
feedstock fed into a biogas digester. The mass balance model
included stages shown in Fig.1, as explained in the previous section.
We reconciled and displayedmass and energy balances using STAN,
a software package used for material and substance ﬂow analysis
[53].
For the harvested SB, we used data from Schoups et al. [54] and
Thalbitzer [55], to determine mass distribution into roots, tops and
soil. Harvested beet root accounted for 70.7% of the total mass,
whereas beet tops were 25.6% and soil 3.8%. The total solids (TS) in
the root were 226 g/kg, and VS was 208 g/kg. While the top is
removed, the root and attached soil are moved further on to the
cleaning step. The amount of soil left after the wet washing step
was assumed to be 2.1% of TS. Since soil contains mostly ash (85% in
TS), the VS concentration is slightly lower than the case where the
root is without soil.
We assumed the pulping process would involve no mass loss,
andwemodelled the storage process for the beet root as employing
two sub-processes, both responsible for signiﬁcant VS degradation
(i.e. ~28% and 12% respectively, Table S2 in supporting information)
and any subsequent decrease in biogas production during AD. For
the sake of simplicity, the two storage sub-processes were repre-
sented by one overall storage process in the mass balance model.
We experimentally measured the composition of SB and PS, as
well as biogas production data during AD from different sources
(details provided in the supporting information). We carried out
physicochemical analysis of PS and SB according to the standard
procedure (APHA standard method [56], see supporting informa-
tion), and we determined biochemical methane potential (BMP)
according to VDI 4630 (2006). We also investigated the AD of
different feedstock mixes using a 20 L continuous ﬂow stirred-tank
reactor (CSTR) in a mesophilic condition (37 C), with a hydraulic
retention time (HRT) of 20 days. Data for the individual co-
digestion mixing ratios are presented in Table 1, where it is
evident that contributions of VS from SB and PS are considerably
different for the analysed scenarios. For example, in the PSSB-25
scenario, 58% of VS is from SB while 42% is from PS, while
approximately 63 and 37% of VS originates from SB and PS,
respectively, in the PSSB-12.5 ratio. The prime feedstock (i.e. PS)
had BMP of 296 NLCH4/kgVS (9.42 NLCH4/kgww). The BMP of SB was
424 NLCH4 kg/kgVS (54.8 NLCH4/kgww). During CSTR experiments,
43.4e55.9% of VS was transformed into biogas (supporting infor-
mation, Table S5). When only PS was digested, CH4 production was
9.10 CH4NL/kgww, while CH4 productions from the PS and SB mix-
tures were 12.3 NLCH4/kgww and 18.0 NLCH4/kgww for PSSB-12.5 and
PSSB-25, respectively. Using the equation provided by Sommer
et al. [4], methane emissions post-storage were estimated at
0.30e1.99 NLCH4/kgww. Additional details are provided in the sup-
porting information.
Fig. 1. Overview of the biogas chain model.
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2.3. The energy balance model
For individual ﬂows of materials in the system, we assumed an
energy content (Haw, ash- and water-free) of 20.5 MJ/kgVS and
26.6 MJ/kgVS for the VSD and VSND respectively. As speciﬁc data for
VSD and VSND does not exist, we derived these values through data
reconciliation, in order to ﬁt the energy balance with respect to the
energy content of the inputs, outputs and biogas production. These
estimated values are in accordancewith data reported for cellulose/
hemicellulose and lignin materials. Energy related to the cultiva-
tion and harvesting of sugar beet was 0.334 MJ/kg, taken as cu-
mulative energy demand for the Ecoinvent (v2.2) process ‘Sugar
beet, from farm’. We assumed the production of PS as being
burden-free, meaning that energy and material consumptions uti-
lised for animal growth were excluded from the calculation.
For transportation, we based diesel consumption on estimated
driven distances (see later) and assumed a consumption factor of
0.02645 l/tkm (Ecoinvent process ‘Transport, lorry >32t, EURO5’).
For the energy balance, we assumed that diesel has an energy
content of 43.1 MJ/kg, a density of 0.832 Mg/m3 and a cumulative
primary energy content of 54.8 MJ/kg (Ecoinvent process ‘Diesel,
low-sulphur, at regional storage’). We estimated energy con-
sumption during ensilage at 150 MJ/Mg and 6.7 MJ/Mg, based on
Ecoinvent processes ‘Baling/CH’ and ‘Loading bales/CH’, respec-
tively, and assumed that each bale contained ~1.3 Mg of beet root.
The spreading of digestate on land requires 0.26 L/m3 of diesel
(Ecoinvent process ‘Slurry spreading, by vacuum tanker’).
We estimated electricity consumption for operating the biogas
plant at 30 MJ/Mg [22], while the energy requirement for heating
up the feedstock was estimated at 121 MJ/m3 of slurry (or 1800 MJ/
MgTS). For the estimation, we assumed that the average tempera-
ture of the inlet material was Tin ¼ 8 C and that the slurry had a
density and speciﬁc heat similar to water (i.e. 1000 kg/m3 and
4.19 kJ/kg/K); additional details are provided in the supporting in-
formation. The biogas produced is combusted in an engine (i.e.
Jenbacher 420), with conversion efﬁciencies of 40 and 42% for
electricity and heat, respectively [57]. Part of the produced energy
is used for operating the plant, while the surplus of electricity and
heat is delivered, respectively, to the electricity network and dis-
trict heating facilities. For electricity, cumulative primary energy
was assumed at 2.47 MJ/MJelectricity, as in ELCD process ‘Electricity
mix, AC, consumption mix, at consumer, 1kV-60 kV DK’. For heat,
cumulative primary energy was assumed at 1.55 MJ/MJheat, as re-
ported by the Danish Energy Agency [58].
2.4. The GHG model
We established the GHG balance using the conversion factors for
diesel combustion, electricity and heat (reported in Table 2) applied
to the individual energy inputs described previously. The loss of
biogas due to fugitive emissions from the plant is rather uncertain,
as very few measurement studies at full-scale plants have been
conducted so far. In the present study, we assumed that the fugitive
emission of CH4 corresponds to 3.1% of the CH4 production in the
biogas plant, as estimated by Flesch et al. [59] for an agricultural
biodigester, including storage of the digestate.
We predicted the short-term emission of N2O using the N2O
sub-model developed by Sommer et al. [4], which considers N2O
emission to be a function of VS in slurry or digestate, reactive slurry
nitrogen (N) and soil water potential (j). As explained in the sup-
porting information, the model makes use of the VSD and VSND
introduced in section 2.2. For model calculations of N2O emissions,
we assumed an application rate of 100 kg NH4þ-N/ha. Following
Sommer et al. [4], the nitriﬁcation of reactive N in slurry hotspots
was assigned an N2O emission factor (EF) of 0.5%, and the nitriﬁ-
cation of N from digestate or slurry in the surrounding soil was
allocated an EF of 0.2%. We calculated total denitriﬁcation in the
slurry clumps as a function of VSD in the hotspot, and the resulting
N2O emission was estimated by assuming an EF of 2%. Total N2O
emissions produced by nitriﬁcation in clumps and soil, and by
denitriﬁcation in clumps, were expressed on an area basis but also
relative to slurry/digestate VS. The calculation considered a ﬁeld-
application scenario where slurry/digestate is applied in early
spring, prior to seeding a spring cereal crop. We assumed an NH3
loss of 10% during application, and soil-water potential was set
to 0.015 MPa, i.e. close to ﬁeld capacity.
We estimated VSD in digestate and untreated feedstock from the
short-term evolution of CO2-C after incubating slurry/digestate in
soil under aerobic conditions. We assumed that VSD in applied
materials would be fully degraded when CO2 evolution rates
became constant. The six incubation tests included three samples
of digested material, two samples of raw feedstock and one control
(i.e. only soil); each test included ﬁve replicates. The digestate
samples were produced in CSTR experiments, as explained in
Table 1
Composition of co-feedstock and biochemical methane potentials (BMP) for biogas production at different co-digestion mixing ratio scenarios.
Parameter Unit PSSB-0 PSSB-12.5 PSSB-25
PS PS BS Co-feed PS BS Co-feed
Wet mass g 1000 875 125 1000 750 250 1000
TS g 37.7 33.0 22.4 55.4 28.3 44.9 73.2
% ww 3.8 3.8 17.9 5.5 3.8 17.9 7.3
Water g 962 842 103 945 722 205 927
% ww 96.2 96.2 82.1 94.5 96.2 82.1 92.7
VS g 31.8 27.8 16.2 44.0 23.9 32.3 56.2
% TS 84.4 84.4 72.0 79.4 84.4 72.0 76.8
Ash g 5.9 5.2 6.3 11.4 4.4 12.5 17.0
% TS 15.6 15.6 28.0 0.0 15.6 28.0 0.0
VS pools
VSD g 28.2 24.7 13.8 38.5 21.1 27.6 48.7
% VS 88.6 88.6 85.3 86.7 88.6 85.3 86.7
VSND g 3.6 3.2 2.4 5.5 2.7 4.8 7.5
% VS 11.4 11.4 14.7 13.3 11.4 14.7 13.3
Biogas potential
BMP NLCH4/kgVS 296 296 424 342 296 424 370
NLCH4/kgww 9.4 9.4 54.8 15.1 9.4 54.8 20.8
PS: pig slurry; SB: sugar beet pulp silage; VSD: degradable VS; VSND: non-degradable VS; ww: wet weight; TS: total solids; VS: volatile solids; BMP: biochemical methane
potential.
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section 2.2. The three samples of digestate corresponded to feed-
stock mixtures previously described (i.e. PSSB-0, PSSB-12.5, PSSB-
25), while the two samples of raw feedstock included undigested
PS and SB. The main physicochemical properties of the materials
used for the incubation tests are reported in the supporting infor-
mation (Tables S3 and S8), together with a description of the
experimental setup (Table S7), the gas sampling procedure, the
data analysis and the estimation of N2O emissions for the analysed
scenarios (Table S9 and Table S10).
We converted the emissions of different gases to CO2-equivalent
emissions, by using the following 100-year global warming po-
tentials (GWPs): 1 kg CO2eq/kg CO2 for fossil CO2, 28 kg CO2eq/kg
CH4 for biogenic CH4, 30 kg CO2eq/kg CH4 for fossil CH4, 265 kg
CO2eq/kg N2O for N2O (according to IPCC [60]) and 0 kg CO2eq/kg
CO2 for biogenic CO2 [61].
2.5. The economic model
In the following, the economic model is described brieﬂy, while
additional details are provided in supporting information. The
objective of the economic model was to determine the total net
income (TNI) of different scenarios, where we deﬁne the
TNI(pk,Mj,Mk,rj,jk) as (Equation (1)):
TNI

pk; Mj; Mk; rj; j; k
 ¼ TIðpk; MkÞ  TC

Mj;Mk; j; k

(1)
where TI(pk,Mk) is the total income as a function of the price pk of
output k and themassMk of output k; TC(Mj,Mk) is the total cost as a
function of the mass Mj of biomass j and the mass Mk of output k
and the index j and k are objects of the set J of input biomass (i.e. PS
and SB) and the set K of output (i.e. digestate, biogas), respectively.
2.5.1. Income
Total income TI(pk,Mk) is the sum of the prices paid for the
different outputs and is deﬁned as (Equation (2)):
TIðpk; MkÞ ¼
X
k2K
pkMk (2)
where Mk is the mass of output k (i.e. digestate, Mdig, biogas, Mgas)
and pk is the price of output k.
The factorMk is a function of the process yield, which is in turn a
function of different operational parameters, such as feedstock
composition and HRT in the process, as explained and estimated in
section 2.2. We estimated the prices pk of the digestate (pdig) and
biogas (pgas) based on market considerations. In an agricultural
context, digestate has some value because of its fertilising potential
and reduced smell in the area. The pdig depends on the speciﬁc
supplier agreement between the operator of the biogas plant and
farmers, thereby including the requirement of the farmer to
dispose of the PS.
We estimated pgas in Denmark based on the ﬁnal use of the
biogas and the level of public support. We considered the following
two options:
 Biogas is upgraded and fed to the natural gas network.
 Biogas is used locally in a combined heat and power (CHP) plant.
When biogas production exceeds a speciﬁc amount, hereby
estimated as 3.5 million m3 per year, it was calculated that biogas
was upgraded and fed into the natural gas grid. In this case
(Equation (3)), the selling price of the biogas (pgas,UP) is determined
by the market price for the natural gas (pNG), the support level (S)
and a potential green factor (pg), corresponding to the market price
for “being green”, determined from sales of green certiﬁcates.
pgas;UP ¼ pNG þ pg þ S (3)
When biogas is used at a CHP plant, its price (pgas,CHP) is a
combination of the price of biogas as such and a market power
value, as shown in (Equation (4)):
pgas;CHP ¼ pðpNG; S; pHPÞ  pMP (4)
where pNG is the price of natural gas, S is the level of public support
given to the CHP, pHP is the price of heat and power generated and
sold to the market and pMP is the market power value, which de-
pends on the structure of the power market (e.g. user and supplier
are monopolist, or alternative supply/production options exist).
2.5.2. Costs
From the biogas plant perspective, total cost TC(Mj,Mk) is
expressed as (Equation (5)):
TC

Mj;Mk
 ¼ Ctrans

Mj;Mk;GPk
þ Copex

Mj;Mgas;UP

þ Ccapex

Mj;Mk

(5)
where Ctrans(Mj,Mk,GPk) is the transport cost, Copex(Mj,Mgas,UP) is the
operational cost and Ccapex(Mj,Mk) is the cost of investments. The
Ctrans is a combination of the costs borne for transporting PS and SB
to the AD plant, as well as the costs for transporting digestate and
biogas away from the plant, as shown in Equation (6).
Ctrans

Mj;Mk;GPk
 ¼ Ctrans;in

Mj
þ Ctrans;outðMman;Mk;GPkÞ
(6)
where Ctrans,in represents the cost of transporting the PS/SB to the
AD plant and Ctrans,out is the cost related to the transportation of
digestate and biogas away from the AD plant.
The size of the plant will hence inﬂuence transportation costs
signiﬁcantly, as a larger plant will involve longer driving distances,
to ensure the supply of the required biomass. To estimate trans-
portation distances according to the size of the plant, the supply
areawas modelled using concentric circles around the biogas plant,
whereby availability and supply cost of PS/SB could be estimated as
a function of the radius (i.e. the distance from the plant). With
respect to digestate transportation, it was considered that a share of
the digestate could be transported back to the some farmers
delivering PS. The maximum amount that could be returned to
individual farmers was set to 115% of the PS they delivered; any
excess sludge would involve additional costs for its transportation
to other farmers. A detailed description of the calculation is pro-
vided in the supporting information.
Operational expenditures (Copex) for the biogas plant are esti-
mated as follows (Equation (7)):
Table 2
Emissions factors for energy inputs to the biogas chain.
Process Unit Amount Note, reference
Diesel combustion kg CO2-eq/liter 3.1 Provision þ combustion (Fruergaard et al., 2009)
Electricity production kg CO2-eq/kWh 0.95 Hard coal, NORDEL (Fruergaard et al., 2009)
Heat production kg CO2-eq/GJ 72 District heating, natural gas (Fruergaard et al., 2009)
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Copex

Mj;Mgas;UP
 ¼ Copex;input

Mj
þ Copex;oper

Mj;Mgas;UP

(7)
where Copex,input represents the cost of buying PS/SB beet according
to the market prices and Copex,oper is cost related to operating the
biogas plant, including the following factors (Equation (8)):
Copex;oper

Mj;Mgas;UP
 ¼ Cbasis
X
j2J
Mj

þ Cwear þ Cpow
þ Cman

$Msug þ Copex;UP

ppow;Mgas;UP

(8)
where Cbasis is the basis cost of a biogas plant with size
P
j2JMj,
Cwear is the cost of wear per Mg of SB, Cpow is the cost of power per
Mg of SB, Cman is the cost of manpower per Mg of extra SB andMsug
is the total mass of SB. Copex,UP is the cost for biogas upgrading,
which is a function of the amount of biogas upgraded (Mgas,UP) and
the price of power (ppow).
Investment costs (Ccapex) depend on investments related cost-
wise to input, production and output. As in this model it is
assumed that all transportation is rented (i.e. no investment costs
for trucks and other), and the Ccapex is deﬁned as (Equation (9)):
Ccapex

Mj;Mk
 ¼ Ccapex;prod

Mj
þ Ccapex;output

Mj;Mk

(9)
where Ccapex,prod is the investment cost for production, including
the biogas plant, the process heat boiler, the purchase of land,
counselling and other elements, and Ccapex,output is the investment
cost for output, including the storage of digestate, the storage of
biogas and the biogas cleaning/upgrading facility. The depreciation
time for the biogas facility is assumed being 20 years, as recom-
mended by Ea Energianalise to the Danish Energy Agency [62].
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Mass and energy balance
We reconciled mass balances for the PSSB-0, PSSB-12.5 and
PSSB-25 feedstock mixtures, including wet weight, TS and VS. An
example of mass balance for PSSB-12.5 is presented in Figs. 2 and 3,
while remaining ﬁgures are provided in the supporting information
(section 4).
We found that, when looking at the wet mass, PS represents the
most signiﬁcant ﬂow in all of the scenarios analysed. However,
when SB is added to the feedstock in scenarios PSSB-12.5 and PSSB-
25, this ﬂow represents the major input of VS and TS into the sys-
tem. We found similar results in the energy balance (Fig. 4), indi-
cating that, as expected, even a relatively small addition of SB
signiﬁcantly increases the throughput of energy in the system
while signiﬁcantly boosting biogas yield (both total production and
yield per Mg of input). PS indeed represents a preferable mean for
diluting the high content of solids in SB instead of freshwater: be-
sides the signiﬁcant savings of water resources (and connected
expenses), the use of PS as a prime co-substrate provides better
nutrient balancing and increased buffering capacity.
Digestate represents the main output of the system, regardless
of the feedstock mixture considered, the reason being the sub-
stantial amount of water carried as a result. With regards to VS, the
situation is rather different, as the majority of VS is converted into
gaseous compounds during the AD process.While biogas is used for
energy production, the signiﬁcant amount of gas forming during
ensiling represents a loss of energy within the system; this loss,
however, is almost unavoidable, as SB storage is needed to ensure
the supply of feedstock to the reactor throughout the whole year.
The addition of SB to the feedstock mixture has a clear effect on
biogas production (per unit of input), which almost doubles e
going from PSSB-0 to PSSB-25 (Table 3). This result is a combination
of three aspects: an increase in the BMP of the input (Table 3), an
increase in VS content in the feedstock (from 3.2% ww in PSSB-0 to
5.6% ww in PSSB-25) and a decrease in the ratio between biogas
yield and the BMP (Table 3). The latter suggests that, when adding
SB, some adjustments in the digestion process HRT may be needed,
to exploit further the methane potential of the feedstock material.
VS degradation throughout the whole biogas chain is in the
order of 45%e68% (Table 3) of VS input into the system, whereas VS
degradation within the digestion process is in the order of 43e56%.
This ﬁgure is in line with what was reported byMøller et al. [18] for
cattlemanure (i.e. 21e44%) and pigmanure (i.e. 47e78%), while it is
lower than ﬁndings for other substrates (e.g. 53e80 in Mara~non
et al. [63], Gebrezgabher et al. [37], Schievano et al. [64], Delzeit &
Kellner [41]). The results in Table 3 show that, with a ﬁxed HRT, the
addition of SB as a co-substrate decreases CH4 yield (as percent of
Fig. 2. Mass (kg, wet weight) balance of the biogas chain relative to 1 Mg ww of input to the anaerobic digester. The input is PSSB-12.5, i.e. a mix of PS (87.5% ww) and SB (12.5%
ww).
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Fig. 3. VS (kg) balances of the biogas chain relative to 1 Mg ww of input to the anaerobic digester. The input is PSSB-12.5, i.e. a mix of PS (87.5% ww) and SB (12.5% ww).
Fig. 4. Energy balance (MJ of primary energy) of the biogas chain relative to 1 Mg ww of input to the anaerobic digester. The input is PSSB-25, i.e. a mix of PS (75% ww) and SB (25%
ww), while the size of the plant is 320,000 Mg/y.
Table 3
Overview of key parameters for the modelling of biogas production.
Parameter Unit PSSB-0 PSSB-12.5 PSSB-25
CH4 yield m3/Mgww input 9.10 12.3 18.0
CH4 yield m3/MgVS input 296 343 369
CH4 yield % of BMP 96.6 82.2 87.6
CH4 concentration % in biogas 57.2 57.1 57.2
VS degradation e system % VS input to the system 44.8 66.4 67.6
VS degradation e digestor % VS input to the digestor 43.5 55.6 51.2
VSND in digestate % of total VS 20.6 29.4 27.8
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the BMP), while the overall VS degradation increases slightly. This is
due to the fact that SB contains a larger amount of slowly degrad-
able VS, which in turn possibly requires longer HRT to reach high
yields. In general, a signiﬁcant share of the VS in the digestate is
non-degradable in anaerobic conditions (i.e. 21% for PSSB-0, 17% for
PSSB-12.5, 28% for PSSB-25).
3.2. GHG balance
Our ﬁndings show that increasing the share of SB in the feed-
stock mix results in a signiﬁcant decrease in N2O emissions from
land application (Table 4). This is due to the fact that adding SB to
the mix enhances both the C content and the C:N ratio of the
digestate, thereby increasing CO2 production and decreasing the
formation of N2O per unit of VS added (see supporting information,
section 2.2).
An overview of GHG emissions from the analysed system is
presented in Table 5, according to individual sub-processes in the
biogas chain. We found that fugitive emissions of gases from the
digestion process, and the storage and application on land of
digestate, represent a signiﬁcant contribution to the overall GHG
balance (i.e. between 33 and 44% of direct emissions). Because of a
lack of data, some of these estimations may, however, be associated
with signiﬁcant uncertainty. For example, in the present study we
assumed fugitive emissions from digestion in the order of 3.1% of
the produced biogas; however, other studies indicate that such a
value may be subject to signiﬁcant variability. For example, fugitive
emissions in the order of 0.3e2.6% were estimated by Liebetrau
et al. [65] for 10 agricultural biogas plants in Germany, and 2.1e4.4%
were estimated by Yoshida et al. [66] for a biogas plant treating
wastewater treatment plant sludge in Denmark. However, it is
generally not well-clariﬁed whether the age/technology of the
biogas plant, as well as the feedstock material, has an inﬂuence on
these emissions. The operation of the digester (i.e. pumping,
heating, etc.) also makes some signiﬁcant contribution to the
overall GHG balance, in the order of 16 kg CO2eq/Mg of feedstock.
The use of SB as a co-substrate also signiﬁcantly inﬂuences overall
GHG emissions, in that it makes a signiﬁcant contribution to direct
emissions, albeit this is completely counterbalanced by increased
biogas production. Energy production (i.e. electricity and heat)
from biogas is themost important element in the GHG balance, as it
may offset energy production somewhere else in the system (i.e.
the results in Table 5 are displayed as negative contributions). In
this context, the choice of the alternative source of energy pro-
duction (herein coal, see Table S6 in supporting information) may
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the results.
The results in Table 5 show that, regardless of the size of the
plant and the subsequent distance driven, transportation does not
make signiﬁcant contribution to direct GHG emissions. This rep-
resents a substantial inconsistency compared with results
regarding bioenergy production based solely on energy crops,
where transportation did matter, as driven distances were much
longer (e.g. Boldrin & Astrup [67]), while highlighting the impor-
tance of both using biomass residues and carefully selecting the
location of the biogas plant to ensure the availability of locally
(short distance) produced biomasses.
3.3. Economic analysis
We estimated total income (TI) for the biogas plant in the range
17.3e24.9 V/Mg of input into the biogas plant (Supporting Infor-
mation, Table S33). Gas subsidies have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
income (Fig. 5 and Fig. S8), while market revenue for energy
products is less pronounced. Without subsidies, the TNI of biogas
production would be negative, thus conﬁrming previous ﬁndings
(e.g. Gebrezgabher et al. [37], Delzeit & Kellner [41], Mafakheri &
Nasiri [34]). This highlights the importance of future support pol-
icies for the sustainability of biogas production in Denmark. Our
ﬁndings show positive signs of economies of scale, whereas the
composition of the feedstock has an even greater effect on the re-
sults, as increasing the utilisation of SB signiﬁcantly enhances
biogas production, albeit not enough to outweigh increased costs
related to the SB.
We estimated total costs (TCs) for the biogas production chain in
the range 15.8e26.5 V/Mg of input into the biogas plant (sup-
porting information, Table S35). Costs, to a high degree, are con-
nected to the feedstock supply, as the price of manure is closely
linked to an agreement with farmers, whereby manure is returned
in a treated form as digestate; feedstock costs are considered here
only as SB costs and account for 0e39% of the costs, depending on
the share of SB utilised (see Fig. S9 for details). This ﬁgure is in the
lower range compared with previous ﬁndings by Schievano et al.
[44] formaize (i.e. 40e62%), rye (i.e. 54e67%), triticale (i.e. 34e48%)
and sorghum (i.e. 49e62%) cultivated in a Mediterranean climate.
Particularly in the PSSB-0 cases, the positive scale effect on capital
costs (Ccapex) becomes clear, while operational costs (Copex) dampen
the economy of scale effect. The TC is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
both the feedstockmix and the scale of the plant. In fact, the SB is so
costly that it becomes the most important cost factor in the PSSB-
25 cases. Moreover, the utilisation of SB also has an inﬂuence on
the costs of transportation (which can add up to 20% of TC), as
longer distances need to be covered to guarantee the supply of SB
for biogas production. The scale of the plant also inﬂuences trans-
portation and Ccapex costs, as an increase in plant size requires a
larger supply of feedstock with a subsequent increase in driven
distance, which varies in the range 5.5e10.3 km for PS and
0e70.4 km for SB (supporting information, Table S15), depending
on the plant size. These ﬁgures, however, depend strongly on local
farming types (e.g. animal, plant), thereby suggesting that decision
making should be based on regional considerations. We estimated
costs for transportation in the range 1.1e4.1 V/Mg, with lower
ﬁgures associated with small-scale plants not making use of SB.
These values are in line with what is reported by, for example,
Walla & Schneeberger [35]. Capital costs (Ccapex) are estimated in
the range of 3.1e5.2 V/Mg (supporting information, Table S36),
with lower ﬁgures referring to large-scale plants. We estimated
operation costs (Copex) in the range 3.3e4.3 V/Mg (Table S36). The
size of the plant has rather a small inﬂuence on the Copex, while
Copex does increase when introducing SB to the feedstock, as
additional manpower is needed for handling SB (additional details
in supporting information).
An overview of total net income (TNI) is shown in Table 6. Based
on existing subsidies, price assumptions for inputs and outputs and
Table 4
Emissions of N2O from applying different digestates on land (NH3 loss 10%, soil water potential 0.015 MPa).
Treatment N2O [g N2O/kgVS,applied] N2O from NH3 loss [g N2O/kgVS,applied] Total N2O [g N2O/kgVS,applied]
PSSB-0 0.66 0.17 0.83
PSSB-12.5 0.59 0.12 0.71
PSSB-25 0.45 0.06 0.50
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the production technology (biogas yield), the only viable input
composition is a feedstock containing 0% of SB (i.e. PSSB-0). In this
case the largest plant is the most proﬁtable. Scenarios including SB
utilisation as a feedstock (i.e. PSSB-12.5 and PSSB-25) result in
negative TNI, as costs are greater than income, due to the fact that
increasing costs related to SB input are not counterbalanced by
increased biogas production and any associated revenue.
Conversely, for the entirely PS-based case (i.e. PSSB-0), the result is
positive, meaning that incomes exceed costs. The size of the plant
does inﬂuence the TNI to some extent, in particular because of the
costs associated with transportation (i.e. the larger the plant, the
greater the distance) and investment (i.e. the larger the plant, the
smaller the investment per unit input). The results presented in
Table 6 differ fromwhat was estimated by Delzeit and Kellner [41],
as our ﬁgures indicate that large-scale facilities have a fundamental
potential for better proﬁtability compared with small-scale facil-
ities. For those cases with SB, the beneﬁts of increasing scale are not
clear, as we ﬁnd that the TNI per unit of input is almost neutral in
relation to scale.
3.4. Comparison
Results for energy balance, GHG emissions and TNI are pre-
sented comparatively in Fig. 6, in which it is evident that utilising
SB is a major factor inﬂuencing the results of the energy, GHG and
economic analyses. However, a univocal conclusion cannot be
drawn, because while the energy and GHG analyses may suggest
that the utilisation of SB as a feedstock into the biogas plant may
prove beneﬁcial, the economic analysis indicates that this may be
too costly in the long run. As previously described, the only viable
input composition is a feedstock containing 0% of SB (i.e. PSSB-0),
whereas increasing utilisation of SB results in negative TNI.
The scale of the plant has little inﬂuence on the energy and GHG
balances, as also indicated in previous studies (e.g. Stephenson et al.
[68]); the scale, however, signiﬁcantly affects net income, while if
the biogas plant is operated using solely PS as a substrate, a large-
scale plant may be preferable. If an SB co-substrate is employed, it
becomes less clear what is preferable. A similar conclusion was
reached byWalla & Schneeberger's [35] study of biogas production
in Austria using maize silage as feedstock.
With respect to the results in Fig. 6, we found that the most
critical assumptions and main uncertainties are related to the price
of SB (relative to manure) and biogas yield in the AD plant. The
price of SB is about 4.5 times higher than the PS one. In general
terms, production costs for energy crops must be reduced to make
biogas production proﬁtable [35,37,44]. The increased biogas yield
obtained when using SB as a substrate results in better energy and
GHG balances, but it does not compensate for increased costs, due
to the larger input costs of SB. Biogas yield is indeed a very critical
Table 5
Overview of GHG emissions [kg CO2eq/Mg input] throughout the biogas production chain.
Stage Process GHG emissions [kg CO2eq/Mg input]
PSSB-0 PSSB-12.5 PSSB-25
SB production SB production 11.3 22.5
SB transportation 110,000 Mg/y 0.68 1.37
320,000 Mg/y 1.04 2.08
500,000 Mg/y 1.12 2.25
PS transportation 110,000 Mg/y 0.59 0.52 0.44
320,000 Mg/y 0.82 0.72 0.61
500,000 Mg/y 1.01 0.89 0.76
SB pre-treatment and storage Washing 4.15 8.31
Baling 0.71 1.42
Loading bales 0.05 0.09
Anaerobic digestion Milling þ pumping 7.9 7.9 7.9
Heat to digester 8.7 8.7 8.7
Electricity production 34.4 46.7 68.3
Heat production 9.9 13.4 19.6
Biogas fugitive losses 5.6 7.6 11.2
Digestate storage Gas losses 5.9 8.0 11.4
Application on land of digestate Spreading 1.2 1.2 1.1
N2O in ﬁeld 4.0 3.7 4.0
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Fig. 5. Distribution of total income (TI) and total costs (TC) per Mg of input to the
biogas plant.
Table 6
Overview of total net income (TNI) [V/Mg] for the biogas chain, according to plant
size and input mixture.
Treatment Unit Plant capacity (1000 Mg)
110 320 500
PSSB-0 V/Mg 1.52 1.88 2.18
PSSB-12.5 V/Mg 0.54 0.17 0.50
PSSB-25 V/Mg 1.64 1.74 1.66
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factor for proﬁtability. To reverse negative results for the TNI in
Fig. 6, a further increase in gas yield (i.e. 5% for PSSB-12.5 and 13%
for PSSB-25) is needed, thus suggesting that further optimisation of
the process is required. The proﬁtability of large-scale facilities
seemsmore affected by biogas yield, as increased biogas generation
would allow counterbalancing the costs for longer transportation
journeys. In general, improving biogas yield may play an important
role in relation to the proﬁtability of biogas production [34,41,67].
Our results (Fig. 6) seem to indicate that the low-to-no use of
additional co-substrate is preferable for the proﬁtability of biogas
production. However, while TNI on a unitary basis (per Mg input of
m3 biogas produced) is better, the overall production of biogas is
signiﬁcantly lower, meaning that achieving renewable energy tar-
gets would be more difﬁcult. The TNI results are quite sensitive to
biogas yield, SB price and transport distances, and thus small de-
viations could make adding SB a more proﬁtable undertaking. With
respect to the economy of scale, medium-to large-scale plants are
probably most favourable. This would, however, require signiﬁcant
planning, where many factors (e.g. type and density of farms)
would be taken into account and contextualised to local/regional
conditions. Planning should make use of dynamic models to be
used for optimisation purposes, taking into consideration a number
of uncertainties, which could be a key aspect in decision making.
Alternative scenarios to be investigated could include a price/value
comparison between upgraded biogas to natural gas quality
compared to the actual value of biogas used in local CHPs. In fact,
biogas injected into the natural gas grid can be used for more
diverse purposes and at more valuable times, thanks to storage
advantages. In such a scenario, larger biogas plants may have an
advantage in connection with the relatively high investment costs
involved in upgrading facilities.
4. Conclusions
We carried out an integrated assessment of the biogas produc-
tion chain based on the co-digestion of pig slurry (PS) and sugar
beet pulp silage (SB). The assessment was based on detailed mass,
energy and GHG balances, coupled with an evaluation of economic
proﬁtability. The inﬂuence of feedstock composition was studied
using three different feedstocks (i.e. with 0% SB, 12.5%, and 25%).
The assessment included three sizes (i.e. 110,000 Mg of biomass per
year, 320,000 Mg/year and 500,000 Mg/year) of biogas plant to
investigate economies of scale. The study was based ostensibly on
experimental data and/or data collected speciﬁcally and referring
to the Danish context.
We found that increasing the share of SB in the feedstock mix
has a beneﬁcial impact on energy and GHG balances. This
improvement in energy balances is due mostly to increased biogas
and energy production, whereas the transportation of feedstock
plays a minor role (regardless of the size of the plant). Utilisation of
SB was beneﬁcial for the GHG balance, mainly because of reduced
N2O emissions after applying digestate to land. The results showed
that fugitive emissions of CH4 from the biogas plant may make a
signiﬁcant contribution to overall GHG emissions. The proﬁtability
of biogas, on the contrary, was negatively affected by the intro-
duction of SB as a co-substrate, as the increase in income from
selling biogas was less than the increase in costs associated with
buying SB and the transporting it. The subsidy level was established
as a key aspect in biogas proﬁtability.
The size of the biogas plant does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
energy and GHG balances, as the performance of the conversion
process has little to do with scale. Conversely, though, size is
important with regards to economic analysis, as an increase in size
is associated with reduced capital costs, which are outweighed by
SB-related costs in the PSSB-12.5 and PSSB-25 cases, in particular
because of the transportation distances involved.
The results indicate overall that utilising energy crops as a co-
substrate, while preferable from an energy and GHG balance
point of view, is not proﬁtable from an economic point of view. In
this respect, we identiﬁed the price of SB and biogas yield as the
most sensitive parameters for the results.
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A B S T R A C T
Biogas production is characterised by economies of scale in capital and operational costs of the plant and
diseconomies of scale from transport of input materials. We analyse biogas in a Danish setting where most
biogas is based on manure, we use a case study with actual distances, and ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of scale in capital
and operational costs dominate the diseconomies of increasing transport distances to collect manure. To boost
the yield it is common to use co-substrates in the biogas production. We investigate how costs and income
changes, when sugar beet is added in this case study, and demonstrate that transport cost can be critical in
relation to co-substrates. Further we compare the new Danish support for upgraded biogas with the traditional
support for biogas being used in Combined Heat and Power production in relation to scale economies. We argue
that economies of scale is facilitated by the new regulation providing similar support to upgraded biogas fed into
the natural gas grid, however in order to keep transport costs low, we suggest that the biogas plants should be
allowed to use and combine as many co-substrates as possible, respecting the sustainability criteria regarding
energy crops in Danish legislation.
1. Introduction
Denmark has a long tradition for biogas production; and since the
Energy crisis in 1973 initiated the building of the ﬁrst biogas test
plants, biogas production have increased in Denmark in varies tempi
(Raven and Gregersen, 2007). Biogas production is focused on using
domestic resources to generate renewable energy along with reducing
environmental damage from waste products in agriculture, industry
and households. In Denmark the primary input is manure with various
co-substrates added to boost the yield, the development in biogas
production have been supported through R&D projects, temporary
investment grants and support connected to the biogas output. The
scale of plants have varied from decade to decade with focus on farm
scale plants, then centralised plants and afterwards a revival of farm
scale plants (Geels and Raven, 2007). Focus in biogas production has
also changed through time from energy production to waste manage-
ment, nutrients distribution, and green-house-gas reduction and lately
back to energy production, where the newest development is towards
centralised plants. Traditionally co-substrates have been waste pro-
ducts from the agricultural sector such as e.g. slaughterhouse waste,
which the biogas plants were paid to receive. Today these recourses are
already in high demand with rising prices and new biogas plants will
have to ﬁnd other resources. (Geels and Raven, 2007).
Earlier studies have already found economies of scale in biogas
production e.g. (Jacobsen et al., 2013; Nielsen and Hjort-Gregersen,
2002; Raven and Gregersen, 2007), and while the collection of
resources requires transport over longer distances, driving up unit
costs of inputs (Mafakheri and Nasiri, 2014), economies of scale for
capital expenditures (capex) drives unit costs down. Walla and
Schneeberger, (2008) look into the optimal size of a biogas plant
supplying a combined heat and power plant (CHP) and ﬁnd that the
increased costs of transporting silage maize is oﬀset by the beneﬁts of
scale in terms of capital costs and generation eﬃciency. We extend this
analysis to larger plant size and examine a similar co-substrate (sugar
beet) for which there is a speciﬁc resource mapping in relation to our
case location, distances are however long illustrating the consequences
of high transport distances.
Support for biogas in Denmark does not vary with scale in contrast
to e.g. in Austria and Germany (Brudermann et al., 2015; Lantz et al.,
2007). However, until recently support was only provided to biogas
used in local CHPs limiting the biogas production to ﬁt the heat
demand for the connected CHP. Since 2014 it has been possible to
upgrade the biogas to biomethane for the extensive natural gas net and
receive a similar support as for the CHPs. The speciﬁc aim of this paper
is to determine whether the new Danish support for upgraded biogas
allows the scale eﬀects to be realised, compared to the traditional
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support for biogas being used in Combined Heat and Power produc-
tion.
We therefore consider larger scales compared to earlier studies
(Walla and Schneeberger, (2008) and a situation with manure as the
primary input resource and allow the choice of upgrading biogas to the
natural gas grid. Scale eﬀects for Denmark reported in (Jacobsen et al.,
2013) and (Skovsgaard and Klinge Jacobsen, 2015) indicated that
economies of scale could be identiﬁed in some cases for biogas plants,
but adding sugar beet did not provide clear results with respect to scale.
We investigate this further and consider whether the current Danish
regulation provides the incentives to exploit the economies of scale,
and which policy changes that can be aﬀecting this.
Section 2 documents the methodological modelling approach. In
Section 3, the results are presented starting with scale eﬀects in the
100% manure case and proceeding with the addition of sugar beet as a
co-substrate which facilitates a higher yield, but also adds costs.
Section 4 performs a sensitivity analysis of the key parameters such
as yield, sugar-beet prices and transport distances. Section 5 discusses
the risk elements that are revealed by the sensitivity analysis and
identiﬁed due to the regulatory risks. In Section 6, the results for
economies of scale, earnings with co-substrates and risk elements are
combined for their regulatory implications and policy advice. Finally,
Section 7 draws the main conclusions.
2. Methodology and model
Based on a case study of an area in Denmark, we compare the two
opposing scale eﬀects for three speciﬁc sizes of a biogas plant. Like
(Delzeit and Kellner, 2013), we include transport costs for manure, co-
substrate (sugar beet) and the output (digestate). We extend our
analysis to larger scale and include the option of upgrading to the
gas grid, economies of scale is also included in the investment costs for
upgrading. We use an excel model to calculate the costs of input
collection, biogas production and cleaning or upgrading for further use.
Revenues from the operation are based on the gas prices plus subsidies
that can be obtained depending on various choices for supplying the
biogas output to a local combined heat and power unit (CHP) or to the
natural gas grid. The approach is to focus on private proﬁtability
regarding the choice of scale and input composition.
Cost data are estimated from Danish historical data, and transport
costs are calculated on the basis of an actual location in Northern
Jutland in an area, where manure is found in large amounts so it is
suitable for large-scale biogas plants. The applied biogas yields are the
results of actual experiments on co-digestion conducted as a part of the
Biochain project (see Acknowledgements), the choice of co-substrate
(sugar beet) is therefore dependent on the availability of consistent
data within the project. In order to comply with the issue of case
speciﬁcity we conduct a sensitivity analysis, and this conﬁrms the
importance of speciﬁc co-substrate availability (transport cost), price
and yield assumptions, which is supporting our conclusions on the
importance of regulatory ﬂexibility with regard to co-substrate choice.
2.1. The model set-up
The model is used to calculate total costs for the biogas production
based on required input amounts for each scale of operation. We
examine scale eﬀects on total costs and income both with a production
entirely based on (pig) manure as input as well as the cost and income
eﬀects of adding a co-substrate (sugar-beet) to boost the biogas yield.
The value chain is depicted in Fig. 2.1, where the dotted parallelo-
gram encases the economic work space for the biogas plant, and
thereby the costs and income which is included in the calculations.
Manure and sugar beet is bought from the farmers at a given price and
then transported to the plant. Here the input is mixed and digested
resulting in two products; the digestate, which is returned to the
farmer, and biogas, which is either upgraded for the gas market or
cleaned and sold to the local CHP.
Three diﬀerent plant sizes are investigated. Small (110) with a
capacity of 110,000 t of biomass input p.a., Medium (320) with a
capacity of 320,000 t and Large (500) with a capacity of 500,000 t.
Arguments for this choice of size can be found in the Appendix in the
section on key data.
Three diﬀerent cases of input mix of pig sludge (PS) and sugar beet
(SB) in the feedstock are analysed for all scales: A case with manure
only, PSSB-0: 100% PS, 0% SB and two cases where sugar beet is
added: PSSB-12.5: 87.5% PS, 12.5% SB and PSSB-25:75% PS, 25% SB.
The cases were selected on the basis of current and future Danish
regulation (to achieve biogas support, the permitted maximum percen-
tage of energy crops is 25% until 2017 and 12% subsequently1 (Danish
Energy Agency, 2012). This gives nine diﬀerent results to analyse and
compare.
To compare the scenarios, the total net income,
TNI p M j k( , M , , r , , )k j k j for the diﬀerent scenarios has to be found.
TNI p p M M TI p p M M TC M M( , , , ,) = ( , , , ) − ( , )j k j k k manure k manure j k
Where TI p p M M( , , , )k manure k manure is the total income for the plant as a
function of the price of output k , pk , the mass of output k , Mk and the
price and mass of the input manure. TC M M( , )j k represent the total costs
as a function of the mass of biomass input, j, and the mass of output k .
The sets J and K represent the set of input biomass (manure and sugar
beet) and the set of output (gas and digestate).
2.2. Total costs
Total costs are expressed as:
TC M M C M C M M C M
C M C M
( , ) = ( ) + ( , ) + ( )
+ ( ) + ( )
j k input SugarBeet trans j digestate opex j
capex j outputrelated k
Where C M p M( ) = ×input Sugar Beet sugar beet Sugar Beet, input- and output pro-
ducts are marked in green rectangles in Fig. 2.1. The pricing of manure
is, however, closely linked to the output price of digestate and,
therefore, input costs for manure are integrated in the income
equation, this is further explained in Appendix A.
All capital expenditures are annuitized at a 5% discount rate with a
depreciation period of 20 years.
2.2.1. Capital expenditures (Capex) and operational costs (Opex)
C M( )opex j andC M( )capex j are the investment and operational costs related
to the actual production of biogas. In Fig. 2.1, this is depicted as the
costs related to pre-storage, digestion and post digestion i.e. C M( )capex j
includes all necessary plant speciﬁc investment costs in storage tanks,
digesters, buildings, land, process heaters, control systems, advisory
services and so on. C M( )opex j , on the other hand, encompasses all
operational costs directly related to the plant, i.e. manpower, fuel costs
for process heating, maintenance and running costs (Ea Energianalyse,
2014).
Capex and Opex are estimated from data on the estimated costs for
projected plants applying for investment support in 2012 in Denmark
combined with model plants from the same period in time. The data
estimations have been calculated from the equation of the best-ﬁtting
estimated trend line on these data, and are implemented in the model
as the primary cost for Capex and Opex respectively (Table 2.1).
In the cases where sugar beet is added to the process additional
Capex and Opex related to sugar beet are included.
To calculate the input cost for sugar beet pulp, a price of 27.46
Euro/tonne is used. The price is given by SEGES2 (Abildgaard, 2015)
1 In the experimental study it was decided to use 12,5% and not the regulated 12%,
(Boldrin et al., 2016).
2 SEGES is an independent consultant ﬁrm with focus on agriculture located in
Denmark
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and the price is estimated for sugar beet pulp/sliced sugar beets.
Capex and Opex related to output is included in the output-related
costs.
2.2.2. Output related costs
C M( )output related k costs are depicted in Fig. 2.1 and include cleaning,
upgrading, transport and storage. The output related costs are all
additional costs related to the output, investment in upgrading equip-
ment or biogas cleaners and the related operational costs along with
gas compression costs. Also within the output related costs there are
scale eﬀects, see more in Appendix A . In case PSSB-25, where 25% of
sugar beet is added, not all digestate can be returned to the animal
farmers and, therefore, the remaining digestate has to be stored on site
and transported separately to neighbouring plant farmers. These
additional capital, operational and transport costs are also included
in the output related costs.
The output related costs are found separately from several sources
and added together. Further information on these data can be found in
the section on key data in the Appendix.
2.2.3. Transport: collection costs and density of resources
C M M( , )trans j digestate , transport costs are the sum of transport costs for
transporting input biomass to the biogas plant (PS and SB) and
returning the digestate to farmers.
Transport costs are calculated on the basis of available data given
by SEGES and typical km and load costs. We use the speciﬁc locations
of the farms and calculate the necessary travel distance to collect the
manure using concentric circles around the biogas plant modelling the
estimated distance as a function of the radius (i.e. the distance from the
plant). We assume that already treated manure/digestate is returned to
the farmers on the same trip. Transport distances, type of vehicle,
loading costs, etc. are taken into account as in (Walla and
Schneeberger, 2008); the kilometre cost correspond to 62–81% of
total transport costs; further information on the transport modelling
can be found in (Boldrin et al., 2016).
Increasing the scale of operations results in longer distances to
collect, but it varies substantially between the manure and the sugar
beet. The plant is purposely placed in a high manure density area,
which in itself reduces the distances and, thereby, transport cost for
manure, the average distance is calculated to be in the interval of 5–
10 km depending on scale and share of manure input. Furthermore,
transport cost can be considered as shared with the output, digestate,
as it is assumed that this is returned in the same trucks that deliver the
manure. This is common practice in Denmark as manure is the most
substantial part of the biomass input and the return of the digestate to
the farmer is an integrated part of the value chain (Raven and
Gregersen, 2007) in contrast to some biogas production plants in, for
example, Austria and Germany (Brudermann et al., 2015; Lebuhn
et al., 2014).
Sugar beets, on the other hand, are not produced in vast amounts
close to the model plant, which results in longer transport distances;
here the average distance is calculated to be in the interval of 22–70 km
Furthermore, transport costs are "doubled" so to speak, as it is
assumed that the sugar beet trucks drive empty in one direction. Due
to this long transport distance for sugar beet, particularly in the PSSB-
25 cases, a maximum distance assumption has been added to the
model data with the larger scales. The assumption is that all sugar beet
demand can be covered within the distance of 80 km – even when the
data say otherwise. This constraint makes sense as sugar beet would
normally not be transported more than 40 km (Abildgaard, 2015). The
eﬀect of this can be seen in the ﬁnal results, but it does not aﬀect the
overall conclusions.
2.3. Total income
Total income is determined by price and quantity of the three
products marked in green rectangles in Fig. 2.1 (biogas, manure and
digestate), support (marked with blue rounded rectangles) is an
integrated part of the price. Income is expressed as:
∑TI p p M M p M p M
I p M NI p M
( , , , ) = − ×
= ( , ) + ( , )
k manure k manure
k K
k k manure manure
gas gas Digestate digestate
∈
Where Mk is the mass of output k resulting from using a speciﬁc mix of
biomass 1 and 2 from the set J . The digestate Mdigestate is the residual
after gasiﬁcation
Data on biogas yield, the digestate price and biogas prices can be
found in the Appendix in the section on key data.
Income from digestate is deﬁned as a net income where the
input cost from manure is deducted from the income from sold
digestate.
NI p M p M p M( , ) = × − ×Digestate digestate digestate digestate manureinput manure
This is due to a trade principle with the farmers, where digestate
buyers and manure sellers in most cases are the same. Therefore, the
net income expresses the actual value of the digestate.
Biogas income is deﬁned as
I p M p M
where p p p S and p p S
( , ) = × ,
= + + = +
gas gas gas gas
gas UP
NG UP g gas UP gas CHP
NG CHP gas CHP,
, , ,
, ,
I is income, p is price, Mgas is the amount of m
3 biomethane. Pgas, UP is
the price of upgraded biogas, pNG, price of natural gas (here referred to
as the basis price), pg, a potential green value and S equals the support
value, depending on where the gas is delivered (at a local CHP or
upgraded for the natural gas net).
Notice that all support for the biogas production is concentrated on
the biogas yield.
Fig. 2.1. Economic ﬂow chart. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 2.1
Details on the cost estimates.
Nr. of
plants
Data year Size interval in
t/y
Equation in Euro/
t/y
R2
Capex 15 2012 42.000–491.000 Y=115,4–6ln(x) 0.40
Opex 12 2012 42.000–491.000 Y=9.87–0.46ln(x) 0.33
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2.3.1. Biogas price
The biogas price diﬀers depending on whether the biogas is
upgraded or sent directly to a local CHP.
p p p S and p p S= + + = +gas UP NG UP g gas UP gas CHP NG CHP gas CHP, , , , , ,
In this model, it is assumed that p p=NG UP NG CHP, , and S S≈gas UP gas CHP, , .
In real life, both p andpNG UP NG CHP, , will most often be a function of the
natural gas price, where it can be expected that the upgraded price will
be closer to the actual market price, whereas the CHP-price is expected
to be lower if biogas is the only input fuel to the CHP. This is because
the CHP has a seasonal fuel demand and biogas production is almost
the same throughout the year. Furthermore the pNG CHP, is pushed down
by a looser regulation on the use of cheap biomass and the heat
regulation setting a cap on the biogas price (Lybæk, 2014; Tafdrup,
2010).
The green value pg is a green certiﬁcate which is sold along with the
biogas. There is no actual support attached to this certiﬁcate, however
it can be exchanged for CO2-quotas and then it further represents the
green value that some may be willing to pay for.
In the model S S≈gas UP gas CHP, , as we assume that all support is handed
to the biogas producer. In real life it is probable that most support is
given to the biogas plant when the gas is upgraded as support is paid
directly to the upgrading facility, which often has the same owner as the
biogas producer (Danish Parliament, 2012). Support for biogas used in
a local CHP, on the other hand, is less likely to be entirely handed over
to the biogas plant as the support is only paid indirectly through a tax
reduction on fuel for heat and support to the power production. In
many cases the CHP does not have the same owner as the biogas plant.
2.4. Upgrade vs. direct use
The biogas plant can send the biogas to a local CHP or upgrade to
biomethane and connect it to the gas grid. With larger scales it becomes
more relevant to upgrade due to the limited demand for the heat output
from the CHP. Both choices involve additional capital and operational
expenditures, where upgrading is the more expensive choice.
The choice between upgrading and local use is determined by actual
conditions at the plant position. In the case considered here there is a
local CHP using approximately 3.5 mill m3 biogas per year. Therefore,
the model determines whether to upgrade or not based on the expected
biogas yield. If yield < 3.5 mill m3 biogas p.a., the biogas is cleaned and
sent to the local CHP otherwise all the biogas is upgraded and sent to
the natural gas net.
Imbedded in this model decision is the assumption, that all gas is
demanded when it is produced. In the case of upgraded biogas, there is
unlimited storage and a larger market which can match the demand. In
the case of local use, there is a higher risk that demand will not match
the supply – for example during the summer season when demand for
heat is lower. The larger the biogas production, the higher the risk that
a local CHP will not be able to use all the biogas eﬃciently; therefore,
upgrading can reduce the risk of insuﬃcient demand, a risk that must
be expected to increase with scale.
3. Results
The three scales of operation are compared: Small 110,000 t of
input p.a.; Medium (320,000) and Large (500,000) each denoted by
110, 300 and 500. We are looking for scale eﬀects and the most
proﬁtable case. To identify pure scale eﬀects, we start with the simplest
case; 100% manure.
3.1. Costs and scale, 100% manure
First costs are investigated in the case of 100% manure. As seen in
Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 there is a tendency towards economies of scale
although the total unit cost only reduces by 6% while the plant becomes
almost ﬁve times as large, it is clear there is a trade-oﬀ between rising
transport costs (almost 50%) and falling investment and operational
costs (approximately 18%).
It is also clear that output-related costs shift signiﬁcantly between
the three diﬀerent scales. The ﬁrst shift from small to medium size is
the result of a technology shift from gas cleaning to upgrading, while
the second shift is due to economies of scale within the upgrading
technology.
3.2. Adding sugar beet
It is common to add co-substrates in order to boost the manure
based biogas yield. To investigate whether the beneﬁts from the higher
yields outweigh the additional costs related to sugar beet, we therefore
examine two cases where 12.5% and 25% sugar beet is added as co-
substrate.
Fig. 3.1. Cost distribution, Euro/tonne.
Fig. 3.2. Cost distribution, Euro/m3.
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Scaling up the biogas plant reduces capital and operational costs
per unit of input for all input compositions with 16–18%.
Total costs in Euros/m3 are depicted in Fig. 3.3, from which it
becomes clear that the extra costs related to sugar beet are not
outweighed by the sugar beet related boost to the biogas. Total cost
per tonnes of input more than doubles when 25% sugar beet is added
and the main contributor to this increase is the purchasing cost of
sugar beet that determines the level of costs, but also the rising
transport costs is an important factor. Both elements reveal the
importance of securing low cost co-substrates and collecting the
resources available close to the plant. When looking for scale eﬀects
in the sugar beet cases, we ﬁnd an almost stable unit cost in all three
diﬀerent plant sizes. Thus there are no clear signs of economies of scale
as found in the 100% manure case.
The balance between, in particular, increased transport costs and
the reduced capital and operational costs results in almost equal total
unit costs for the large and small-scale in the PSSB-25 case, this is due
to a combination of several counteracting eﬀects. We ﬁnd positive scale
eﬀects regarding the upgrading facility in the shift from a medium to a
large-scale plant, while the 110,000 t case does not involve upgrading
resulting in lower output related costs.
At the same time does the unit costs associated with transport
increase so much that they exceeds capex in the large case. Along with
the increased output related costs this outweighs the entire scale
beneﬁt from opex and capex.
3.2.1. Transport costs; adding sugar beet
Focusing on the transport costs, we ﬁnd that sugar beet availability
in the local area is dispersed and requires longer transport distances
than the manure. Hereby, the total transport costs per unit increase by
almost 150% when moving from zero to 25% sugar beet (represented
by the vertical arrow) in Fig. 3.4. The ﬁgure presents the summed
transport costs in all three cases of input mix and the cost of manure
transport and sugar beet transport in the PSSB-12.5 case. For the sugar
beet cases, the unit cost also increases with scale (represented by the
horizontal arrow). The graph clearly shows that sugar beet transport
costs increase faster than manure transport costs. Furthermore, as the
level of transport cost is higher, the absolute increase in transport costs
from 110 to 500,000 t results in a larger contribution to diseconomies
of scale than for the zero sugar beet case. However even though
transport costs increase with scale, they only account for 17–18% of the
total costs, even in the large scale cases. This cost share seems quite
small compared to other analyses such as (Yabe, 2013), who ﬁnds that
transport costs account for around 56% of the yearly costs of biogas
plants in Japan.
3.3. Total costs and scale eﬀect results
Only based on the graphs it is clear, that costs increases – in line
with the amount of sugar beet that is added to the slurry. Furthermore
it is diﬃcult to detect a clear scale eﬀect in the mixed manure and sugar
beet cases. Purely based on the costs, the options with 110,000 t
annually seem best in the sugar beet cases. However, as the income
from the upgraded biogas is slightly higher, the options with upgrading
may become more attractive considering the fact that the cost
diﬀerence is marginal between scales.
When summarising the cost results we can say that:
• A unit cost reducing eﬀect results from upscaling biogas plant size
from 110,000 t of annual inputs to 500,000 t (together capex and
opex per unit are reduced by 16–18%).
• A unit cost increasing eﬀect results from scaling on transport costs
(an increase of 45% for manure input and 47–65% for sugar beet
input).
• The net eﬀect (trade-oﬀ) results in almost equal costs per unit for all
sizes in the PSSB-12.5 case and a small increase in the medium-
sized cost in the PSSB-25 case, where the small and large-scale unit
costs are otherwise almost the same. The beneﬁt of upscaling to
500,000 t (biogas plant+upgrade capex) is outweighed by the
increase in transport costs for both inputs and outputs.
3.4. Income
The biogas plant earns its income from both the treatment of
manure (converting it to digestate), and from biogas.
Net income from digestate accounts for around one third of total
income ( Fig. 3.5). The basis price of the biogas accounts for around
20–25% of the income, and this is only slightly higher in the cases
where the biogas is upgraded (in cases with medium and large-scale
production). The remaining income can be assigned to the biogas
support.
Consequently, around two thirds of the income is dependent on the
Fig. 3.3. Cost distribution when sugar beet is added, Euro/m3 biogas.
Fig. 3.4. Transport costs in Euro/tonnes of input. Fig. 3.5. Income distribution.
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level of biogas subsidies and, thereby, a high biogas yield.
3.5. Net income results
Based on existing subsidies, price assumptions for inputs and
outputs and the production technology, the only viable input composi-
tion is PSSB-0, i.e. 100% manure, with the most viable size being the
large-scale production plant (Table 3.1). The ﬁnding that the large-
scale plant is the most proﬁtable is in line with the ﬁndings for new
Danish plants based on manure examined in Jacobsen et al. (2013),
(table 4.16 and 4.17) where a plant size of 360,000 t is more proﬁtable
than smaller sizes.
Adding sugar beet to the production increases the biogas yield,
although not enough to compensate for the additional costs related to
the sugar beet, so that the net earnings become negative. For the PSSB-
12.5 case, the result is close to break-even between investing or not.
The price of sugar beet is around 4.5 times the price of manure. The
higher yield from adding sugar beet leads to increased earnings in the
sugar beet cases which are almost high enough to achieve positive net
earnings for the 12.5% sugar beet case, but the yield in the case with
25% sugar beet is not high enough to make up for the increased cost
due to the higher input costs of sugar beet. This is not the result of
increased transport costs, but rather the high price of sugar beet. A 30%
reduction in the price of sugar beet could make all cases proﬁtable. The
price of sugar beet is, therefore, a key assumption and sensitivity has
been conducted in the following section.
Biogas yield is also a critical factor for proﬁtability. The negative
results for the sugar beet cases are caused by the unexpectedly
relatively lower yields for the sugar beet cases. The yields would have
had to be somewhat higher to make these options more economical
than the 100% manure case. Sensitivity analysis in the next section also
examines this variable.
4. Sensitivity analysis
In this paper, we use a case study to form a general picture on the
potential for scale eﬀects in biogas production and relate it to the
current regulation, given the wish to expand biogas production in
Denmark. We are aware, that some factors and assumptions in a case
study will be case speciﬁc and subject to insecurity. We therefore
perform this sensitivity analysis in order to get a picture of the
importance of certain factors in relation to the net-income for a biogas
plant. We have chosen to use a constant symmetric variation in the
sensitivity analysis in order to be able to compare the importance of the
investigated factors to each other. We then assess the probability of
variation qualitatively.
We perform a sensitivity analysis on four factors related to net-
income: sugar beet prices, transport costs, yield and the biogas subsidy.
As previously discussed, sugar beet prices and transport costs can have
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the proﬁtability of the biogas plant and,
therefore, these costs are examined. Furthermore, yield and support
are investigated due to the high income share from support, which
entirely focuses on the biogas yield.
The sensitivity analysis is conducted with regard to the net-income
where the factors in question are halved and increased by 50%. This
factor is chosen from the perspective of achieving substantial altera-
tions in the results and in the same time sustains symmetry.
Table 4.1 presents a sensitivity analysis of transport costs for all
three cases (PSSB-0, PSSB-12.5 and PSSB-25). As can be seen in most
cases, a relatively large reduction/ or increase in transport distances is
not enough to change the overall results regarding net-income.
In order to compare the importance of transport cost in relation to
the sugar beet costs, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on sugar beet
prices and plotted together with the transport distance as illustrated in
Fig. 4.1.
While transport costs play a signiﬁcant role, the sugar beet price,
unsurprisingly, is an even more important factor regarding the net
income result in the sugar beet scenarios. We ﬁnd that while a 50%
reduction in transport distance only just makes the business case
positive in the larger cases, a 50% reduction in the sugar beet price
leads to a positive result for all sizes. It is, however, unrealistic to
assume that the price of sugar beet will be halved, as the modelled
sugar beet price is relatively close to production costs (Abildgaard,
2015). Transport costs, on the other hand, particularly for sugar beet,
may be expected to be signiﬁcantly lower in cases where sugar beet is
used as substrate (Abildgaard, 2015). In the Appendix, Fig. B1 presents
the same sensitivity analysis for PSSB-25 with approximately the same
result, although even a 50% reduction in transport distance is not
enough to change the negative net income result.
Not only are costs important for the results, but also potential
income in the form of biogas yield and biogas prices. When we compare
the biogas yields used in this case study with what is actually produced
annually at Danish biogas plants the yields generated in the cases with
co-substrates seems relative low see for example (Jacobsen et al.,
2014). When conducting the sensitivity analysis on the biogas yield and
subsidy we ﬁnd that a 50% increase in biogas yield improves proﬁt-
ability signiﬁcantly in all cases. The best results are found in the PSSB-
25 cases where net-income per tonne of biomass suddenly becomes
larger for the PSSB-25 cases than for the PSSB-12.5 case for the large
and medium-sized plants, and the higher yield compensates for the
substantial increase in transport and sugar beet costs. Similar; only less
pronounced results appears with changes in the biogas subsidy, also
displayed in Table 4.2. This is not surprising given, that the subsidy
covers a smaller part of the income.
The importance of the factors on the input and output side are
compared in Fig. 4.2 through changes in net income when sugar beet
prices are changed compared to changes in the yield.
The ﬁgure illustrates that even though the price of sugar beet has a
Table 3.1
Revenues, costs and net-income, Euro/tonnes.
Euro/tonnes PSSB-0 PSSB-12.5 PSSB-25
110,000 320,000 500,000 110,000 320,000 500,000 110,000 320,000 500,000
Revenues Biogas 2.31 2.49 2.49 3.13 3.37 3.37 4.58 4.93 4.93
Support 4.94 4.99 4.99 6.70 6.76 6.76 9.79 9.89 9.89
Digestate 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.77 4.77 4.77 5.53 5.53 5.53
Costs Transport 1.12 1.45 1.62 1.60 2.19 2.64 2.72 3.64 3.99
Capex 4.19 3.59 3.34 4.39 3.77 3.52 4.54 3.92 3.68
Opex 4.57 4.09 3.88 4.87 4.39 4.18 5.18 4.69 4.48
Output related 0.46 1.22 0.87 0.61 1.18 1.16 1.15 1.99 1.67
Sugar beet – – – 4.04 4.04 4.04 8.09 8.09 8.09
Net-income 0.93 1.15 1.79 −0.91 −0.67 −0.64 −1.77 −1.98 −1.56
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signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the net income, the level of biogas yield has an
even greater eﬀect.
It is also clear that net income increases less in the small-scale case.
This is because the biogas yield is so high that it becomes necessary to
invest in upgrading, even in the small-scale cases. In the Appendix, Fig.
B2 presents the same sensitivity analysis for the PSSB-12.5 case.
Upgrading costs matter for the net-income as seen in Fig. 4.2 and
can be a critical option for achieving economies of scale. In our
reference cases we assume that the plant upgrades when the biogas
yield exceeds 3.5 mill m3 p.a., this may however not be the optimal
solution. In order to compare the choice between direct use and
upgrading we explore this with a sensitivity analysis for the 12.5%
sugar beet case in relation to yield variations and scale. In the case of
direct use, it is assumed that the heat demand is completely covered
with a biogas supply of 3.5 mill m3 p.a. All biogas exceeding this level
generates an electricity production which is supported, while all
additional heat production is wasted (cooled). All biogas exceeding
3.5 mill m3 will thus receive a lover price only related to the electricity
production.
Fig. 4.3 illustrates the challenges for a biogas plant feeding into a
local CHP with a limited heat demand. This challenge increases with
scale as the risk of biogas excess supply increases, which then decreases
the value of a higher than anticipated biogas yield. That yield is such an
important factor is not surprising as two thirds of the income is based
on the biogas yield and around two thirds of this is support. This shows
the importance of focus on the yield, but also illustrates a clear risk
associated with yield and changes in support.
On the cost side, the results are relatively robust towards changes in
the individual cost factors. Only the sugar beet cost has a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the net income results. So, even though changes in costs
can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on net income, there is still potential to
Table 4.1
Sensitivity-net income effects, when transport distances change, Euro/tonnes.
PSSB-0 PSSB-12.5 PSSB-25
110,000 320,000 500,000 110,000 320,000 500,000 110,000 320,000 500,000
Net-income 0.93 1.15 1.79 −0.91 −0.67 −0.64 −1.77 −1.98 −1.56
50% distance 1.29 1.67 2.40 −0.42 0.12 0.23 −0.83 −1.09 −0.79
150% distance 0.57 0.62 1.18 −1.40 −1.46 −1.50 −2.71 −2.87 −2.33
Fig. 4.1. Sensitivity–net income eﬀect in the PSSB-12.5 case with changes in transport
costs and sugar beet prices.
Table 4.2
Sensitivity - net income effects with changes in the biogas yield and support.
PSSB-0 PSSB-12.5 PSSB-25
Yield 110,000 320,000 500,000 110,000 320,000 500,000 110,000 320,000 500,000
Net-income 0.93 1.15 1.79 −0.91 −0.67 −0.64 −1.77 −1.98 −1.56
50% yield −2.63 −1.71 −1.42 −5.53 −5.01 −5.37 −8.55 −8.91 −8.48
150% yield 4.35 4.81 5.36 3.72 3.84 4.20 3.33 5.09 5.19
Support
50% subsidy −1.54 −1.35 −0.70 −4.26 −4.05 −4.02 −6.67 −6.93 −6.51
150% subsidy 3.40 3.64 4.29 2.44 2.71 2.75 3.12 2.96 3.39
Fig. 4.2. Sensitivity - net income eﬀect with changes in biogas yield or sugar beet prices,
PSSB-25.
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Fig. 4.3. Sensitivity - net income eﬀect with changes in biogas yield depending on the
choice to upgrade the biogas or direct usage in a local CHP, PSSB-12.5.
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adjust other costs to achieve an improved net income, whereas the yield
determines whether net income is positive or negative.
5. Main risks associated with input prices, yield and output
prices
Managers of a biogas plant consider several risk factors when
investing in technology and planning the operational strategy. In this
paper, we focus on the risks associated with raw material inputs and
output price/demand for biogas. The sensitivity analysis revealed some
of the consequences from varying important parameters including
input prices/costs and yield. We highlight the following risk elements:
• Sugar beet-price increase.
• Transport cost increase due to limited local availability of sugar beet.
• Technically poor performances of plant with low yield as a result -
break-down and repair delays.
• Reduced yield due to varying/seasonal supply of co-substrates
(sugar beet) and varying composition of primary input/manure.
• Output price variation (natural gas price excl. support) and ﬂuctu-
ating demand for heating from CHP plant - resulting in too low
biogas demand and possible losses from ﬂaring.
5.1. Input cost elements
The plant costs depend on changes in input prices and, in our case,
speciﬁcally the sugar beet price for the cases with 12.5% and 25% sugar
beet. A potential increase in the sugar beet price by up to 50% would
have a severe impact on earnings (Figs. 4.1 and 4.2). This kind of price
change is not entirely speculative, if the demand for sugar beet
increases or supply decreases because farmers decide to grow more
proﬁtable crops. A parallel example could be the growth in demand for
maize in Germany as the result of high biogas subsidies, adding a
pressure on dairy farming (Jacobsen et al., 2014). The risk of
ﬂuctuations in the price of sugar beet in the future is serious and
measures to reduce this risk or the eﬀect of such price increases will
have to be a focus of the biogas plant. Being dependent on only one
secondary high-yield resource is risky. Therefore, measures that secure
the technical use of alternative inputs and the availability of these can
reduce the risks associated with input prices. A high price for sugar
beet would call for a part/full substitution to other co-substrates as
inputs and a more moderate cost increase on the input side. Flexible
technology and the ability to substitute between co-substrates is a key
strategy to reduce this risk element. One step could be to focus on
waste products which are already common used at many biogas plants;
this could be a cheaper and more sustainable solution. It can however
also introduce other issues in terms of how to use the digestate
containing waste products (Huttunen et al., 2014; Lantz et al., 2007)
and already now the access to good waste products is reduced and
prices have increased (Geels and Raven, 2007).
The distance and, thereby, transport costs are also important
(Fig. 4.1), but the risk is probably lower than the risk of an increase
in the sugar beet price. For manure, availability is relatively predictable
and the resource is local so there is little competition regarding this
input. Therefore, changes in livestock/pig populations would only
increase the transport distance to collect manure gradually and with
moderate increases in distance. One risk is that it would only be
possible to use the same lorry to collect the manure and distribute back
to the farmer directly to a limited extent, which would double the
distance driven compared to our assumption.
For the secondary input, sugar beet, the transport costs are much
higher per tonne and the resource is widely used with many alter-
natives. Our assumptions for distance are quite conservative (up to
80 km), but the risk is still substantial if sugar beet has to be
transported from other regions of Denmark. The probable solution
would be to use another and closer substrate, so risk will here be
reduced if the plant technically and legally can use a variety of co-
substrates instead of only one.
The entire revenue for the biogas plant depends on the output level
and, therefore, the biogas yield is one of the main risk factors as
revealed in the sensitivity analysis (Fig. 4.2). First, the general
technology risk of the performance of the plant being lower than
expected is a risk prior to investment. In particular, the lifetime of
equipment along with necessary downtime for repair and cleaning will
be risk factors regarding the realised annual yield. Using proven
technology reduces this risk, but the use of diﬀerent/ﬂexible inputs
necessitates the use of unproven technology to some extent. This is a
major ex ante risk to the investment decision.
To optimise the yield, a steady input mix and controlled feeding
with inputs of a constant quality is the best. The risk here is that the
inputs will vary in availability and quality during the year/seasons
(especially sugar beet which cannot be expected to have the same
quality/availability throughout the year). This implies the risk that the
average realised yield will be lower than the optimally controlled case.
Also, the knowledge of the actual content and biogas potential of the
inputs is not always perfect and, therefore, optimal feeding is not
possible. The risks associated with lower yield due to these causes is
probably less than the basic technology risk, but moderate assumptions
of realised yield should be used.
5.2. Income risk elements
As described in the methods section, income consists of income
from sales of digestate and income from sales of biogas output (here
both the biogas used directly and upgraded natural gas).
I p M p M p M p p S M
p M
( , ) = × + × =( + + ) ×
+ ×
j j gas gas digestate digestate
NG g gas gas
digestate digestate
The natural gas price ﬂuctuates and constitutes one risk element on
the income side, but the market price pNG is only a smaller fraction of
the biogas income, and this price risk can be hedged in the short to
medium term. The support (Sgas) on top of the gas price is an almost
ﬁxed premium and constitutes around 2/3 of the revenue per biogas
unit, which reduces the risk (variation) on the income side substan-
tially, see more on this in Appendix A. In the case of sales directly to a
local CHP plant which does not use upgraded biogas, the price risk is
higher as the support is provided for the electricity generation of the
CHP plant. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the biogas price is
directly tied to the support. For this reason, the solution is often to
reduce risk for the biogas plant by negotiating a long-term ﬁxed price
for the gas used by the CHP plant. However, there is also a volume risk
associated with the sales to a CHP plant. If the biogas output is
dimensioned relative to the heat demand supplied by the CHP,
seasonal variation in heat demand will result in varying demand for
biogas throughout the year. This is critical to the risk actually faced by
the biogas plant and can be expected to reduce the average income
realised. The sensitivity analysis presented in Fig. 4.3 further illustrates
how the beneﬁt of an extra yield increases with scale in the case of
upgrading, whereas this beneﬁt in fact decreases with scale when the
biogas plant feeds directly into a local CHP with a predeﬁned heat
demand. In the long-term this risk can even be enhanced with
structural changes if, for example, heat pumps, electric boilers or
biomass boilers take over a larger fraction of the supply for the district
heat grid and thereby even reduce biogas demand if heat demand
decreases . This combination of a seasonal and long-term structural
volume risk must be characterised as important and to some extent
fundamental regarding the decision of whether to base a biogas plant
on supply to CHP plants or to upgrade for input to the natural gas grid.
The biogas plant also generates income from the digestate output of
the plant. The risk associated with the part that is returned directly to
the farmer who supplies the manure is limited as the contract with the
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farmer often ties the supply of manure with the return of the treated
manure with ﬁxed prices for both. As long as the farmer receives a
higher value product than he supplies, the contract and, thereby, the
income must be assumed to be associated with low risk. Farmers are,
however, quite ﬁnancially exposed (high debt ratios) which means that
there is a risk that some of them may go bankrupt and the contracts
may not be continued with the farmer who takes over. Furthermore,
there is a volume risk as the farmers may change the composition of
livestock/pigs and the size of their activities, while the amount of dry
matter in the manure may also vary. The dry matter has a substantial
eﬀect on the biogas potential and, therefore, poses a considerable risk
to the biogas income.
Finally, the main income source is the support level set by the
authorities. There is always a risk element associated with this kind of
public support. In this Danish case, the support is a ﬁxed premium
(upgraded gas), which must be seen as guaranteed by the general
Danish government principle of never changing support provided to
existing plants (investors). Indirectly, the authorities can, however,
change the eﬀective level of support by modiﬁcations to the fees for
entering the grid, regulations/requirements for emissions from biogas
plants, etc. but this risk can be characterised as relatively low and with
very moderate potential impact.
6. Regulatory implications
We ﬁnd that input cost and transport cost can have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the proﬁtability of the biogas plant. Investment in the
biogas plant is proﬁtable in our case based on current support policies.
The cases with added sugar beet are not proﬁtable under the assump-
tions of sugar beet prices, yield and transport distances, but they are
attractive from the perspective of replacing fossil fuels in the energy
sector. The biogas output level is much higher in these cases and based
on the public policy for replacing fossil fuels (natural gas) with biogas
and reducing GHG emissions, these cases have the greatest environ-
mental beneﬁt (Boldrin et al., 2016). The sensitivity analysis illustrated
that the price of the co-substrate (sugar beet) is critical for proﬁtability
and the risk discussion pointed to the option of reducing the associated
risk for the cost of the co-substrate.
6.1. Input mix alternatives should be allowed
A biogas plant will be located close to a supply of manure, but it is
also important to be located close to a cheap source of co-substrate.
With the right pre-treatment and process, biogas plants can digest
almost any co-substrate to increase the probability of proﬁtable
operations. In order to support ﬂexibility and thereby proﬁtability,
regulation should set as few restrictions on the types of co-substrates as
possible without undermining other objectives such as sustainability,
food safety and the environment. Flexibility in the input mix will
considerably reduce the risk associated with the co-substrate price, but
also the risk regarding the necessary transport distances as a secondary
beneﬁt. If one co-substrate has to be collected from very far away to
achieve the desired volume, the plant may choose to add an additional
co-substrate even though its price is higher as its location is closer;
thereby reducing transport costs so that the combined cost is compe-
titive in relation to the ﬁrst co-substrate. Current Danish regulatory
policy limits the use of energy crops to 25% of total inputs, but in 2018,
this will be reduced to 12%, which is the constraining factor for the
design of new plants (Danish Energy Agency, 2012). This restriction
does not seem critical in the cases analysed in this article as proﬁt-
ability in the 25% case is lower than in the 12.5% case. However, there
may be co-substrate shares in the range 12.5–25% that are more
proﬁtable, but not tested in our case. As already mentioned these co-
substrates could be various waste products which are already used with
great success in Denmark (Geels and Raven, 2007; Holm-Nielsen et al.,
2009), in order to assure ﬂexibility but also food safety we suggest a
safelist on waste products, which can be used in biogas production
without damaging the beneﬁts and the reputation of the digestate
(Huttunen et al., 2014).
6.2. Yield focus is a result of support provided for end-use of biogas
We ﬁnd that the biogas yield has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the net-
income. Therefore, the focus of the plant is on maximising yield. Net
income is dominated by the income from biogas, particularly from the
biogas feed-in tariﬀs which account for approximately 40–50% of the
total net income. The fact that public biogas support is provided
primarily for biogas output has the following implications:
– The biogas plant will not use biogas for own process use at the plant
– Yield maximisation drives demand for high yield co-substrates
– The incentive when upgrading to the natural gas grid is to maximise
total annual biogas output
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the support for biogas used in a local
CHP is for the electricity output and a tax reduction on the heat
produced from biogas. For a CHP plant supplied with biogas, there is
an incentive to maximise biogas-based electricity production indepen-
dently of power demand on the grid, only conditional on the steady
supply of biogas and heat demand. This is ineﬃcient for the power
system, where conditions include hours with low electricity demand
and correspondingly very low or zero electricity prices. A ﬁnal indirect
implication of the Danish biogas support system is that the farmer has
no incentive to support a high biogas yield, but only has to comply with
manure characteristic requirements from the biogas plant.
6.3. Regulation, the choices of scale and whether to upgrade
Until recently, support for biogas production was only available
indirectly via support for electricity and heat production in a local CHP.
Regulation has now been modiﬁed to include support at a comparable
level for biogas supplied to the natural gas grid. This change towards a
more ﬂexible regulation aﬀects both the ability to exploit economies of
scale and the choice of whether to upgrade or not.
We ﬁnd economies of scale and to exploit this, the biogas plant has
to either ﬁnd a large district heating market or upgrade the biogas. The
large district heating market should be situated in an area with a
suﬃcient concentration of manure resources to limit transport costs.
These requirements are quite restrictive and would, therefore, often
hinder the full exploitation of economies of scale; with upgrading to the
gas grid the biogas plant becomes independent of a large heat demand.
Furthermore the exploitation of economies of scale is dependent on
suﬃcient available input, allowing several alternative co-substrates
would increase biogas output with lower costs even in areas where
manure is less concentrated, if only few co-substrates are allowed this
may in itself be a barrier to exploiting economies of scale.
Upgrade is a way to exploit economies of scale and reduce the
dependence on a monopoly CHP buyer of biogas. An essential
assumption in our model is that upgrading is possible with support
levels similar to support for use in CHPs. Before the recent change in
regulation, CHPs were monopoly buyers of the biogas, which forced the
biogas plants into long-term contracts with relatively low biogas prices.
Furthermore, the biogas producer would have an increased risk of
demand when the contract expired, which would set a heat demand
determined limit on the optimal size of the biogas plant and prevent
economies of scale. With support for upgraded biogas, the CHPs have
lost the monopoly power and the biogas producer has an improved
better chance to beneﬁt from economies of scale.
7. Conclusion and policy implications
In this Danish case study, we ﬁnd that per unit transport costs for
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biogas plants increase with scale, which partly oﬀsets the economies of
scale found for capital and operational expenditures. A detailed
modelling of available manure resources, the ﬁxed and variable
transport costs and digestate transport costs suggests that in certain
areas of Denmark, centralised large-scale biogas plants are the most
economical; provided that all biogas production can be upgraded to the
natural gas grid and receive the available support.
When the biogas plant size is scaled up from 110,000 t of annual
inputs to 500,000 t, the opposing contributors to scale eﬀects and the
net result found are:
• A unit cost reducing eﬀect in capex and opex, where unit costs are
reduced by 16–18%.
• A unit cost increasing eﬀect from transport, with an increase of 45%
for manure input and 47–65% for sugar beet input.
• For the 100% manure case, the net eﬀect (trade-oﬀ) is a total unit
cost reduction of 6%.
• For the two cases with sugar beet, the net eﬀect is a slight increase in
unit cost, where the economies of scale disappear due to faster rising
sugar beet transport costs and output related costs.
The regulatory choices made by the authorities both concerning the
level of support for biogas and the end use options supported are
crucial for the proﬁtability of biogas production and also for providing
incentives for choosing the most eﬃcient scale and inputs for opera-
tion.
Scale eﬀects favour the choice of upgrading to natural gas quality as
the biogas production becomes independent of local demand, both in
relation to scaling of the plant, production variations and the risk of a
decreasing and varying heat demand.
Additionally, the assumption that the entire subsidy for biogas used
in the CHP plant accrues to the biogas plant is questionable for
alternative ownership structures. We have assumed that either the
CHP owns and builds the biogas plant as an additional activity or that
the negotiating power of the biogas plant is suﬃciently strong to secure
the full subsidy. Alternative assumptions may further change the
attractiveness of upgrading relative to the CHP solution, and autho-
rities have to carefully consider both the level of support provided, but
also diﬀerences in support for diﬀerent end uses of biogas.
The sugar beet price and biogas yield were identiﬁed as critical
assumptions for the results and sensitivity analysis carried out for these
elements. We can conclude that there is a case for larger scale biogas
plants in Denmark based on economies of scale regarding costs, but
that the eﬀect of co-substrates such as sugar beet requires availability
relatively close to the plant combined with a low price for the co-
substrate or a higher biogas yield. Alternatively other co-substrates
could be considered emphasising the need for ﬂexible input options as
for example waste products in order to keep transport and substrate
costs down and the yield up.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for
valuable insights and suggestions. The authors also wish to acknowl-
edge the support given by the Innovation foundation under the
“Strategic Research in Sustainable Energy and Environment” research
programme (Grant no. 12–132631) to the project “Optimisation of
value chains for biogas production in Denmark (BioChain)”.
Appendix A. Key data
Data for the model have primarily been found in Danish biogas literature estimated from public and less public data and collected in the
BioChain project, see Acknowledgements.
Scale
Scale is represented in the form of mass input, which is typical for Danish analyses with most cost data being related to input size in tonnes. The
input mix varies in the diﬀerent cases as does the output in energy content. Therefore, the stable capacity factor is tonnes of input. Other analyses
around Europe relate to energy output in the form of kWel capacity which makes sense as regulation in most European countries is related to output
in the form of kWhel (Hjort-Gregersen et al., 2011). Under the new Danish regulation, which was ﬁnally ratiﬁed in spring 2014, biogas support was
equalised regardless of whether biogas is upgraded for the gas net or cleaned for use in a local CHP. Furthermore, the support is independent of
scale, contrary to biogas support given in other European countries such as Austria and Germany, (Brudermann et al., 2015; Lantz et al., 2007).
Three diﬀerent plant sizes are investigated. Small(110) with a capacity of 110,000 t of biomass input p.a., Medium(320) with a capacity of
320,000 t and Large(500) with a capacity of 500,000 t. Plant size has been decided on the grounds of history, the size used in other analyses and
future expectations in Denmark. The plant is considered as a centralised plant and the small scale (110) can be considered relatively large-scale
compared to the sizes dealt with in both Delzeit and Walla who consider electricity capacities up to 1 MW (Delzeit and Kellner, 2013). Depending on
the input mix, our small scale (110) plant could feed into a CHP plant of the size of 0.5–1 MWel. The Medium (320) size case is considerably larger
and corresponds to a size which is often used in Danish analyses and is relatively typical for a Danish central plant (COWI, 2013; Deloitte, 2013; Ea
Energianalyse, 2014). Only a few large-scale (500) plants have been built, but several plants of this size have been planned for the future. As support
is independent of size in Denmark, plants even larger than 500,000 t have been built in Denmark.
The output related costs
The output related costs are the sum of biogas treatment costs, storage and transport. The chosen technology for biogas cleaning is biological
trickling ﬁlter and water scrubber for the biogas upgrading, water scrubber is a widely used technology, see e.g. Patterson et al. (2011). Depending
on the size of the biogas yield, the model can choose between three diﬀerent treatment sizes (Australian Meat Processor Corporation, 2013; Bauer
et al., 2013). Again we ﬁnd scale eﬀects as unit costs decreases as the gas amounts increases. Storage costs relates to the biogas storage with a
capacity which corresponds to one day of production – allowing temporary storage in cases where the biogas is polluted; and storage of digestate
that cannot be returned to the animal farmer immediately. Only in the PSSB-25case, where sugar beet input is 25%, will some of the digestate be
sold to other parties (plant farmers). In this case, additional costs are added as the extra digestate has to be stored at the plant until spring, when it
can be delivered to the plant farmers. Transport costs for biogas include pipe and compression costs; assuming that the connected CHP and the
distribution net is situated only 1 km from the biogas plant.
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The scale eﬀect within the upgrading technology is illustrated by the ﬁgures in Table A1.
From the table, it is also apparent that there is a substantial diﬀerence in costs depending on whether gas is cleaned or upgraded. In this model,
upgrading seems less attractive to the biogas producer, due to the higher treatment costs, combined with the assumption that price and support is
almost independent of whether the gas is upgraded or cleaned for local use; similar results was found in Jacobsen et al. (2014).
Yield
The biogas yield has been estimated from our project partners in the Biochain project on the basis of micro-experiments with pig manure
combined with sugar beet pulp in diﬀerent ratios ( Table A2). From these experiments, we also experienced that the results become diﬃcult to use
when the percentage of sugar beet exceeds 25% (Boldrin et al., 2016).
Prices
The Sugar beet price is given by SEGES and the price is estimated for sugar beet pulp/sliced sugar beets. This price is close to the production cost
of Sugar beet, and according to SEGES this price has been constant for a long while (Abildgaard, 2015). Input and output prices for manure/
digestate are also given by SEGES (Abildgaard, 2015) and are based on prices negotiated between the animal farmers and the biogas plant. There is
both a price on manure and digestate, but the prices used for the calculations are the digestate and net-digestate prices (digestate price minus
manure cost). The digestate price corresponds to the fertilizer value of the digestate (see for example (Lemvig biogas, 2016) ) and the net-digestate
price can be interpreted as the value added through the biogas process. The interlinkage between digestate price and manure costs implies our focus
on the net-price of digestate. This also corresponds to models used elsewhere se for example (Jacobsen et al., 2014). The pricing of manure and
digestate vary among biogas plants, depending on where they are situated ( Table A3).
Biogas prices are calculated on the basis of the oﬃcial feed-in tariﬀs and results from the Biogas Taskforce analysis on the expected basis price
plus the expected green value (PlanEnergi, 2014). The feed-in tariﬀ consists of three parts; 1) approximately 70% of the subsidy is without any time
limit and indexed following 60% of inﬂation, 2) approximately 20% of the subsidy is also without a time limit and is negatively correlated with the
gas price - thereby reducing the risk of income loss related to the natural gas price, and ﬁnally 3) approximately 10% of the subsidy is phased out in
the period from 2015 to 2020 (Danish Energy Agency, 2016). This basically means that support is expected to decrease to some extent, however
with a high certainty, so income losses on this account can be included in the calculations from the start.
As argued in Sections 2.3 and 5.2, it is debatable whether the biogas plant can expect the same price for the biogas when it is sold directly to the
local CHP as if it was upgraded. This counts both for the natural gas price but also the expected share of the subsidy. The green value only relates to
the case of upgrading, but this value is not considered to be high. The authors of "GGI" from blue energy planet have found indications of
willingness-to-pay in the region of 1–10 Eurocent/NM3. When asked directly, however, they expect a price in the lower end of this range. The
estimated value is uncertain, but is close to the current value of the CO2-quota price, and therefore the best approximation we could achieve given
the currently lack of an open market for green certiﬁcates in Denmark.
Table A1
Investment and operational costs associated with treatment of gas for upgrade or CHP,
Euro/tonnes.
Ratio/Scale 110,000 320,000 500,000
Gas, Cleaning for CHP 0.15 0.15 0.08
Gas, Upgrading for the net – 0.89 0.55
Table A2
Biogas yield, cubic metres biogas per tonne of input.
PSSB-0 PSSB-12.5 PSSB-25
Biogas yield (70% NH4) 12.6 17.1 25.0
Biomethane yield (98% NH4) 9.0 12.2 17.8
Table A3
Prices in Euro/tonnes and Euro/NM3 Biomethane.
Basis
price
Support Green
value
Manure
price
Total
price
Sugar beet, Euro/
tonnes
27.46 27.46
Digestate, Euro/
tonnes
10.05 – – −6.03 4.02
Biomethane, Euro/
NM3
0.26 0.55 0.02 0.83
Biogas CHP, Euro/
NM3
0.26 0.55 0.81
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Appendix B. Additional sensitivity graphs
See Appendix Fig. B1 and B2.
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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the effects of politically motivated economic instruments on biogas value chains. 
This is done by comparing two European countries who each have implemented a set of regulations: 
Norway provides investment support and the support is mostly focused on the input side of biogas 
production, while Danish support is focused on the output side. The comparative study is done through 
an assessment of the costs and income of a Norwegian and a Danish value chain. Furthermore, the 
economic instruments were evaluated by assessing the economic consequences of implementing the 
Danish instruments on a Norwegian value chain, and vice versa. We find that both structural and 
regulatory conditions have a large impact on the configuration of the value chains. The policy 
implications of end-use support in Denmark is large-scale plants, maximising the output through co-
digestion of manure and high yield substrates, while avoiding losses. Investment support in Norway has 
increased biogas production from organic waste with less emphasis on efficient gas usage, while input 
support regarding manure has led to an increase in the usage of manure as substrate. Current regulations 
do support the political objectives however; both countries can improve and learn from each other.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Anaerobic digestion of organic resources 
 Biogas production from organic resources is seen as a measure to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions in several sectors. A large variety of policies have been proposed and implemented to increase 
and improve biogas production. In this paper, we aim to investigate how these policies can affect biogas 
value chains, specifically by evaluating the effect of regulatory measures. This is done by comparing 
two countries that have implemented different sets of economic instruments. Denmark currently 
provides an end-use support through a feed-in tariff for electrical power and gas delivered to the grid, 
while Norway provide investments support for plants and support to farmers sending manure to biogas 
production. 
Biogas is produced through an anaerobic digestion process using different substrates such as 
manure, sewage sludge and organic waste from households or industry. Two products are generated: 
biogas and digestate Biogas can be used to generate heat and electricity, or upgraded to a higher methane 
content and applied as a fuel in transport or fed into the natural gas grid as biomethane. Digestate can 
be used as a fertiliser on agricultural soils, if the co-substrates are allowed for this alternatively the 
digestate can be separated into a wet and a dry fraction, where the wet fraction is sent to waste water 
treatment and the dry fraction act as soil improvement. 
There is a large diversity of biogas value chains in Europe. In Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands the substrate for biogas is mainly from agriculture (IEA Bioenergy, 2014), while in UK, 
Italy, Spain and France a large share of the biogas production originates from landfills (EurObserv’ER, 
2014). In Norway, Sweden and Finland biogas is mostly produced from sewage sludge, or organic waste 
from household and industry (Huttunen, Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014; Olsson and Fallde, 2014). In 
many countries, biogas production is driven by the demand for renewable energy, and feed-in tariffs for 
electricity and gas production to the grid are used as incentives for production (e.g. Germany, Austria 
and Denmark). In Norway, Sweden and Finland, however, biogas is increasingly used as a fuel for 
transport  (Lantz et al, 2007; EUROBSERV’ER, 2014; Jacobsen, Laugesen and Dubgaard, 2014; 
Brudermann, Mitterhuber and Posch, 2015).  
Few studies have been done specifically on biogas in a context of political regulation. Raven 
and Gregersen (2007) made a comparative assessment between biogas development in the Netherlands 
and Denmark. They underline the importance of formal rules and concludes that subsidy grants and 
investment grants played a role in both countries. The long-term character of the financial support 
mechanisms in Denmark has been an important factor and proved to be successful compared to the ad 
hoc support in the Netherlands. Policy support was usually linked to broader regime development (e.g. 
energy strategy, manure handing problems, climate change). 
Wirth et al (2013) examined how the effects of formal institutions depend on informal 
institutional structures through a comparative assessment of biogas technology in different Austrian 
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regions. They found that the professional culture in which the farmers are embedded modulates the 
effects of feed-in tariffs and investment subsidies. This explain large differences in diffusions and 
technology in the regions, which cannot be explained on the basis of physical geographical conditions 
or prevailing economic structures in agriculture alone. 
 Lantz et al. (2007) analysed the regulatory landscape for biogas in Sweden and distinguished 
between production and utilisation of biogas, identifying both barriers and incentives. They concluded 
that the existing policy in Sweden was not enough to exploit the full potential for biogas production, 
which depend on a large variety of incentives and barriers within several sectors. 
 Larsson, Grönkvist and Alvfors (2016) performed an analyse of the development of upgraded 
biogas in the Swedish transport sector in relation to policy instruments and the availability of a natural 
gas grid. They concluded that investment support schemes and exemptions from energy and carbon 
dioxide taxes have been key instruments in initiating the establishment of new biogas production 
facilities and infrastructure. Carrosio (2013) studied policies and organisational models for biogas plants 
managed by farmers in Italy. His conclusion was that the intentions of the policies are thwarted because 
of the intuitional creation of a dominant unsustainable organisation model, and recommended thus a 
diversification in the use of biogas and reorganisation of the political incentives.  
 Clercq et al. (2017) performed a review of policies around the world regarding the conversion 
of food waste to biogas in South Korea, China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. They 
identified best practices and challenges useful for policymakers in developing countries. 
All of the studies above underline the importance of economic instruments and policies in general 
to facilitate the development of sustainable biogas value chains. In this study, we go beyond this, and 
investigates quantitatively how different economic instruments can affect the biogas value chains. We 
further discuss the results in the context of structural conditions and political goals. 
 
1.2 Objective of this study 
The main objective of this study has been to develop new knowledge about how national policies 
and regulatory systems influence the design and operation of biogas value chains. This was done by 
comparing how the economic instruments affect the economy of biogas value chains in Norway and 
Denmark, and by discussing the results in the context of the differences in political objectives and 
structural conditions. The results were used to evaluate how the instruments are contributing to obtaining 
the political goals and to discuss whether the countries will benefit from dissemination of knowledge 
across different regimes.  
 We have chosen to include two different substrates in the case study: organic waste (OW) 
(source separated food waste from households and solid organic waste from industry and service sector) 
and substrate from agriculture (manure and deep litter) because they were identified as the substrate 
types with the largest potential.  Both countries have expressed ambitions to increase the amount of 
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manure to biogas production, and the interest for recycling of organic waste is increasing due to the 
circular economy package and the European bioeconomy strategy. Sewage sludge was not included as 
a substrate in the case studies because it is not desirable to co-digest agricultural substrates and sewage 
sludge, due to legal restrictions on the use of digestate produced from sewage sludge. In addition, the 
use of sewage sludge for anaerobic digestion is decreasing in Denmark (Danish Energy Agency, 2017b) 
and is identified as the substrate with lowest future potential in Norway (Norwegian climate and 
pollution agency, 2013). 
2 Conditions for biogas value chains in Norway and Denmark 
The effect of economic instruments cannot be assessed without considering other aspects that will 
affect the value chain such as structural conditions, political goals and the regulatory system in general, 
as well as markets for substrates, biogas and digestate. These aspects are thus compared and discussed 
in the following sections. 
2.1 Structural conditions for biogas production in the two countries 
Norway and Denmark are countries closely located, with similar climatic conditions. There are, 
however, large differences in topography, total surface area and general framework conditions of biogas 
production. To understand these differences, we map the demographic and structural conditions for the 
relevant sectors in Table 1.  
 
    NO DK 
Agriculture Average livestock unit, small farms1 23 86 
Average livestock units, large farms1 61 681 
Waste 
 
Share of households with source separation of organic waste23 67 %  30% 
Logistics: Population density, inhabitants (inhabitants/km2) 
Worldatlas (2017) 
13 125 
Energy 
 
Share of renewables in gross final consumption of energy 
(2015)Eurostat (2016) 
69.2 % 30.8 % 
Energy prices household consumers, 2016 (EURO/kWh) (Danish 
Ministry of Environment, 2016; Statistics Denmark, 2017) 
0.163 0.308 
Energy prices industry, 2016 (EURO/kWh) 6 0.081 0.094 
Natural gas prices industry, 2016 (EURO/kWh)Eurostat (2017b) N/A  0.030 
Transport Share of renewable fuels for transport 5 8.9 % 6.7% 
Fuel prices diesel net (EURO/liter)DKV Euro Service (2017) 1.148 1.014 
Fuel prices gross (EURO/liter) 8 1.435 1.268 
Table 1 Aspects affecting biogas production in the two countries  
 
                                                     
1 (European Comission, 2017)  
2 (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2013). 
3 Own calculations based on (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2014) 
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Both Norway and Denmark are countries with ambitions of sustaining a productive agricultural 
sector; however, there is a substantial difference in farm structure. The Norwegian agricultural strategy 
is based on a wish to be self-supplying and maintain employment in the rural areas, while Denmark is a 
large exporter of a livestock based agricultural production that bears the mark of a highly efficient sector 
that competes at international markets, taking advantage of a low topography enabling a high degree of 
economy of scale. This affects the access to manure as substrate for biogas production. Large distances 
and smaller concentrations of manure in Norway is likely to result in higher transportation costs.  
The share of households with source separation of OW is higher in Norway compared with in 
Denmark, despite lower population density. The large share of source separated OW in Norway indicates 
better access to OW resources for existing biogas plants. This access, together with the willingness to 
pay for high yield substrates in Denmark has led to export of pre-treated OW from Norway to Danish 
biogas plants. Martinsen (2012) estimated that about 470,000 tonnes of OW were exported per year to 
Denmark and Sweden.  
Norway has (together with Iceland) the largest share of renewable energy in Europe, resulting 
in low electricity costs and heating mostly based on electricity. Denmark has a lower share of renewables 
and the highest energy prices in Europe, when taxes are included (Eurostat, 2016). With the low 
topography, there is almost no hydropower however; a large production of wind power has emerged due 
to good wind conditions and a profitable regulation.  
 Due to a highly developed natural gas grid and a large supply of local heat distribution grids in 
Denmark, it has been natural to use biogas in local heat and power production, as it is also used in other 
countries (Hjort-Gregersen, Blandford and Gooch, 2011). Today with the rapid expansion of wind- and 
solar power, local heat- and power plants (CHP’s) are less profitable, and the development in Denmark 
is currently going in the direction of pure heat production based on biomass. Norway has a significantly 
larger production of natural gas and is today a large exporter of natural gas. Domestically, however, the 
use of natural gas is low, and the infrastructure of natural gas is limited.  
The shares of renewable fuels in the transport sectors are similar in the two countries, but 
marginally higher in Norway. The diesel price in Norway is higher, indicating a larger revenue in the 
fuel transport market. In both countries, the interest in biogas as a renewable transport fuel is increasing.  
 
2.2 Political goals in the two countries 
Table 2 summarises the political goals relevant for biogas production and use at EU level and 
for Norway and Denmark. Norway is not part of the EU, but the country is collaborating closely through 
the European Economic Area (EEA-agreement) and has committed to the EU target of reducing at least 
40% of GHG emissions by 2030.  
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 EU Norway Denmark 
Agriculture CO2-reduction goals in 
agriculture 
30% of manure to biogas 
production within 2020 4 
50% manure in biogas by 
20205 
Waste 70% material recycling or 
reuse for waste from 
households within 20306 
75% of waste to recycling 
within 2010, further 
escalation to 80%7 
Increased biogas production8 
50% of waste to recycling 
within 20229 
Energy The EU's Renewable energy 
directive sets a binding 
target of 20% final energy 
consumption from 
renewable sources by 2020. 
EU target of a 80-95% CO2-
reduction by 205012 
 A goal for an “ambitious 
expansion” of the biogas 
production, e.g. 17PJ biogas 
by 2020 
Danish goal that heat and 
power production should be 
renewable by 2035, and the 
total energy consumption 
should be based on 
renewables by 205010 
Transport - At least 10% of the energy 
used in the transport sector 
should be renewable within 
2020 
- CO2-reduction goals in 
transport11 
- Regional goals: e.g. Oslo: 
public transport non-fossil 
within 2020 
- Biogas strategy (states that 
biogas should be used for 
transport) 
Municipal goals, e.g. 
Randers Municipality have a 
goal of 30% of municipal 
biogas should be used for 
biogas12 
Table 2 Political goals relevant for biogas value chains in EU, Norway and Denmark 
 
Norway has a national goal of increasing the biogas production which is stated in the Biogas 
Strategy, though cost efficiency is a requirement (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, 
2014). Denmark does not have a separate strategy for biogas, although a biogas task force was created 
to aid an increase in production along with new regulation (Danish Government 2012). Denmark has 
high goals for renewable energy production and for becoming independent of fossil fuels by 2050. 
Norway is highly independent of fossil fuels and focuses on waste resources, with a goal of over 
75% recycling. In Denmark, there is a long tradition for waste incineration with a large capacity. New 
initiatives have started to increase the recycling level in Denmark aided by EU recycling-targets and the 
resource strategy in 2013.  
A white paper from 2009 states that 30% of the manure in Norway should go to biogas 
production within 2020 (The Norwegian Department of Agriculture and food, 2009) as a measure to 
                                                     
4 White paper on agriculture (Danish Ministry of Environment, 2013) 
5 Green Growth agreement (Danish Government, 2012) 
6 Circular economy package (Danish Ministry of Climate, 2013)  
7 Norwegian waste strategy (European Parliament, 2009b) 
8 Norwegian cross sectional biogas strategy (European Parliament, 2009a) 
9 Facts on the ressource strategy (European Commission, 2014) 
10 Energy Agreement 2012 (Danish Government, 2012) and The Danish governmental climate plan (Danish 
Ministry of Climate, 2013) 
11 Renewable energy directive (RED) (Danish Government, 2012) and Transport fuel directive (Energinet.dk, 
2017) 
12 Regional Bioeconomy profile, central Denmark (European Commission, 2014) 
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reduce GHG in the agricultural sector. Simultaneously a 50%-goal was set in Denmark (Danish 
Government, 2009a). This goal has not been ratified later. 
There is no clear text concerning actual goals for biogas or renewable fuels in the transport 
sector for any of the two countries. 
In summary, the Norwegian goals are mostly targeted towards management of manure and waste 
resources, indicating that policy makers focus on GHG-reduction and waste recycling. The objectives 
in Denmark are more directed towards renewable energy and secondarily the agricultural sector, which 
may originate from a focus on GHG-reduction and security of energy supply. This makes good sense, 
as Norway have a high degree of security of energy supply, while Denmark in near future could become 
dependent on foreign energy supply. 
 
2.3 Biogas production in Norway 
2.3.1 Development of biogas production 
In Norway biogas production emerged primarily as a waste treatment option for sewage sludge 
and OW. Due to a large share of renewable and clean hydropower in the electricity grid and low prices 
on electricity, there has been few drivers for producing electricity from waste resources in Norway.  
Historically the use of biogas has been inefficient. In 2007 about 19% of the biogas was flared, 
53% was used for heat purposes, while only 2% of the gas was used for transport purposes (Raadal, 
Schakenda and Morken, 2008). In 2010 About 63% of the energy generated from biogas plants was used 
for heating of own premises and only about two thirds of the capacity of the biogas plants was exploited 
(Nedland and Ohr 2010). The share of biogas used for transport has increased to more than 30% of the 
consumed biogas in 2015 (Statistics Norway, 2016b). The total consumption was 308 GWh (1.1PJ), 48 
GWh was used for district heating and electricity production, 105 GWh (0.4PJ) for transport, 30 GWh 
for industrial purposes and 126 GWh (0.5PJ) by other consumer groups. Biogas constitute about 3% of 
the total national biofuel use (Statistics Norway, 2016a) and has currently a marginal significance in the 
total energy use in Norway.  According to the national waste statistics, about 48% of the solid organic 
waste went to biogas production in 2015 (Statistics Norway, 2017). A significant share of the available 
sewage sludge resources are currently being used for biogas production, and the future potential for 
biogas production is identified to be the organic waste and manure resources (Norwegian climate and 
pollution agency, 2013). The production capacity of biogas is expected to be up to 600 GWh (2.2PJ) in 
2016 (Måge, 2015). The deviation between the estimated capacity and the national statistics on 
consumption indicates that there are still large amounts of gas being flared and that the total capacity of 
the plants is not being exploited. 
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About 58% of the gas is produced from sewage sludge in wastewater treatment facilities, while 
only 1% is produced at farms with small scale plants. The rest is produced based on OW and co-digestion 
plants (Lånke et al., 2016 ,Norwegian climate and pollution agency, 2013).  
Digestate is dewatered and composted in many plants, and the dry digestate is used as a soil 
improvement product. The experience related to use of liquid digestate on an industrial scale as a 
fertiliser is limited to a few, recently built plants.  
 
2.3.2 The regulatory system 
The regulatory system in Norway relevant for biogas production is shown in Table 3. Investors 
of industrial scale biogas plants can apply for investment support through the Enova programme. 
Applications are evaluated based on criterions related to cost efficiency and energy efficiency. The 
support has been limited to 30% of the capital costs of the anaerobic digestion plant (pre-treatment and 
upgrading not included). Farm scale plants can apply for investment support through Innovation 
Norway. 
 
   Regulatory framework Economic incentives 
Input Access to 
substrates 
=>Public procurement on municipal 
organic waste. 
=>For certain substrates hygienisation is 
required. 
Support per tonne manure to biogas 
(to the farmer) 
Plant Anaerobic 
digestion 
plant 
Cost of service regulation for municipal 
organic waste affects income. 
 
=>Investment support (30%). 
=>Plants that co-digest substrates can 
apply for funding to become national 
pilot. 
Output Biogas to 
Heat/CHP 
  
Biogas for 
upgrade 
  
Biogas for 
transport 
Public procurement for public transport 
(buses) and waste collection vehicles 
Exempt from road fee and CO2 tax 
compared to other transport fuels 
 
Digestate in 
agriculture 
=>Restriction on spreading areas for 
waste water residues 
=> Logistics: Cleaning of vehicles to 
avoid infections 
 
Table 3 The regulatory system in Norway relevant for the study objects 
 
An economic incentive system with support to farmers per tonne of manure supplied to a biogas 
plant was recently introduced. The support is calculated based on the dry matter content of the manure 
delivered to the farm and is regulated in (FOR-2014-12-19-1815, 2015). 
Municipally owned biogas plants must follow a cost of service regulation (“the self-cost 
principle”),  as described in the national waste regulation (FOR-2004-06-01-930, 2004). This means that 
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the income from treatment of municipal waste (gate fee) must cover the cost of treating the waste, and 
cannot pay for, or be financed by, other substrates treated in the plant. The rationale behind this is that 
the waste fee the inhabitants pay to the municipality to cover the treatment of their waste should reflect 
the actual price of the service.  
Public procurement criterions affect the value chains both regarding income from treatment of 
waste and sales of biomethane. Municipalities that do have source separation of OW in the households, 
but do not have their own treatment facilities, performs a public procurement of the waste treatment 
service. The treatment plants are chosen through a request for tenders. Privately owned biogas plants 
and municipal plants from other areas can compete based on pre-defined criterions, such as price and 
environmental impact. The income from the treatment of waste make up a large portion of the income 
for Norwegian plants (66-78%) and there are large variations in the price per tonne waste treated 
(between 67 and 107 Euro/tonne treated) (Lyng et al, 2017). Biomethane is normally used in public 
transport and waste collection trucks, purchased through public procurement tenders. 
Biogas used for transport has an advantage compared to fossil fuels because renewable fuels are 
exempted from road fee and CO2-tax. The most common market competitors are vehicles running on 
diesel. Because the fees for the fossil alternatives are per litre, and because the efficiency in gas and 
diesel motors is different, the economic advantage for biogas as a fuel cannot be compared directly. In 
Table 4, the fees for diesel are shown per litre and per kWh before and after transmission losses in the 
diesel motor. 
 
 Road fee CO2 tax Total 
Euro/Per litreMinistry of finance (2016) 0.4 0.1 0.5 
Euro/kWh (before transmission losses)13 4.1 1.3 5.5 
Euro/kWh (transmission losses included)14 1.7 0.5 2.2 
Table 4 Avoided fees for biogas used as transport fuel compared to diesel in Norway in 2016 
There is no economic support targeting the use of digestate or biogas for heat and electricity 
production. Other regulations affecting biogas plants includes the regulation of the need for sterilisation 
(FOR-2016-09-14-1064, 2016) and the fertiliser ordinance, which regulates use of digestate as fertiliser 
(FOR-2016-09-14-1064, 2016).  
2.4 Biogas production in Denmark  
2.4.1 Development of biogas production 
The Danish biogas production emerged because of the oil crisis in the 1970’s leading Danish 
farmers to look for an alternative energy supply. Later biogas was introduced as a mean to distribute 
                                                     
13 Lower heating value for diesel 43,1 MJ/kg, 0,85 kg/litre 
14 Efficiency diesel motor 40% 
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nitrogen and phosphorous resources to avoid environmental problems and reduce odour (Lybaek, 
Christensen and Kjaer, 2013).  
According to the Danish Energy Agency (2017b), approximately 85% of the biogas produced 
in Denmark is based on manure as a substrate. Most of this production includes an added co-substrate 
to increase the yield, mainly OW products (≈18%) and energy crops (≈2%). The most common energy 
crops are corn and sugar beet. The interest for energy crops are low due to a Danish regulatory limit on 
the usage of energy crops and to a large demand from Germany, which has resulted in increased prices 
(Jacobsen, 2014). Biogas producers therefore search for usable waste inputs. According to Raven and 
Gregersen (2007) and Lybaek, Christensen and Kjaer (2013) the lack of industrial OW has been a barrier 
for biogas production in Denmark. A few biogas producers have solved this problem by importing OW 
from for example Norway, which has proven profitable due to the differences in regulation between the 
two countries. 
In contrast to Norway, most of the digestate is used as fertiliser and spread on the fields in the 
agricultural production. Only some of the digestate, mainly from wastewater treatment plants, is 
dewatered and composted. Consequently, producers with the choice of co-substrates will not risk inputs 
with even small levels of pollution. This limitation is due to Danish regulation and organisations within 
the agricultural sectors with requirements on which substrates may be used to produce digestate spread 
on agricultural soil that produces cow feed. There is a development towards using other agricultural 
waste products such as straw, deep litter and some experiments with grass and algae.  
The usage of municipal OW is experiencing a growing interest, since more municipalities have 
started to implement sorting and the dairy sector have started to consider municipal OW as “uncritical” 
– (under specific conditions). Currently municipal OW constitute less than 1% of the total biomass input 
and approximately 2% of the co-substrates in the manure based biogas production (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2017c). The amount of sewage sludge and organic waste sent to anaerobic digestion constitute 
a small share of the total mass compared to other waste treatment methods. 
Until 2012, the economic support was targeted towards the use of biogas for heat and power 
production, which resulted in a low amount of upgrading. In 2012 the support increased and changed so 
that also biogas upgraded for the natural gas grid could receive support (Danish Government, 2012). 
Consequently, biogas production has increased from approximately 1100GWh (4PJ) in 2012 to above 
2200GWh (8PJ) in 2016 and is expected to be somewhere between 3600-5800GWh (13-21PJ) by 2020 
(Harder, 2016). Biogas production is foreseen to play a marginal role in the total energy consumption, 
of approximately 750PJ by 2017(Danish Energy Agency, 2017a). 
Currently most new biogas plants are upgrading the biogas for the grid, and also older plants 
have installed upgrading facilities (Harder, 2016). When the biogas is upgraded to biomethane the biogas 
can be sold as natural gas quality together with a green certificate and be used in industry or heat-and 
power production. While gas for transport have been almost non-existent in Denmark for many years, 
the transport industry has recently started to show interest for gas. 
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2.4.2 The regulatory system 
The main driver for biogas development in Denmark is the output-based support; see Table 5. 
The secondary focus is on using agricultural residues such as manure from the large livestock 
production, which can contribute to reductions in GHG emissions, reduced smell and reduced nutrients 
emissions in the ground water. The economic incentives on this part are, however, weak and contradict 
the renewable energy focus at least regarding the usage of manure.  
A maximum of 25% energy crops in weight input can be added to the biogas production and 
still be defined as sustainable. After August 2018 will this be reduced to 12% (Energistyrelsen, 2015). 
This does not seem to be a challenge for the biogas producers, since energy crops accounts for less than 
1% of the total biomass in biogas production and approximately 2% of the input in manure based biogas. 
In most cases, the digestate is returned to the livestock farmers and used as fertiliser for the 
fields. In consideration of the water environment, farmers are often restricted on the amount of fertilisers 
and thereby manure that they can add to the soil, through the statute on manure usage (Danish 
Government, 2017). In Denmark, these restrictions apply both for nitrates and in some areas phosphorus. 
The digestate has approximately the same fertilising effect as manure; however, the nutrient mix might 
be different and plants typically absorb the nutrients better. Still, the digestate is regulated as manure, 
which increases the fertilizer value. 
Within the regulation on fertiliser for agricultural soils are also restrictions regarding the risk of 
spreading pollution on the soils. When OW products are mixed into the biogas production, restrictions 
apply on whether this input could be considered as pure agricultural waste (regulated following the 
statute on manure-usage) or as waste. If it is the last type, it is only allowed to spread a small share 
before the total mix will be regulated following the statute on sludge (Miljøministeriet, 2006). Forces 
are working on moving the categorisation of organic household waste away from potential polluted 
waste towards a cleaner product. 
The biogas support was initially a feed-in tariff on electricity produced on biogas. As most of 
the biogas-based power-producing units are regulated by the combined heat and power demand, most 
of the biogas is also indirectly supported by a tax exemption on the fuel used for heat production15. 
Fossil fuels and electricity used for heat production are massively taxed while there are no taxes on fuels 
used for electricity production. The feed-in tariff on electricity is not dependent on scale as in other 
countries (Walla and Schneeberger, 2008; Delzeit and Kellner, 2013); instead the plant size is 
determined by heat demand in the given area, which may not result in the optimal size (Skovsgaard and 
Jacobsen, 2017).  
 
                                                     
15 If the power producer also is supplied with other fuels such as natural gas, will the plant receive a feed-in 
premium for the electricity based on biogas  
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Table 5 Regulatory system in Denmark relevant to the study objects 
 
 
Danish Government (2012) has decided to increase the support and expand it to other 
applications of the biogas. Upgraded biogas receive a feed-in premium corresponding to the support for 
                                                     
16 See for example (Danish Government, 2012) 
17 See the homepage of the Danish TSO for electricity and gas (Energinet.dk, 2017) 
   Regulatory framework Economic incentives 
Input Access to 
substrates 
=> Supported biogas should be based on 
manure, other waste or waste water 
=>(25%) 12% maximum of energy crops 
(Energistyrelsen 2015, Danish Energy 
Agency 2017) 
  
Plant Anaerobic 
digestion 
plant 
=>Planning regulation 
=>Requirements to sterilisation of waste 
water slurry 
Occasionally investment 
support16 
Output Biogas to 
Heat/CHP 
Monopoly regulation on district heat CHP =>Feed-in tariff on 
electricity produced on biogas 
=>Tax exemption on fuel for heat 
Industry => lower support 
Heat-only => tax exemption and 
lowest supportError! Bookmark not 
defined. 
Biogas for 
upgrade 
=>Gas quality requirements, wobbe-index 
=>Pressure demand from grid 
=>Biogas certificates17 
=>Feed-in premium on upgraded 
biogasError! Bookmark not defined. 
=>Same taxation as for natural 
gas (high taxes), when taken from 
the grid  
=>with a biogas certificate can 
CO2-quotas be avoided 
Biogas for 
transport 
=>5.75% blending demand on biofuels 
=>0.9% blending demand on advanced 
biofuelsDanish Government (2009b, 2016) 
=>Many biogas plants can be certified to as 
producing advanced biofuels => this is not 
yet connected to the biogas-certificate and 
can thus – not yet – ad any value through 
upgrading for the net 
=>Feed-in tariff for direct use in 
transport, same level as 
industryError! Bookmark not defined. 
Digestate in 
agriculture 
=>Restriction on spreading areas for waste 
water residues(The Norwegian Department 
of Agriculture and food, 2009)and organic 
household waste 
=>Ecological digestate compared to 
conventional (not allowed with complete 
mix of manure from Ecological and 
conventional farms)(Danish Government, 
2009a) 
=>Excess phosphorus can be reshuffled 
Restrictions on digestate based on org. waste 
=>A little more nitrate is allowed  
=>improved fertilizer value 
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biogas used in heat and power production, while biogas used directly for industry, transport or heat 
production receive a lower support, see Table 6. 
 
 Direct use Upgraded 
2016 CHP Heat Industry & transport   
Unit Euro/MWh Euro/GJ Euro/GJ Euro/GJ 
Feed-in tariff 108.6       
Feed-in premium 59.2   5.23 10.86 
NG price dependent 45.0 4.50 4.50 4.50 
Temporary 10.7 1.07 1.07 1.07 
Total 164.3 5.58 10.80 16.43 
Tax, when the gas is used for heating  -  0.0 0,0 9.6 
Tax, when the gas is used for transport  -   - 11.2 12.9 
Table 6 Feed in support for biogas in Denmark 
 
The purpose is to increase the support temporarily by two additional fees, a temporary support 
that is declining and a fee that is negatively correlated with the natural gas price the year before. If the 
natural gas price increase, the support will decrease as the need is decreased, and vice versa.  
If upgraded gas is used in the grid, it receives a higher support and the tax is only vaguely higher 
than in the case of direct use. It is thus likely that most biogas plants decide to upgrade the gas for the 
grid.   
3 Method 
In this comparative assessment, we study the effects of the regulatory system on the private 
economy of biogas value chains under the two support regimes. This is done by defining a typical value 
chain in each of the countries and compare their total cost and income. The effects of the political 
instruments are then evaluated by assessing the economy for the defined Norwegian value chain under 
Danish regulation and vice versa. Generally, the scales in tonnes of treated substrates at each plant are 
larger in Denmark than in Norway. In the case study, we have chosen to analyse a plant that is large in 
the Norwegian context, and small in the Danish context to ensure comparability.  
The Norwegian case under Norwegian conditions (NO): A co-digestion plant treating OW and 
manure from cattle and pig, capacity is 110.000 tonnes of input and the plant is based on an actual plant 
situated in Vestfold County, which is currently the only large-scale plant in Norway receiving 
considerable amounts of manure from surrounding farms. For simplification, it is assumed 100% 
municipal waste. The biomethane is used as fuel for transport. The actors included in the assessment are 
livestock farmers and OW treatment plant (biogas plant including an upgrading facility), see Figure 1. 
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The farmers receiving the biofertiliser and the transporter using the biogas is outside the system 
boundary. Farmers are paid to receive digestate. 
 
 
Figure 1 Actors in the Norwegian biogas value chain  
The Danish case under Danish conditions (DK): A plant producing biogas from manure and 
deep litter from farms in Northern Jutland. The plant is a model plant with the capacity of 150.000 tonnes 
of input and geographically situated in Northern Jutland. This area is dominated by agricultural 
production, and has a vast supply of manure and potential co-substrates. Experience from using a plant 
optimization model described in Jensen, Münster and Pisinger (2017) show, that a substrate mix of 70% 
manure and 30% deep-litter is an optimal solution for a plant situated in this area, given a set of 
assumptions presented in Skovsgaard and Jensen (2017). The actors included in the assessment are: 
livestock farmers, biogas plant and energy converter (CHP plant), see Figure 2. The farmers receiving 
the digestate and the farmers supplying deep litter are outside the system boundaries. The digestate is 
assumed to represent an income. 
 
 
Figure 2 Actors in the Danish biogas value chain 
When studying the Norwegian case under Danish conditions (NO → DK) (see Table 7), two major 
adjustments were done to make the case realistic: (1) We assume the same share of OW, however, the 
biogas plant does not invest in a pre-treatment facility. While treatment of OW is an income for 
Norwegian biogas plants, it is more likely that a Danish biogas plant must pay to get access to the 
substrate. We assume that the waste has been pre-treated before it arrives to the plant, resulting in a dry-
matter content of 20%, compared to 33% in the NO-case, resulting in the typical dry matter content in 
an ordinary Danish biogas production (Jørgensen, 2013). The large share of municipal OW is unusual 
and requires a higher level of control of the digestate to allow it to be spread on agricultural soils.   
Enduse
Upgrade
 - Transport
 - Grid
Livestock Farmer
Plant Farmer
Waste treatment sector
Organic Waste 
Treatment Plant
Organic Waste 
Supplier
Agricultural sector
Biogas value chain Energy sector
Plant Energy Converter
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 NO NO->DK DK DK->NO 
Capacity 
(tonnes) 
110,000 110,000 150,000 150,000 
Input 
(substrates) 
45% organic waste, 
55% manure 
 
45% pre-treated 
organic waste, 55% 
manure 
70% manure 
30% co-substrate 
(deep litter) 
70% manure 
30% co-substrate 
(deep litter) 
Biogas produced 7,113,750 Nm3 
(43GWh) 
 
4,200,000 Nm3 
(26 GWh) 
5,977,500 Nm3 
(36GWh) 
5,977,500 Nm3 
(36GWh) 
Output (Use of 
biogas) 
Upgrade (for 
transport) 
Upgrade (for natural 
gas grid) 
Combined heat and 
power (CHP) 
Heat plant 
Investments Pre-treatment food 
waste, digester, 
upgrading (water 
scrubber) 
Digester, upgrading 
(water scrubber) 
Digester, CHP plant Digester, heat 
converter 
Table 7 Definition of biogas value chains in Norway and Denmark 
 
 (2) It is assumed that the biomethane is fed into a natural gas grid rather than directly used for 
transport. Further, the market prices for biomethane and costs and income related to digestate is changed, 
and the investment support is removed, see Table 8. The transport costs are reduced because of larger 
farms and thus shorter transport distances.  
 
    NO NO -> DK DK DK -> NO 
Input 
CAPEX Pre-treatment 
organic waste 
Payment for 
organic waste 
Pre-treatment deep 
litter and input price 
Pre-treatment deep 
litter and input price OPEX 
Income 
Gate fee on waste 
Support for manure 
as input 
  
Support for manure 
as input 
Conversion 
CAPEX 
Plant and after 
treatment (reactor 
size larger due to 
addition of water in 
pre-treatment 
process). 
Investment support 
30% of Capex. 
Plant and after 
treatment 
Plant and after 
treatment 
Plant and after 
treatment. 
Investment support 
30% of Capex. 
OPEX 
Output 
CAPEX 
Upgrading facility 
(and pressure 
regulation) 
Upgrading facility 
and pressure 
regulation 
CHP-plant Heat converter 
OPEX Payment to farmers receiving digestate 
Payment to farmers 
receiving digestate 
Income 
Sold biogas Feed-in premium 
for biomethane, 
market price 
biomethane and 
sold digestate 
Feed-in tariff 
electricity, heat 
price and sold 
digestate 
Electricity and heat 
prices 
Transport Total Norwegian transport cost 
Danish transport 
cost 
Danish transport 
cost 
Norwegian 
transport cost 
Table 8 Costs and income in each of the scenarios 
The Danish case under Norwegian conditions (DK →NO) result in the following adjustments 
as shown in Table 8: As sale of electricity is assumed as not realistic, the plant produces heat from biogas 
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and invest in a heat generator instead of a CHP plant. The transport costs are increased due to smaller 
farm sizes and larger transport distances. The market prices for heat are adjusted to Norwegian 
conditions and feed-in tariffs are removed, while investment support is introduced. 
A large share of the income is related to direct- or indirect support. How this support is shared 
between the actors of the value chain is complicated and out of scope for this paper. Other studies have 
been done on profit sharing, see e.g. Skovsgaard and Jensen (2017). Profit sharing is left out by assessing 
the total profit of all the actors of the value chain, which are directly affected by the regulation in the 
respective countries. Economic transactions between the actors inside the system boundaries are not 
included. Assumptions for cost and income are presented in Appendix A. As the purpose of this study 
is to compare the effect of regulation, we have decided to use the same cost data in the two countries 
and assume the same cost level. This is a simplification as costs are likely to be higher in Norway. The 
hourly labour cost is about 20% higher in Norway than in Denmark (Eurostat, 2017b), and according to 
the OECD price level index, the general price level is about 5% (OECD, 2016). This is likely to lead to 
a discrepancy between the income and the costs for the Norwegian case, which will be discussed further 
in the result chapter. The results cannot be used to conclude on the profitability of the different scenarios 
or a direct comparison of the annual results. They are, however, suitable to discuss the effect of different 
regulations and to compare the differences in type of income, and keeps the regulations such as 
investment support at a comparable scale. 
4 Results 
4.1 Comparative analyses of biogas value chains in Norway and Denmark 
As the development of biogas value chains is affected by a large range of other factors than the 
economic instruments, the structural conditions and political objectives described in Section 2.2 must 
be considered when assessing the effect of political instruments. The key differences in biogas 
production in the two countries are summarised in Figure 3. Biogas production is significantly larger in 
Denmark than in Norway: 500 GWh (1.8PJ) per year in Norway (Lånke et al., 2016, Norwegian climate 
and pollution agency, 2013) and 1764 GWh (6.4PJ) in Denmark (Danish Energy Agency, 2017a). 
The main difference in input is the use of OW from household and industry in Norway and of 
manure and other residues from agriculture in Denmark. While Norwegian plants in the past has had a 
history of flaring and use of heat in own premises, there is now a development towards using the gas as 
a transport fuel. In Denmark, biogas is mainly used to produce heat and electricity. There are no official 
statistics on the use of digestate in the two countries. The large share of substrate from agriculture in 
Denmark implies, however, that the use of digestate in agriculture is widespread because these plants 
are closely integrated with the farms. In Norway, however, the use of liquid digestate as a fertiliser on 
an industrial scale is limited to a few plants, and it is more common to use dry digestate as a soil 
improvement product. 
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Figure 3 Production, feedstocks and utilisation of biogas in Norway and Denmark 
The economic assessment of the Norwegian value chain under Norwegian conditions and the 
Danish value chain under Danish conditions are presented in Figure 4 and 5. The figures indicates the 
importance of the various cost and income factors. The profit in the Norwegian value chain is 
approximately 50 – 28 ≈ 22 Euro/tonnes input while the profit in the Danish value chain is approximately 
21 – 16 ≈ 5 Euro/tonnes input. This is a large difference, which to a high degree can be explained by the 
assumptions made in the case study. 
The high profit for the Norwegian value chain is likely to be explained by the assumption of the 
same cost level in the two countries, which result in an unrealistic difference between the income (which 
are based on Norwegian prices) and costs (which are based on Danish costs) as described in section 2.2. 
The income from treatment of OW is for most plants regulated by the cost of service regulation, 
described in section 2.3.2. Because the treatment cost of OW is regulated to reflect the actual cost of the 
service, profits would be lower as income from gate fees in reality would be adjusted. The profit for the 
Norwegian case is thus not realistic and cannot be used to conclude on whether the Norwegian biogas 
value chain is profitable or not. Results should therefore only be used to compare types of costs, and the 
effect from the regulatory systems on the value chains. 
The total costs in Norway are higher due to inclusion of OW that requires pre-treatment and 
increased Capex and Opex. All cost factors are presented in Euro per tonne input, and for the 
Norwegian biogas value chain are largest cost factors the capital and operational costs for the digester 
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Utilisation of biogas
Upgraded, Heat and electricity Upgraded, Transport Upgraded, Other
Heat and electricity Other
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
NO
DK
Annual production, GWh
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
NO
DK
Feedstocks for biogas production
Sewage sludge Organic waste Agriculture Industrial
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(3.9 €/t and 9.7 €/t) and capital costs and operational costs for pre-treatment of waste (4.6 €/t and 1.4 
€/t) and transport costs (4.3 €/t).  
 
Figure 4 Distribution of cost and income in the Norwegian biogas value chain in Euro per tonne treated 
 
 
Figure 5 Distribution of costs and income in the Danish biogas value chain Euro per tonne treated 
In the Danish, value chain, the largest cost factors are related to operation (6.6 €/t) and capital 
costs (4.0 €/t) of the anaerobic digestion facilities together with operational (1.3 €/t) and capital costs 
(1.9 €/t) of the CHP plant.  
Estimated costs for transport is approximately 100% higher in Norway (4.3 €/t) than in Denmark 
(2.1 €/t), but even though transport of manure and digestate represent significant cost factors in both 
countries, they do not seem to have a determining effect on the final results in the two defined cases.  
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The main difference in profitability of biogas value chains in Denmark and Norway is the 
organization of the economic incentives. In Norway, more than 60% of the total revenues originate at 
the input side as income from waste- and manure treatment. Capital expenditures on the anaerobic 
digestion facilities are reduced by an investment support of 30%.  
The economic support to Danish biogas value chains is founded in energy supply from the biogas 
production (electricity and heat production), where more than 90% of the revenues originates from sales 
of energy with feed-in tariffs or a premium. In our case, the support accounts for 60-75% of the total 
income. Another income, which is not supported, is the sales of surplus digestate. In Denmark, the 
agriculture has a long tradition in using digestate, and it is considered as an improved fertiliser compared 
to manure.  In contrast, the use of liquid digestate represent a cost for the farmers in Norway, due to the 
need to invest in infrastructure. Consequently, the biogas plant must pay the farmer to accept the 
digestate. 
 
4.2 Case study on effect of economic incentives 
The implications of the annual economic results when constructing the Norwegian value chain in 
Denmark and vice versa is shown in Table 9 (per tonne treated) and Table 10 (per GWh biogas produced, 
before transmission losses). The costs and income are categorised into their occurrence in the value 
chain: input, conversion, output and transport. 
 
  NO NO->DK DK DK->NO 
 Input 110,000 tonnes  150,000 tonnes 
Input (substrates) 
CAPEX 1.44 0.0 0,0 0 
OPEX 5.0 9.0 1.0 1.0 
Revenue, manure 3.0 0 0 3.9 
Revenue, waste 31.7 0 0 0.0 
Conversion CAPEX 3.9 4.2 4.0 2.8 
OPEX 9.7 8.1 6.6 6.6 
Output (biogas and 
digestate) 
CAPEX 0.8 0.6 1.9 1.1 
OPEX 2.9 0.2 1.3 6.0 
Revenue, digestate 0 1.8 2.0 0 
Revenue, gas 15.4 20.2 19.7 5.9 
Transport Costs 4.3 1.1 2.1 5.1 
Total in Euro/tonnes input 22.1 -1.2 4.9 -12.7 
Table 9 Results in Euro per tonne treated 
The waste sector plays a large role in Norwegian biogas production, and the income from treatment of 
waste represents the main income for biogas plants. In Denmark, the treatment of OW appears to be 
less important and is motivated by the wish to increase the biogas yield. There is no support for the use 
of OW and it is seen as a challenge when it comes to quality of the digestate. There is, however, a 
movement towards a more sustainable treatment of the OW resources. 
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  NO NO->DK DK DK->NO 
 Production (GWh) 43  32  36  36  
Input (substrates) 
CAPEX 3667  0  11  11  
OPEX 12802  31223  4110  4110  
Revenue, manure 7756  0  0  16154  
Revenue, waste 80798  0  0  0  
Conversion CAPEX 10024  14436  16412  11488  
OPEX 24734  27877  27078  27078  
Output (biogas and 
digestate) 
CAPEX 2104  2104  7815  4445  
OPEX 7386  572  5557  24850  
Revenue, digestate 0  6107  8411  0  
Revenue, gas 39200  69717  81302  24566  
Transport Costs 10831  3924  8475  21208  
Total in Euro/GWh produced 56207  -4312  20256  -52471  
Table 10 Results in Euro per GWh produced (before transmission losses) 
The NO value chain in a DK setting (NO->DK) loses the investment support, save the Capex 
and Opex costs from pre-treatment facilities for OW and will see a 75% reduction in transport costs. As 
the support per tonne manure disappears and the biogas plant is assumed to pay for the waste rather than 
receiving a payment for waste treatment, the total income is largely reduced. In Denmark, the goals of 
increasing the share of renewable energy are ambitious and this is reflected in the economic instruments 
through a feed-in tariff. The support for production of input of biomethane to the natural gas grid is 
considerable. Upgraded gas in Denmark is more likely to be inserted into the natural gas grid than to be 
used for transport with the current Danish regulation. In Norway, the use of biogas as a fuel for transport 
has increased substantially. An indirect economic support is provided, all though the national goals are 
unclear. In Denmark, the share of biogas used for transport is low and there are no specific political 
goals for this. There is some support for direct use in transport however, as the tax is high there is no 
clear policy. 
The overall economic result for the NO->DK value chain is negative; however, with few 
alterations it could become profitable. This can be explained by a high level of support for biomethane, 
and that OW provides a reasonable yield, despite the water added in the pre-treatment process.  
The DK plant in a Norwegian setting (DK->NO) is not profitable either, as there is a loss of 
revenue from the biogas output because the plant loses the feed-in tariff for renewable electricity. In 
Norway, there are no particular political goals or incentives to use biogas in the energy sector, due to 
the high share of renewable hydropower. The most probable solution for the plant in Norway is assumed 
to be production of heat only and not electricity. There is a small subsidy to the manure treatment in 
Norway, but this is not sufficient to outweigh the loss of output subsidy. The investment support 
represents reduced Capex, but not enough to compensate. The income from digestate is turned into a 
cost because the demand for digestate is lacking in Norway. The agricultural sector has been less 
important in Norwegian biogas production however, a new support system aims at including farms to 
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reduce GHG emissions from manure handling. In Denmark, agriculture is a large sector and it plays a 
primary role in biogas production. Earlier analysis show, that biogas production is a socioeconomic 
costly way to reduce GHG emissions in Danish agriculture (Dubgaard and Jacobsen, 2013), however 
compared to Germany it is relatively cheaper (Jacobsen, Laugesen and Dubgaard, 2014). The goals for 
the sector are, however, unclear and support is only indirect. 
The results per GWh produced (before transmission losses) in Table 10 show the significance 
of the support on the output side in Denmark. The income from the produced gas is lower for the two 
cases in Norway (NO and DK->NO), however the income from treatment of waste in the NO-case is in 
the same range as the income from the sales of biogas in the DK-case. The use of OW as an input 
increases the biogas yield, but at the same time costs are increased due to the need for pre-treatment and 
additional costs for the Capex and Opex for the digester.  
5 Discussions of results 
Two countries with fundamentally different support systems are compared in this study. The 
economic instruments have a visible effect on the value chains. One clear consequence of output support 
is that it incentivises the use of high-yield inputs and contributes to avoiding biogas losses. While input 
support result in less focus on the biogas yield, more flaring and own use in the production. What is 
most efficient depend on the overall goals for the biogas production. 
5.1 GHG reduction in agriculture and management of waste resources 
Biogas production can be used to obtain political goals on reducing GHG emissions in agriculture 
through degassing of manure and thereby converting methane- and nitrous emissions into CO2-
emissions. Furthermore, biogas production can potentially reduce the leaching of nutrients with the use 
of digestate as a fertiliser instead of manure and mineral fertiliser. Farms have different roles in the 
biogas value chain: as supplier of manure and as the user of digestate. While the agricultural sector is a 
part of most biogas value chains in Denmark, the inclusion of the agricultural sector is under 
development in Norway. The two countries have large differences in farm sizes and structure in 
agriculture. Wirth et al. (2013) concluded, however, that differences between biogas productions in 
different regions in Austria cannot only be explained based on physical geographical conditions or 
prevailing economic structures in agriculture, and that public support schemes also plays an important 
part.  
Both countries have stated a political goal of increasing the amount of manure for biogas 
production, however, only Norway is targeting this specifically through a support to farmers per tonne 
of manure delivered. According to Raven and Gregersen (2007) an increased number of farm scale and 
centralised plants in Denmark did not emerge without a struggle, and was strongly aided by measures 
for interaction between social groups, long term action programme and financial support and policies 
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for decentralised CHP. In Norway, there has been an increase in the use of manure for biogas, but the 
potential remains high, as there is no demand for decentralised energy production. This case study 
reveals that if the Norwegian support system for manure to biogas were to be introduced in Denmark, 
the magnitude of the economic support would be small compared to the other biogas support. In 
Denmark, the combination of biogas support and the sustainability criteria has led to high use of manure 
as a substrate and an increase in size of the plants. Introducing support on input in addition to output 
could contribute to increasing the amount of manure used for biogas production even more, and 
potentially reduce the search for high yield substrates. This may also contribute to an increase of manure 
treatment in areas with lower farm density and a decrease in socioeconomic costs of GHG-emission 
reductions, as pure degasification of manure can be less costly from a socioeconomic perspective 
according to Dubgaard & Jacobsen (2013). 
In Norway, the emphasis is on increasing the biogas production, motivated by ambitions of a 
more sustainable management of waste resources. This has led to increased biogas production and 
increased amount of OW being source separated. Raven and Gregersen (2007) concluded that one of 
the most important factors causing reduction in establishment of new biogas plants in Denmark in the 
late 90’s was limited access to organic waste. Clercq et al. (2017) identified lack of source separation 
as a common obstacle for increased anaerobic digestion of organic waste in several countries, and 
suggest that this should be addressed by policymakers.  
The waste resource perspective is rising on the political agenda in Denmark due to the Circular 
Economy package adopted by the EU. Consequently, more municipalities have started to sort organic 
household waste. The economic instruments for biogas in Denmark are solely targeting the output, hence 
the use of OW is not supported other than indirectly because it can increase the yield when co-digesting 
with manure. Danish biogas plants are restricted by older regulations that do not reflect all concerns of 
the dominant dairy sector. This has resulted in reluctance towards use of digestate containing municipal 
OW however; new developments are on their way.  
In Norway, income from treatment of waste is essential for the centralised biogas plants. As 
treatment of waste is less expensive in Sweden and Denmark, some OW is exported. In Denmark, the 
demand for waste for incineration has contributed to lack of incentives to introduce source separation. 
This shows that there are large differences in the demand for waste, which affects access of OW for the 
biogas plants and determines whether the treatment of waste represent a cost or an income. 
Using municipal OW as a substrate comes with a high cost due to the need for pre-treatment and 
requirements for documenting the quality and content of the digestate. Acceptance from the user of the 
digestate can be challenging to achieve when the origin of the substrate is from the waste sector. 
None of the countries seems to have specific political goals on using digestate from biogas 
production as a fertiliser in agriculture except in Denmark where it is implicitly a part of regulation, 
since farmers are obliged to find usage of the manure arising from their production. In Norway, the 
market for digestate as a fertiliser is still under development, while Danish farmers are experienced in 
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using digestate from agricultural waste as fertiliser. Huttunen, Manninen and Leskinen (2014) identified 
end use of the digestate as one of the most critical points for biogas production in Finland. A premise 
for increased amount of OW for biogas production in Denmark seems to be a combination of more 
source separation clearer regulation to ensure quality of the fertiliser produced from digestate and 
increased knowledge about digestate from co-digestion of OW and manure. In Norway, the digestate 
represent a cost for centralised biogas plants, as there is no willingness to pay for the digestate. Because 
there are no incentives targeting recycling of nutrients, it is hard to predict whether the demand for 
digestate as a fertiliser will increase and represent an income rather than a cost in the future. Experience 
in using digestate in agriculture is, however, likely to increase due to the support to manure for biogas, 
because most farmers that supply manure to a biogas plant would expect to receive the digestate in 
return. 
 
5.2 Renewable targets for energy and transport 
Biogas value chains can contribute to phase out fossil fuels, both in the energy systems and in the 
transport sector. In Denmark, the regulatory system is developed with an emphasis on increasing the 
share of renewable energy, which can increase security of energy supply and reduce CO2 within the 
energy system. The economic support on output incentivises the use of high yield substrates together 
with manure and an efficient use of biogas, while flaring and internal use of biogas is minimised.  
There is a degree of flexibility embedded in the regulation, as the output support is given for 
upgraded biogas and for several applications of direct biogas usage. This allow each producer to design 
the value chain to fit his or her needs, however, the variation favours upgrading for the grid and 
electricity generation. Even though the support system could be more flexible and efficient, it does 
contribute to the goal of complete independence of fossil fuels by 2050.  
The input based regulation (investment support) in Norway has led to an increase in biogas 
production. The system contains few incentives on the output side, which is likely to have contributed 
to a high amount of flaring and use of biogas internally. The lack of incentives on the output side became 
particularly clear when a Danish value chain was tested under Norwegian conditions, resulting in the 
worst result, despite low investment- and operational costs (DK prices). Without the output support, it 
would not be profitable to build a CHP plant or a heat generator. Due to the high share of hydropower 
and low demand for gas, the CHP solution is irrelevant in Norway, while in Denmark the existence of 
district heating systems has been important for the development of the biogas industry (Raven and 
Gregersen, 2007). 
Biogas as a fuel for transport is relevant in both Norway and Denmark, as it has been proven 
difficult to reduce the use of fossil fuels in this sector. The use of biogas as a fuel for transport has 
increased, aided by an indirect support through an exemption from road fee and CO2-tax compared to 
fossil alternatives. The increase in use of biogas as a fuel for transport is likely to lead to less flaring and 
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better use of the production capacity in the plants. Tax exemption has also been crucial in Sweden 
(Larsson, Grönkvist and Alvfors, 2016), which is one of the European countries with the largest number 
of upgrading plants (EurObserv’ER, 2014).  
Both Norway and Denmark have no specific goals for biogas in transport, all though they share 
the EU targets of 10% renewable fuels in the transport sector by 2020 and CO2-reduction goals in 
transport. Pöschl, Ward and Owende (2010) identified upgrading of biogas for utilisation in the transport 
sector as the most promising option for use of biogas in the future in Germany, which is currently the 
largest producer of biogas in Europe. Except for the tax exemption in Norway, there are no instruments 
specifically targeting use of biogas in transport in the two countries.  
If Denmark should be independent of fossil fuels by 2050, it could make sense to consider biogas 
in transport along with other renewable fuels. The direct support for biogas to transport is low and hence 
goals and regulation does not seem to be clearly aligned. 
6 Conclusion and policy implications 
We find that several value chain designs for biogas can be profitable, and we find viable value 
chains both in Norway and in Denmark. We do however also find that the viability of a value chain is 
highly dependent on structural conditions and the regulation applied directly on the biogas plants as 
well as the adjacent sectors.  
When comparing the biogas value chains in the two countries, we see that agriculture dominates as 
the supplier of inputs in Denmark, which enables large-scale plants because of the abundant availability 
of agricultural waste products. In Norway, biogas production has been a part of the waste sector, and 
biogas and digestate have been secondary products. 
The case studies demonstrate that the profitability of the value chain deteriorates remarkably, if 
Danish regulations were to be implemented on a Norwegian value chain, and vice versa. This is 
explained by the Norwegian value chain relying on high incomes from the input operation in the form 
of a waste treatment fee, while the Danish regulation remunerates a high biogas yield through support 
on the output side.  
The difference in support both affects the value chain design and usage of biogas. Incentives for 
biogas output have been few in Norway, resulting in a large amount of flaring and self-use. In Denmark, 
this is kept to a minimum.   
Overall, the national targets and regulation in both countries are directed towards GHG-reduction, 
though the emission sources are not equally targeted, as the GHG-reduction in Denmark is concentrated 
on CO2-displacement in the energy system, and less focused on emission reduction in the agricultural 
sector. This is explained by the ambition to increase renewable energy shares and obtain fossil fuel 
independence. Norway already has security of energy supply through fossil resources and renewable 
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based electricity supply by hydropower. Only transport is fossil fuel dependent in Norway, which directs 
the effort to increase renewables in this sector.   
Goals and regulation in both countries are not completely aligned e.g. the low Danish support for 
biogas in transport does not encourage use of biogas in transport. Furthermore, we find that the national 
goals seem to be converging between the two countries presumably aided by common EU regulation, 
but the means for reaching the goals differ. 
Though goals and structural conditions are not completely the same for the two countries, they can 
learn from each other and there are several policy implications based on this comparative assessment. 
If the main objective is domestic GHG-reduction in Denmark, the options for emission reduction on the 
input side should be equally supported as the fossil fuel reduction in the energy system as this may imply 
cheaper reductions. 
In Denmark, most new biogas plants are upgrading for the natural gas grid, while receiving high 
support. It could be considered to shift some of this support to the manure treatment, and thereby 
increase the incentives for GHG-reduction and at the same time distribute the support more evenly in 
the value chain.  
The Norwegian support for the transport use of biogas is less than the average support in 
Denmark, but the input support, gate fee and investment support compensate for this. The development 
in Norway shows that biogas can and will be used in transport with the right incentives. It could, 
however, be considered to supplement the tax-exemption with a corresponding feed-in premium for 
upgraded biogas, as direct or indirect support towards the use of biogas can decrease flaring and lead 
to a more efficient use of the capacity at the plants. 
The digestate can be reused in agricultural soils, with the right input fractions and if the OW is 
sorted properly first. Clear regulation regarding quality and knowledge combined with acceptance in the 
agricultural sector is key to obtaining recycling of the nutrients in a productive manner.  
Because biogas can be produced and used in many different ways, the design of the value chain 
is highly dependent on the opportunities for the producers in the form of infrastructure, restrictions and 
support. 
We cannot conclude that one support system is superior to the other, as they are designed to fit 
different structural conditions and needs, however, it may be possible to increase regulatory efficiency 
if the countries take inspiration from each other.  
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a b s t r a c t
The Danish government has set a target of being fossil fuel independent by 2050 implying that a high
degree of inﬂexible renewable energy will be included in the energy system; biogas can add ﬂexibility
and potentially has a negative CO2-emission. In this paper, we investigate the socio-economic system
costs of reaching a Danish biogas target of 3.8 PJ in the energy system, and how CO2-costs affect the
system costs and biogas usage.
We perform our analysis using the energy systems model, Balmorel, and expand the model with a
common target for raw biogas and upgraded biogas (biomethane). Raw biogas can be used directly in
heat and power production, while biomethane has the same properties as natural gas. Balmorel is altered
such that natural gas and biomethane can be used in the same technologies.
Several CO2-cost estimates are investigated; hereunder a high estimate for the expected CO2-exter-
nality costs. We ﬁnd that system costs increase with CO2-costs in most cases, while the biogas target
becomes socio-economically cheaper. In the case of a very high CO2-cost, system costs decrease and
biomethane becomes the primary fuel. Furthermore, biomethane functions as regulating power and the
Danish fuel consumption increases due to a higher electricity export.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Danish climate strategy is shaped around a goal of being
independent of fossil fuels in all energy consuming sectors by 2050,
and one tool among many is biogas. First focus point have been the
heat and power sector (from now on called the energy system) in
which there has already been a large development in energy sav-
ings and implementation of renewable energy. Therefore, an en-
ergy system independent of fossil fuels by 2035 has been
determined as a stepping stone towards the 2050 goal [1].
Biogas production have been developed in Denmark since the
late 1970's with varying focus points [2]. Biogas is a renewable fuel
that can be produced from a large variety of inputs such as manure,
waste water and other wet substrates, which are expensive to use
in other technologies. In Denmark, biogas is primarily based on
manure of which there is an abundant supply from the large Danish
agricultural industry. The degassedmanure from the biogas process
has an improved fertiliser value and can potentially improve the
water environment as less nutrients are washed out from the ﬁelds.
Furthermore emissions from the far more potent greenhouse
gasses: methane (CH4) and laughing gas (N2O) are converted into
CO2-emissionsdmaking biogas one of the few fuels that potentially
can reduce greenhouse gas emission effects.
In Denmark, biogas has primarily been used in local, combined
heat and power plants (CHPs). As biogas is produced constantly all
over the year and it is expensive to store, it is also used constantly,
i.e. producing a constant stream of heat and power. With an in-
crease in volatile renewable power production, this is not neces-
sarily the optimal usage of biogas. In 2014 new regulation was
ratiﬁed, such that biogas is nowalso subsidised when it is upgraded
to natural gas quality (biomethane). Biomethane can be trans-
ported in the natural gas grid, which allows it to be used where it is
needed, when it is needed.
Biogas has been applied in other analyses on systems opti-
misationdin particular on the issue of waste as a fuel [3e5]. Biogas
is often one fuel out of many and seldom turn out to be the
preferred fuel as seen in e.g. Ref. [3] and the national biomass value
chain model [6]. In our analysis, we turn our attention to biogas
(hereunder biomethane) by including a separate target of biogas
usage.
There is a variety of literature on energy systems optimisation
using different optimisation models, e.g. Balmorel [7e9], MARKAL/
TIMES [10e12], and EnergyPLAN [13e15]. An overview of existing
energy systemsmodels can be found in Ref. [16]. With the choice of
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model, it becomes necessary to assess whether the model can
include varying properties of the two types of biogas and the target
of biogas usage.
In this paper, we consider the year 2025 for which the Danish
Energy Agency (DEA) has a prognosis of the biogas production [17],
which seems to be aligned with the goal of being fossil fuel inde-
pendent by 2035. We model biomethane as a substitute fuel for
natural gas in an energy systems optimisation model and include a
common goal on the use of biogas in the energy system. We allow
the model to use biomethane as well as raw biogas and thereby we
can compare the two options for the energy system. To our
knowledge no other articles have included both raw biogas and
biomethane in an energy systems optimisation model to evaluate
their usage. The optimisation model is minimising the socio-
economic cost of the energy system. From the model, the use of
raw biogas and biomethane can be evaluated to ﬁnd the socio-
economic cost of a biogas target in the energy system both as a
system cost and a marginal cost of the target. Furthermore, sce-
narios for different settings of the CO2-cost is introduced to eval-
uate the effect on the system cost and the marginal cost of the
target.
2. Biogas in Denmark
Biogas production has been developed in Denmark since the late
1970s [2], primarily based on manure and co-substrates from a
large agricultural industry; and due to regulation biogas plants
have primarily supplied heat and power locally.
As Denmark moves towards being fossil independent by 2050, it
becomes necessary to ﬁnd replacements for particularly coal and
natural gas in the energy system. There is already by 2017 amassive
development in Denmark where coal to a large extent has been
replaced by biomass and wind power. However, the lack of ﬂexi-
bility and predictability among renewable energy sources such as
wind and solar power [18] has become a repeated concern, when
renewable energy is integrated into the energy system. One sug-
gested beneﬁt from biogas is the potential to add this needed
ﬂexibility. The traditionally, Danish biogas usage where biogas is
sent directly through a dedicated pipeline to a nearby CHP-plant,
can however not be expected to add much ﬂexibilitydin some
cases it might even work against ﬂexibility, since an effective pro-
duction of raw biogas only can vary a little and due to high costs
with local storing [19] it has to be used gradually while it is
produced.
Raw biogas can also be upgraded to natural gas quality and sent
as biomethane into the national gas grid. Raw biogas is made of
approximately 65% methane and 35% CO2, and the upgrading
process consists essentially in removing this CO2-surplus, con-
verting the raw biogas into biomethane (98%methane and 2% CO2).
Alternatively, hydrogen from electrolysis could be added to raw
biogas, converting the CO2-surplus into additional methane [20].
This process would increase the biomethane production with
roughly 70%. The biomethane can be transported in the gas grid,
stored and used with the same ﬂexibility as natural gas in the heat
and power sector, in industry or in heavy transport.
2.1. Biogas targets
There is no particular target for Danish biogas usage in 2025.
However, a target of using 50% of all manure for biogas production
by 2020 was set in the Green Growth Agreement [21]. This is an
extensive increase in the biogas production, as currently only
7e10% of the Danish manure is used for biogas production. If 50% of
the manure were to be used for biogas production it would corre-
spond to approximately 11 PJ.
The energy consumption prognosis from the Danish Energy
Agency (DEA) [17], predicts a 7 PJ increase in total biogas con-
sumption from 10 PJ in 2015 to 17 PJ in 2025. In Fig. 1 the latest and
expected development in biogas consumption are depicted (left y-
axis) and for comparison the natural gas consumption is also
depicted (right y-axis). From this it is clear, that even with a high
percentage increase in biogas consumption, it will still be far from
the current natural gas consumption.
The latest calculations on future biogas potentials for Denmark
corresponds to approximately 60e85 PJ [22,23]. But evenwith such
high production it only corresponds to roughly 10% of the current
total energy demand in Denmark, which is around 750 PJ.
Furthermore, biogas is considered relatively expensive compared to
other renewable technologies. The expected Danish energy con-
sumption is depicted in Fig. 2 together with the energy consump-
tion for the energy system for 2015 and a prognosis for 2025 from
the Danish Energy Agency (DEA).
From the 2025 prognosis it becomes clear that an increased
biogas production is not expected to be used in the heat and power
sector. An increase in biogas consumption is most likely to happen
in the transport and industrial sectors according to the Danish
biogas task force analysis [24].
2.2. Regulation
As alreadymentioned, support for biogas was until recently only
given indirectly to electricity produced on raw biogas in a local CHP.
With the new regulation support is also given to upgraded biogas.
The support for 2015 can be seen in Table 1 together with an
approximation for the support in 2025. Since the support is
dependent on both the natural gas price and the net price index, it
is uncertain what the exact support will be in 2025.
With the current regulation, the support for raw and upgraded
biogas is in many ways similar and since costs for upgrading are
high, a private economic analysis could point to direct use as the
preferred usage. According to [25], this is also the preferred choice
as long as the plant is small. Following the inﬂexible production of
biogas and the support design, when raw biogas is used in a local
CHP, CHP is incentivised to produce constantly, independently of
the electricity market. Support for biomethane is given before the
biomethane is used anddexcept for a reduced CO2-costdbio-
methane is expected to have the same properties as natural gas and
is taxed the same way. Therefore, the private economic competi-
tiveness of biomethane can already be determined at the gate into
the gas system: if the fuel costs including CO2-costs are sufﬁciently
low, biomethane could compete with natural gas, which may
favour upgrading [26,27].
In conclusion, it is reasonable to expect that biogas will be used
both raw and upgraded in the future energy system depending on
the local conditions, e.g. the local district heating demand.
3. Biogas in the energy system
Based on the above, we ﬁnd it reasonable to include both raw
biogas and biomethane when we model biogas within a Danish
energy system context. The raw biogas and biomethane should be
included in the energy systemsmodel with different properties, e.g.
cost and efﬁciency, and the common target should be handled by
the model.
3.1. Balmorel
We choose to use the energy system model, Balmorel [28], for
analysing the use of raw biogas and biomethane. Balmorel is a
bottom-up model in which the energy system can be optimised
I.G. Jensen, L. Skovsgaard / Energy 134 (2017) 289e300290
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using an economic dispatch model, i.e. assuming all energy
generating units are always online. The general economic dispatch
model for electricity generation without investments can be writ-
ten as:
Min: z ¼
X
t2T
X
a2A
X
g2G
X
s2S
costgvgea;g;s;t (1)
S:t: vgeming  vgea;g;s;t  vgemaxg ca2A ; g2G ; s2S ; t2T
(2)
X
g2G
vgea;g;s;t ¼ da;s;t ca2A ; s2S ; t2T (3)
vgea;g;s;t  0 ca2A ; g2G ; s2S ; t2T (4)
Line 1 is the total cost of producing on the installed technology
type g. Here costg is the cost of producing one unit of power on
Fig. 1. Biogas target shown on the left y-axis compared to the natural gas demand on the right y-axis.
Fig. 2. Danish fuel consumption.
Table 1
Direct and indirect support for biogas, in 2015-prices.
Regulation type 2015 2025
Electricity feed-in tariff,
CHP - raw biogas
16.8 Eurocent/kWh 12.8 Eurocent/kWh
Avoided fuel tax on heat,
CHP - raw biogas
3.1 Eurocent/kWh 3.1 Eurocent/kWh
Biogas feed-in premium,
biomethane
16.8 Euro/GJ 12.8 Euro/GJ
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technology g and vgea;g;s;t is the amount of electricity produced on
technology g in area a in all time periods given by season s and time
t. Equation (2) ensures that each technology produces within its
limits given by a minimum production limit, vgeming , and a
maximum production limit, vgemaxg , in all areas and time periods.
Equation (3) ensures that the electricity demand is met in all areas
and time periods. Equation (4) ensures that the production is non-
negative for all technologies in each area at all time periods. All
used nomenclature can be seen in Appendix A. The economic
dispatch problem can be extended to include heat-only technolo-
gies as well as combined heat and power technologies. This
extension is not covered here, however, Balmorel includes both
power and heat generation, as well as transmission within coun-
tries and between countries. The reader can refer to [28] for more
details on modelling in Balmorel.
Balmorel is adoptable to any choice of geography, however it is
used mostly in the Nordic and Baltic countries. Balmorel can be
extended using several different add-ons, e.g. a unit commitment
add-on, a policy add-on, and a time aggregation add-on. In this
paper we use the economic dispatch model with optimisation of
investments, and the combination technology add-on (Combtech)
described in Section 3.3.
Balmorel performs an economic optimisation with a simplistic
representation of a socio-economic analysis, which do not include
all externalities. The socio-economic optimisation is a cost-based
analysis, using neither national taxes nor subsidies, and costs
used in the model are expected market prices.
3.2. Modelling of biogas in the energy system: limitations and
delimitations
Balmorel is run using economic dispatch, meaning that the fuel
with the lowest cost for the system is used ﬁrst and the most
expensive fuels are used as regulating power. Given the in-
ﬂexibilities of biogas production and expensive local storage [19],
raw biogas cannot be used as regulating power in the system. This
could be included in the model by forcing the model to use the raw
biogas constantly. This addition would make the model an integer
programming model and would increase running time signiﬁ-
cantly. With a long running time already before this addition, it is
not considered a viable solution and the model is kept linear.
Alternatively, the model could be forced to ﬂare a certain per-
centage of the raw biogas. This, however, would require that the
raw biogas is used as base load and, as described in Section 6.2, the
main investments for biogas are made in regulating power tech-
nologies. We therefore address this issue manually in the result
analysis; and to avoid an extensive usage of raw biogas as regu-
lating powerdgiving raw biogas an incorrect competitive advan-
tage compared to biomethanedwe do not allow the model to
invest in new plants using raw biogas as fuel.
Aggregation is widely applied in Balmorel to make the model
both faster anddas in the case of fuel usagedmore speciﬁc. Time
aggregation is applied by using a number of weeks during the year
with a number of hours per weeks speciﬁed by the user. These
choices will make the model faster than running the full year
anddwith a clever choice of weeks over the yeardthe results will
be close to the full year model.
Fuel usage aggregation means that each technology has a spe-
ciﬁc fuel assigned to it with speciﬁc properties, hereunder efﬁ-
ciencies. One plant in the real world with different fuel inputs,
would therefore be displayed in Balmorel as a number of technol-
ogies corresponding to the number of fuel inputs. Balmorel then
optimises the fuel usage considering fuel costs, technology prop-
erties, capacity availability and so forth. At the same time, many
plants in a given area are aggregated into one representative plant,
meaning that in each area in Balmorel there can only be one plant
of each technology.
A combined heat and power plant (CHP) using raw biogas
cannot easily substitute the biogas with another fuel. A CHP using
natural gas can however substitute the natural gas with bio-
methane, as this is essentially the same.
3.3. Combtech: combination of two technologies
The relevant add-on for combining two technologies is called
Combtech. To our knowledge, Combtech has only been used in one
paper [5], where it is used to evaluate howwaste should be used in
the energy system. Combtech can combine two technologies, a
primary technology and a secondary technology, with similar
characteristics, e.g. efﬁciencies, lifetime, and fuel type. In our case,
the only characteristic biomethane and natural gas technologies do
not share is the fuel type, which results in different CO2-emissions
and fuel costs.
To allow substitution of fuels in a speciﬁc plant, the following
constraints must be revised in Balmorel:
 Capacity constraints for existing and new energy conversion
capacities
 Loss of electricity generation per unit of heat generated on
extraction units for existing and new capacities
The capacity constraint is deﬁned for existing electricity units,
existing heat units, new electricity units, and new heat units. For
the sake of simplicity, this constraint is only given for the existing
electricity units but can easily be transferred to the other types by a
name change in variables and sets. The existing electricity units g
are in the set G elec;1 and G elec;2, where the ﬁrst set is for the pri-
mary technologies and the second for secondary technologies.
vgea;g;s;t is the production of electricity in area a, on technology g,
season s and time t. The primary and secondary technologies are
given from g by G 1ðgÞ and G 2ðgÞ, respectively. The capacity of
technology g in area a is given by ca;g and the combination of areas
and technologies where capacity exists is given by the set A G K .
The capacity constraint is:
vgea;g;s;tþ
X
g22G
2ðgÞ
vgea;g2;s;t  ca;g ca2A ; g2G elec;1;
fa; gg2A G K ; s2S ; t2T
(5)
Here the generation on the primary technology and all related
secondary technologies are added and can not exceed the installed
capacity.
An extraction unit can generate both heat and power, but in
contrast to a back-pressure unit, the ratio between heat and power
is not ﬁxed. Instead the extraction unit will have a loss of electricity
produced per unit of heat generated. The loss, which is given by the
so-called Cv-line, is deﬁned for both existing units and new units
and is given here for the existing units. As for the capacity
constraint, the constraint for the new units is similar and can be
derived by a name change in variables and sets. The electricity loss
of the extraction unit g2G ext;1, is modelled using the parameter,
Cvg , which is assumed constant. The loss of electricity generation per
unit of heat generated by extraction units is given by:
I.G. Jensen, L. Skovsgaard / Energy 134 (2017) 289e300292
PAPER D
155
When optimising, Balmorel can then decide whether to use
natural gas or biomethane in the productiondtaking fuel prices
and restrictions into consideration.
3.4. Modelling the biogas target
The common biogas target for raw biogas and biomethane is
included by a new constraint. The model is based on the abbrevi-
ations used above and the following is added. A ðcÞ is the areas
related to country c. vgfa;g;s;t is the used fuel in area a on technology
g in season s in time t on installed capacity and vgfna;g;s;t is the same
for new capacity. fuelðgÞ is the fuel type used on technology g. The
parameter called GMIN2Fc;f ;f 0 is added to the model with the target
described in Section 4 and represents the target for fuel f and f 0 in
the country c. The target should be given in GJ.
The common target can be handled by the following constraint:
3:6$
X
a2A ðcÞ
0
BBBB@
X
g2G j
fuelðgÞ¼f
X
s2S
X
t2T

vgfa;g;s;t þ vgfna;g;s;t

þ
X
g2G j
fuelðgÞ¼f 0

X
s2S
X
t2T

vgfa;g;s;t þ vgfna;g;s;t

1
CCCCA
 GMIN2Fc;f ;f 0 cc2C ; f2F ; f 02F
(7)
The ﬁrst line represents the amount of fuel type f that is used
and the second line represents the amount of fuel type f 0 used in
the model. As the amount of fuel used is given in MWh and the
target in GJ, the left hand side is multiplied by 3.6. Only the
countries and fuels for which there are a speciﬁed target are bound
by the constraint.
4. Assumptions and data
For this analysis we simulate the Nordic countries and Northern
Germany with a focus on Denmark, i.e. only a Danish target of
biogas consumption. The countries are further divided on a regional
level corresponding to the regions on Nordpooldexcept for
Northern Germany, which is divided into three regions. The regions
are further divided in up to 10 areas based on the demand, size and
geography.
We model one year, 2025, using four full weeks, one in each
season. Furthermore, we perform a simple socio-economic analysis,
i.e. cost prices from a Danish viewpoint together with no taxes nor
subsidies. CO2-emission is the only externality included in the
optimisation and is represented by a socio-economic cost of CO2.
Focus is on climate targets, as this is where biogas has a competitive
advantage due to a negative CO2-emission in CO2-equivalents. This
assumed negative emission is based on avoided methane and N2O
-emissions when manure is treated and thereby converted into
biogas and digestate instead of being distributed directly on the
ﬁelds. The CO2-emission value has been calculated by using the
data from Refs. [29,30].
Fuel costs are mainly international market prices, following the
assumption that most fuel prices will not be affected signiﬁcantly
by Danish fuel consumption. The primary source for fuel costs is the
Danish Energy Agency (DEA) 2016-prognosis for socio-economic
analysis, which is estimated on the basis of IEA prices [31]. The
natural gas price is for example based on IEA prices adjusted to
Danish price levels.
Fuels with high transportation costs, which do not enter the
international markets, such as some biomasses, have an estimated
cost which follows the closest substitute [31]. In the case of for
example straw, the closest substitute is wood chips. Biogas costs are
estimated on the basis of production costs found by using a proﬁt
optimising plant model with an input combination of manure and
straw [27]. The straw price is the same as used in the energy sys-
tems analysis. The plant is large, using as input 600.000 t/y and
generating a biogas yield of approximately 34 Mm3/y. Costs are
found both in relation to raw biogas and when upgrading costs for
the biomethane are included. The upgrading to biomethane is done
by water scrubbing.
Type of fuel cost method, fuel costs and CO2-emissions are listed
in Table 2. All costs are in V2015 prices.
4.1. The signiﬁcance of price changes
The Danish Energy Agency (DEA) assumes that ﬁxed fuel prices
will increase over the years, however, not extraordinarily [31].
There is a possibility that particularly biomass prices will increase
more rapidly than expected, which could change the overall system
results signiﬁcantly. As we use the straw price as input to the biogas
production, higher biomass prices will have an effect on the biogas
costs and thereby an effect on the biogas target. However, higher
biomass costs would improve the competitiveness of biogas
compared to biomasses, as straw is a minor part of the biogas costs.
The most important factor in relation to price changes is expected
to be price changes for the nearest substitute, in this case natural
gas.
4.2. Targets and maximum consumption
As mentioned in section 2.1 there are currently no biogas tar-
gets, so we set the biogas target following the biogas consumption
prognosis for biogas in the heat and power sector from DEA [17],
where biogas consumption in the energy system is expected to
decline from 4.3 PJ to approximately 3.8 PJ. This assumption follows
the conclusions from the Biogas Taskforce as well as the general
development in the Danish energy system, where natural gas based
combined heat and power production is crowded out by primarily
wind power [32]. The used target and limitations can be seen in
Table 3.
We do not use a target for natural gas consumption, however we
set a limit following the DEA estimated use by 2025. In this esti-
mation, it seems that the goal of a renewable founded heat and
power production by 2035 is taken into account. Furthermore,
vgea;g;s;t þ
X
g22G
2ðgÞ
vgea;g2;s;t  ca;g  Cvgvgha;g;s;t 
X
g22G
2ðgÞ
Cvg2vgha;g2;s;t
ca2A ; g2G ext;1; fa; gg2A G K ; s2S ; t2T
(6)
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there is a ﬁxed usage of waste which is based on calculations using
the FRIDA model [33] using the recycling targets from Ref. [34].
Last, an upper bound on wind potential is used, which is based on
the IEA report [35].
4.3. Production capacity
We apply the existing generation capacity in the model by 2025,
which for the Danish capacities are based on data from the Danish
counting of energy production capacity by 2016 [36]. These ca-
pacities have been projected up to 2025 following expected
remaining lifetimes and efﬁciencies. We allow the model to invest
in further capacity in order to ﬁll the gaps from existing, depreci-
ated capacity and new demand. The given technology costs are
found in the technology catalogues from DEA [37] and new in-
vestments are depreciated with a 4% interest rate following the
instructions for socio-economic analysis in Denmark [38,39].
Furthermore, it is assumed that all investments have a 20 year
lifetime.
In Table 4 the existing capacities for technologies using biogas
are shown along with their average efﬁciencies. The model is
allowed to invest in new capacity using natural gas/biomethane,
but it is not allowed to invest in capacity using raw biogas. This is
due to the challenges with raw biogas, where it is difﬁcult to
resemble reality and force the model to use the same amount of
biogas all over the year, as explained in section 3.3. As it turns out,
this will only be an issue in one scenario.
5. Scenarios
In order to understand the socio-economic costs from setting a
target for biogas usage in the Danish Energy System, two primary
scenarios are considered. A Base-scenario with no biogas target and
a Target-scenario, with a target for biogas. A determining factor for
the result is the socio-economic cost of CO2. When the socio-
economic cost of CO2 is high, fossil fuels becomes relatively less
competitive. In the case of biogas, this becomes evenmore relevant,
as biogas is assumed to have a negative CO2-emission. Therefore
three secondary scenarios are added investigating the importance
of the CO2-cost. The settings used can be seen in Table 5. In Fig. 3,
the CO2-cost is added to the fuel cost to illustrate the signiﬁcance of
the CO2-cost. It becomes clear that the closest substitute to biogas,
natural gas, continue to be cheaper than biogasdeven in the high
CO2-cost scenario, given the expected development in natural gas
prices.
The actual socio-economic cost of CO2-emissions from the
Danish energy production is difﬁcult to estimate correctly. There-
fore, we followed the recommendation from DEA [31] to use
different prognoses for the CO2-quota price, assuming, that this to
some extent corresponds to the socio-economic cost. We used the
DEA 2015-prognosis for the high and low CO2-quota price which is
based on current CO2-quota prices and the IEA World Economic
outlook prognosis from 2015. Finally, we used the average of the
two scenarios. All scenarios are shown in Table 5.
5.1. CO2-externality cost scenarios
The European CO2-quota prices are based on the expected
marginal costs of CO2-emission reduction given the political
decided cap on CO2-emissions within the CO2-quota affected sec-
tors. As the cap is politically decided it is not necessarily related to
any expectations for the actual CO2-externality costs, and compared
to the literature, these costs also seem rather low. In Ref. [40]
several estimations for the CO2-externality costs from the
Table 2
Fuel data.
Type of price Price, V/GJ CO2-emissions, kg/GJ
Fossil Fuels Market prices [31] Predicted avg. prices Standard ﬁgures [31]
Biomasses Comb. of market and cost prices [31] Predicted avg. prices Avg. ﬁgures calculated on expected usage [30]
Raw biogas Cost calculated [27] 10.2 77 [30]
Biomethane Cost calculated [27] 12.1 77 [30]
Natural gas Market prices 6.7 [31] 56.8 [31]
Straw Comb. of market and cost prices 6.3 [31] 11 [29]
Table 3
Forecasts and targets [17].
Actual, Energy system, 2015 Forecasted, Energy System, 2025 Target or Maximum
Biogas 4.3 PJ 3.8 PJ Target
Natural gas 34.5 PJ 28 PJ Maximum
Table 4
Technology data [36,37].
Existing capacity Efﬁciency
Raw biogas Combination technology Raw biogas Combination technology
Heat Only 19 MW 3161 MW 80.7% 95.6%
CHP 107 MW 934 MW 89.9% 90.5%
Electricity Only 0.3 MW 0.8 MW 31.7% 44.0%
Table 5
Settings for the scenarios.
Scenario Target CO2-cost level CO2-cost, V/ton
Base e Average 15.3
Target þ Average 15.3
CO2High/Base e High 23.1
CO2High/Target þ High 23.1
CO2Low/Target þ Low 7.5
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literature are collected and evaluated, and from this a lower bound
for the social cost of CO2 is formed. This bound is high compared to
other cost estimates in the literature [40].
To see what happens to the biogas consumption when a higher
CO2-cost is used in the model, we include this lower bound as the
Van den Bergh CO2-cost in the CO2Bergh/Target scenario. Further,
we use the lower estimate from Ref. [41] in the CO2Dice/Target
scenario to compare the results from the DEA estimates on mar-
ginal CO2-emission reduction costs to the estimated CO2-exter-
nality costs from Refs. [40] and [41]. The used CO2-costs and the
resulting fuel costs for natural gas, biomethane, and biogas can be
seen in Table 6 for the scenarios with high CO2-cost.
It is noticeable that the Dice CO2-externality costs are quite close
to the estimated high CO2-quota price from the DEA.
6. Results
Seven scenarios have been run: two primary and three sec-
ondary, as well as two sensitivity analysis scenarios of the CO2-
costs.
6.1. System cost
Five parameters are presented in Table 7 giving the overall re-
sults from the scenario runs. The objective function value, OBJ,
constitute the total system costs of the given scenario in Million
Euro. Whereas D OBJ shows the additional system cost of a scenario
in relation to the base scenario. The system cost increases when a
biogas target is added, as the model would otherwise have used the
biogas already. However, the results show, that the system cost
increase is low, compared to a high CO2-cost. This makes sense as
biogas corresponds to approximately 1.6% of the fuel usage in the
target scenario while fossil fuel usage corresponds to approxi-
mately 36% of the fuel usage in all scenarios. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that it becomes relatively less costly to add a biogas target as the
CO2-cost increases, which is due to the negative CO2-emissions
from biogas.
The marginal cost of forcing a biogas target of 3.8 PJ on the
system is between 1.23 and 3.36V/GJ depending on the CO2-cost. In
order to make biogas socio-economically worthwhile, the actual
CO2-externality cost should prove to be even higher in order to call
the biogas target socio-economic beneﬁcial. Alternatively, other
beneﬁts from biogas production could be considered, such as
positive externalities from e.g. reduced smell, increased quality of
agricultural fertilisers, possible reduced nutrient releases to
groundwater, or job creation in rural areas.
The last parameters, CO2-total and CO2-DK, show the amount of
CO2-emissions for the scenarios. Here it shows that a biogas target
changes the CO2-emissions in Denmark more than the high CO2-
cost. The Danish biogas target has an effect on the total CO2-
emission. This can be seen by the total CO2-emission in the target
scenarios being reduced more than the Danish CO2-emissions and
can be explained by an increase of electricity transmission to Ger-
many, which reduces the use of coal in Germany and therefore a
decrease in the CO2-emissions.
6.2. Fuel and capacity usage
In Table 8 it shows that the upper bound on natural gas usage is
binding through all the scenarios. In all scenarios, however, only
approximately 11e12% of the installed capacity is used, and only a
small fraction of the used capacity is using biomethane. An expla-
nation of this low usage combined with new investments could be
that gas primarily is used for regulating power. This is substantiated
by 80e98% of the new investments in combination technologies
are in power producing capacity. Both raw biogas and biomethane
are used in the target-scenarios, however, raw biogas is preferred to
biomethane due to the lower fuel costs. The model does not
distinguish between raw biogas and combination technologies as
Fig. 3. Fuel costs, when the CO2-cost is added; for average, low, and high CO2-costs.
Table 6
CO2-costs for the high CO2-cost scenarios, V2015/ton.
Scenario CO2-cost Natural gas Biomethane Biogas
CO2High/Target 23.1 8.0 11.8 9.7
CO2Dice/Target 30.3 8.4 11.3 9.2
CO2Bergh/Target 99.2 12.4 6.0 3.8
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we have not included the problems with ﬂexible usage of raw
biogas in the model, see section 3.2. These observations emphasise
the need of not allowing the model to invest in new capacity using
raw biogas.
Fig. 4 displays the normalised fuel usage in the base and target
scenarios in order to compare how fuel consumption differs. As the
biogas target represent a small share of the total energy con-
sumption it is no surprise, that the overall fuel consumption is quite
similar. However, it can be seen that the additional biogas usage is
substituting use of oil and heat pumps, but also biomass.
Fig. 5 presents the three target scenarios and displays the sig-
niﬁcance of the CO2-costs on fuel usage. The ﬁgure shows, that the
usage of coal, natural gas, waste, wind, and sun does not change
through the scenarios. Relating this to Fig. 3, an explaining factor
can be that neither coal, natural gas nor waste changes position in
the ranking of fuel costs with these changes in the CO2-costs. When
the CO2-cost is low, it is preferred to use heat pumps, oil, and
surplus heat in the system, whereas biomass and biogas is
preferred when the CO2-cost is high.
For the CO2Low/Target scenario, the usage of biomethane is
Table 7
Results of the ﬁve scenarios. OBJ is the objective function value, DOBJ is the change in the objective function from the Base scenario, MTE is the marginal value of the biogas
target constraint (7), and CO2-total and CO2-DK are the CO2-emissions from the total energy system and for the Danish energy system.
Base Target CO2High/Base CO2High/Target CO2Low/Target
OBJ, MV 35,798 35,804 37,928 37,931 33,385
DOBJ, MV e 6 2,130 2,133 2,414
MTE, V/GJ e 2.22 e 1.23 3.36
CO2-total, MT 296.7 296.3 253.1 252.7 320.7
CO2-DK, MT 8.0 7.8 8.1 7.8 7.8
Table 8
Fuel usage, basic results. BM-COMB represents the percentage usage of biomethane in the combination technologies and %-COMB represents the percentage that the com-
bination technologies are used.
Base Target CO2High/Base CO2High/Target CO2Low/Target
Biogas usage, GJ 485,731 2,083,290 776,758 2,517,432 1,964,166
Biomethane usage, GJ e 1,716,710 e 1,282,568 1,835,834
Natural gas usage, GJ 28,000,000 28,000,000 28,000,000 28,000,000 28,000,000
BM-COMB 0% 5.8% 0% 4.5% 6.1%
%-COMB 11.7% 12.1% 11.0% 11.3% 11.8%
New COMB-capacity, MW 525 568 352 389 735
Fig. 4. Normalised fuel usage for Denmark in the base and target scenario.
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higher than in any other scenario. This is due to the fact that when
comparing raw biogas and biomethane, the fuel costs become
relatively closer to each other when the CO2-cost is low compared
to when the CO2-cost is high. Biomethane is still more expensive,
but when the costs are relatively closer, other factors become more
determining for the result. These factors are e.g. technology efﬁ-
ciency, investment and operational costs, and the relative demand
between heat and power.
Waste, wind, and sun are used equally across all scenarios. This
is due to the fact that the maximum restrictions on these energy
sources are binding in all scenarios. It is out of the scope of this
paper to evaluate further on the restrictions. The results, however,
indicate that the restrictions have an inﬂuence on the ﬁnal results.
6.3. Usage of raw biogas in the system
Raw biogas is preferred to biomethane in all scenarios due to the
lower fuel costs of raw biogas while not all inefﬁciencies from the
real world are implemented in the model, as e.g. the need for an
almost constant use of raw biogas. Fig. 6 represents the usage of
raw biogas in the CO2High/Target scenario, where the biogas usage
in GJ for CHP-units relates to the right y-axis and boilers plus
electricity-only units relates to the right y-axis. It is clear, that raw
biogas primarily is used in CHP-units andmostly during winter and
autumn (ﬁrst and last period) and as regulating power during
spring and summer. If a real world biogas based CHP had this
consumption pattern, it would result in approximately 30% of the
gas being ﬂared, which would increase the cost of using raw biogas
considerably. More likely, the plant would produce constantly, thus
decreasing the value of the output for the system and thereby also
the value of the raw biogas.
6.4. When the CO2-externality costs are implemented
While the ﬁrst scenarios presented in this paper relate to esti-
mated CO2-cost from a CO2-quota system, the CO2-costs in the last
two scenarios are related to estimations of the actual CO2-damage
costs: a low and a high estimate. As given in Table 6, the estimated
CO2-costs in the CO2Dice/Target scenario are quite close to
CO2High/Target scenario, which is also reﬂected in the result
summary in Table 9. However, the interpretation of the costs is not
the same. Total system costs increase slightly from the CO2High/
Target to the CO2Dice/Target scenario, while the marginal costs of
having a target for biogas usage approaches zero, so it seems that
the CO2-costs approaches a breaking point where the needed
biogas would be used without a target.
Total system costs are low in the CO2Bergh/Target scenario
compared to the other high CO2-cost scenarios. This decrease in
system costs is based on fuel costs of raw biogas and biomethane,
which are low due to their negative CO2-emission. This also result
in a high use of biomethane, which by far exceeds the target and
thereby reduces the marginal cost of the biogas target to zero.
In Table 9 we see a small decrease in both usage and installation
of combination technologies in the CO2Dice/Target scenario, and in
Fig. 7, we see that biomass seems to have become relatively more
attractive in the CO2Dice/Target scenario. In the CO2Bergh/Target
scenario on the other hand, both the degree of capacity usage and
investments increase, which could also be expected considering the
increased usage of biomethanedreﬂected in Fig. 7.
The CO2-emissions show to be negative for both Denmark and
the total energy system for the CO2Bergh/Target scenario as shown
in Table 9. The negative CO2-emission in Denmark is explained by
the excessive usage of biomethane in Denmark as shown in Fig. 7.
For the total system, the important contributor to negative CO2-
emissions is Germany where biomethane is also used to a large
Fig. 5. Normalised fuel usage for Denmark in the target scenarios.
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Fig. 6. Usage distribution of raw biogas in the CO2 High/Target scenario.
Table 9
Results of the high CO2-scenarios. MTE is the marginal value of the biogas target constraint (7) and %-COMB represents the percentage that the combination
technologies are used. The capacity installed on the combination technologies are given by New COMB-capacity, and the CO2-emissions for the system and for
Denmark is given by CO2-total and CO2-DK.
CO2High/Target CO2Dice/Target CO2Bergh/Target
OBJ, MV 37,931 39,685 36,437
MTE, V/GJ 1.23 0.13 e
%-COMB 11.3% 10.7% 44.3%
New COMB-capacity, MW 389 352 3443
CO2-total, MT 252.7 232.4 178.4
CO2-DK, MT 7.8 7.7 13.3
Fig. 7. Fuel usage in Denmark for the scenarios with high CO2-cost.
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extentdresulting in negative CO2-emissions for the whole system.
The accumulated amount of fuels used in the CO2Bergh/Target
scenario exceeds the fuel usage in any of the other scenarios. This
can be explained by electricity based on biomethane becoming
cheap enough to substitute a large amount of electricity production
in Germany, resulting in an increased electricity export and a higher
fuel usage in Denmark.
The natural gas consumption in this scenario has been replaced
completely with biomethane, which then function as a base load
provider during winter and autumn, and provider of regulating
power during the summer period. This underlines, that biomethane
can indeed function as a fuel for regulating power, using the gas
transmission net as energy storagedin a scenario where CO2-costs
are very high.
The suggested biomethane consumption in CO2Bergh/Target
scenario exceeds by far the sketched biogas potential in section 2.1,
which means that more biogas would have to be produced. This
could be through the addition of imported biomasses or e.g. grown
algaes, which are not considered in the current prognosis for biogas
potentials [22,23]. Furthermore, biogas could be upgraded by
methanation where hydrogen is added to the raw biogas, such that
excess CO2 and hydrogen are converted into CH4 and thereby in-
crease the biomethane production by approximately 70% [42]. The
hydrogen could be produced when electricity prices are low.
Potentially, this can help even-out the electricity price and give an
effective way to store electricity when there is an oversupply. How
the additional biomethane is produced and interacts with the en-
ergy system is out of scope of this paper. It can, however, be ex-
pected that biomethane made by methanation will affect the
assumed CO2-emission related to biomethane such that less CO2
will be reduced per GJ biomethane produced. When fed into the
calculation, this should make the model less eager to use the large
amount of biomethane.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the socio economic system costs of
having a biogas target in Denmark, and how CO2-costs affect the
system costs and biogas usage. To do this, we used the energy
system model Balmorel with the possibility to combine natural gas
with biomethane in one technology. Furthermore, we set a target
for raw biogas and biomethane corresponding to the predicted
amount used in the heat and power sector in 2025. First, the model
was applied using predictions of CO2-costs from the Danish Energy
Association. Then, we added two sensitivity analysis scenarios
where we applied higher CO2-costs corresponding to estimates for
the actual CO2-externality costs found in the literature.
From our analysis, we see that we need a very high CO2-cost
estimate in the area of the CO2-costs estimated by Van den Bergh
[40] before biogas or biomethane is worthwhile using in large
amounts. When increasing the CO2-costs, the biogas target be-
comes less costly while the total system cost increases. First when
CO2-costs are very high, biogas becomes worthwhile and used to
such an extent, that total system costs decline. Even though the
very high CO2-cost might not be justiﬁed, there could still be ar-
guments for forcing the system to use biogas, as there are other
positive externalities from biogas than CO2-reductions. This has,
however, not been investigated further in this paper.
There are investments in combination technologies in all sce-
narios, but the usage of the natural gas technologies is relatively
low, and the existing combination technologies are not used much.
This suggests that gas primarily is used as regulating power.
However, with very high CO2-costs, combination technologies are
used as base-load during winter and regulating power during
summer. Furthermore, there is an increase in export of electricity in
this scenario, which can be explained by the fact that the high CO2-
cost reduces the biomethane cost, and thereby increases bio-
methane's competitiveness compared to other electricity sources in
the surrounding countries.
The scenario with the CO2-cost estimate by Ref. [40] leads to an
extensive usage of biogas that exceeds the potentials described in
Ref. [22]. The lack of biogas resources could partly be overcome by
biogas upgrading through methanation where hydrogen is used to
upgrade the biogas. This could be investigated further in an energy
system where the upgrading of biogas is included. This requires
new estimates of the biogas CO2-emissions, since upgraded biogas
through methanation contains a lower share of manure per GJ and
thereby also another level of CO2-emissions.
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Nomenclature
Sets
A G K Combination of areas and technologies where capacity
exists
A ðcÞ All areas in country c
A All areas
G 2ðgÞ Secondary technologies for primary technology g
G elec;1 Primary technologies producing electricity
G ext;1 Primary technologies that are extraction units
S All seasons
T All time periods
Variables
vgea;g;s;t production of electricity in area a, on technology g, season
s and time t
vgfa;g;s;t usage of fuel in area a, on existing technology g, season s
and time t
vgfna;g;s;t usage of fuel in area a, on new technology g, season s and
time t
vgha;g;s;t production of heat in area a, on technology g, season s and
time t
Parameters
Cvg Amount of electricity generation reduction per unit of
heat generated on technology g
GMIN2Fc;f ;f 0 Common target in country c for fuel type f and f 0
ca;g Capacity of technology g in area a
costg The cost of producing electricity on technology g
dea;s;t The demand of electricity in area a in season s and time t
fuelðgÞ Fuel type used on technology g
vgemaxg The maximum electricity production on technology type
g
vgeming Theminimum electricity production on technology type g
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Abstract
In Denmark, since 2014, it has been possible to upgrade biogas to a gas grid and achieve support in
line with biogas-based heat and power production. Since then, most new biogas production plants
have chosen to upgrade their biogas. In this study, a mixed integer programming model is used to
find the optimal biogas value chain, and cooperative game theory is used to understand real world
observations compared to this study’s results. Specifically, three profit allocation mechanisms are
applied to allocate the profit between the heterogeneous owners in the value chain. It is found that
Danish biogas plants should use large shares of manure combined with deep litter. Furthermore,
it is found that input suppliers have relatively poor bargaining power in the profit allocation
negotiations due to poor alternatives. This may explain why livestock farmers tend to receive little
payment for their manure, and why they are hesitant to join biogas projects.
Finally, it is found that biogas plants prefer to upgrade their biogas for several reasons. First, if
the natural gas price is expected to be high, it is preferable to upgrade biogas than to use it directly
in a local combined heat and power plant (CHP). Second, if the natural gas price is expected to
be low, it is preferable to upgrade because the CHPs have better alternatives and therefore better
bargaining power before investments (ex ante). Third, when the value chain contains an upgrading
plant, the biogas plant has a greater bargaining power—in particular ex post.
Keywords: Cooperative game theory, Profit allocation, Mixed integer programming, Biogas,
Biomethane, Renewable energy, Value chain
1. Introduction
Danish biogas production has developed remarkably recently since a change in regulation follo-
wing the Energy Agreement in 2012 (Danish Government, 2012), where it was agreed that biogas,
among other renewable energy sources, should be strengthened economically. Thus, several initia-
tives began. The probably most important initiative was that, after an EU ratification in 2014, it
∗Corresponding author: lskn@dtu.dk
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became possible to gain support when biogas is upgraded for the gas grid, used directly for industry
or transport, or used directly for heat and power production (Danish Energy Association, 2013;
European Commision, 2013). The new initiatives have been successful, and new biogas plants have
been built throughout Denmark the latest years (Harder, 2016). Moreover, biogas upgrading has
increased the possibility to take advantage of economies of scale independent of local heat demands
(Skovsgaard and Jacobsen, 2017).
Considering these latest developments, as well as projections for new biogas plants, it is clear
that there is a trend in which biogas plants often choose to upgrade theor biogas instead of finding
local sources for biogas consumption. This development is in relation to not only new biogas plants
but also existing biogas plants have chosen to upgrade their biogas and not proceed to deliver biogas
to local CHPs (Harder, 2016). An explanation for this development could be a lack of heat demand,
or at least a reduced heat demand, along with new, cheaper heat production technologies. However,
two other possible explanations are investigated in this paper. The first is that an assumption on
higher natural gas prices in the future yields higher expected profits for value chains in which
biogas is upgraded than value chains in which biogas is used directly to produce heat and power.
The second is that strategic considerations regarding potential profit allocations among members
of the value chain after investments (ex post) can affect ex ante investment choices.
The biogas value chain involves several actors from different sectors that operate in diverse
markets with diverse regulation. Moreover, the input for biogas production is typically a bi-
product for the farmers, and biogas is one possible fuel out of many for the production of energy
commodities. These factors may affect opportunities for biogas producers, the optimal pricing
between the different actors in the value chain, and the optimal production decision. Additionally,
both input and output prices can be difficult to estimate as there are no or imperfect markets for
both inputs and output. These issues can be a challenge when profits should be allocated within
the value chain.
Furthermore, parts of the biogas value chain can be considered bilateral monopolies after invest-
ments; these ex post consequences can affect investments in the value chain ex ante; such effects are
discussed in this paper. The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983)
states that in cases of private information, it is impossible to achieve ex post efficiency in bilateral
trade; each time two owners meet, there is a risk of adverse selection with an inappropriate design
of profit allocation mechanism. A solution to this challenge is vertical integration (Swami and
Shah, 2011; Buzzell, 1983), of which there are several examples in biogas value chains; however,
this solution is not always feasible.
Blair et al. (1989) finds a disagreement in the literature with regard to finding an optimal
solution for quantity and price issues between bilateral monopolies. The researchers refer to Bowley
(1928), Fellner (1947), and Machlup and Taber (1960) who found a joint profit maximising solution
with a variety of assumptions. Blair et al. (1989) concluded that the social optimal solution can
be found only with joint profit optimisation, and that a price between the parties is a way to share
2
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the maximised profit. Truett and Truett (1993) extended this and proved that under particular
circumstances, hereunder perfect information, there is only one stable and theoretically optimal
price for the intermediate products between two monopolies. This price depends, among other
things, on the bargaining power between the two monopolies. Therefore, since vertical integration
is not always an option, an alternative is to form a cooperative within which profits are maximised
jointly, after which profits are allocated.
Within cooperative game theoretic literature, several allocation mechanisms have been presen-
ted and tested both theoretically, e.g. (Tijs, 1986; Schmeidler, 1969; Megiddo, 1978; McCain, 2008;
Hougaard, 2009), and empirically, e.g. (Massol and Tchung-Ming, 2010; Frisk et al., 2010; Lozano
et al., 2013; Nagarajan and Sosˇic´, 2008). However, most literature is focused on homogeneous pro-
ducer types with slightly different properties, where the cooperatives are alternatives to horizontal
integration. Examples of this are a cooperative of pig producers who slaughter and sell the pigs
together (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2007), a cooperative of liquefied natural gas suppliers (Massol and
Tchung-Ming, 2010), and a cooperative of wood suppliers (Frisk et al., 2010). A typical allocation
mechanism is proportional allocation with which profit is allocated: in accordance with cost (an
equal return on capital) (Hougaard, 2009); in accordance with the marginal cost (alternate-cost-
avoided) (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2007); or in accordance with the gain delivered to the cooperative
(Shapley value) (Lemaire, 1984; Massol and Tchung-Ming, 2010; Frisk et al., 2010). Other pay-
ment schemes focus on the egalitarian principle, such as the egalitarian method, with which profit
is divided equally between all parties in the cooperative (Tijs, 1986; Lemaire, 1984; Massol and
Tchung-Ming, 2010), or the nucleolus payment scheme, with which profit allocation depends on the
alternative profit of the marginal participant (Massol and Tchung-Ming, 2010; Schmeidler, 1969;
Frisk et al., 2010).
In this paper, we apply some of these payment schemes to the non-homogeneous owners in the
biogas value chain. Such application of cooperative game theory has been investigated theoretically,
e.g. in (P. Cachon and Netessine, 2004), but to our knowledge, empirical applications are limited. In
(Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2011) the bargaining power between Russia and central transit countries
is compared for the Eurasian supply chain for natural gas. The study investigated several new
investment options, including extensions of existing routes and entirely new transit routes. The
bargaining power was evaluated by applying both the Shapley value and the nucleolus allocation
mechanisms, the results of which were compared to empirical data on prices.
In this paper, we investigate the best value chain designs and analyse the empirical evidence
for new investments in a game theoretic context. We apply a value chain optimisation model
(Jensen et al., 2017) in order to determine the profits that might be gained under various energy
price scenarios, assuming joint profit maximisation under perfect information; this is presented
in Section 3. Applying the model, we find the optimal biogas value chain design including the
optimal inputs and the optimal energy converter, given a specific set of assumptions; this result
is presented in Section 5.1. Moreover, drawing on cooperative and non-cooperative game theory
3
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(McCain, 2008; Gibbons, 1992) and cost and profit allocation theory (Hougaard, 2009; Bogetoft
and Olesen, 2007), we compare the results of three profit allocation mechanisms and discuss how ex
post bargaining power may affect ex ante choices made by key owners through backward induction
with regard to value chain design. We then argue that such effects can change the preferred design
more than anticipated. We discuss this in Sections 5.2 and 5.4, based on the theory presented in
Section 4. Finally, we present the policy implications in Section 6.
2. Biogas production in Denmark
The biogas value chain, see 1, consists of several separate owners, who often operate in vari-
ous markets in different sectors. In this paper, the group of owners comprises livestock farmers,
substrate farmers, a biogas plant and energy converters. These parties deliver inputs and/or are
involved directly in biogas production and conversion processes. However, only the plant, and
in some cases the biogas upgrading facility, have biogas production as the primary purpose; the
farmers focus on the highly competitive agricultural sector. The energy converter, at the end of
the value chain, focuses on the end products of the chain: biomethane (upgraded biogas), electri-
city and/or heat. Heat production is considered a natural monopoly, and is therefore monopoly
regulated, while electricity and gas markets are exposed to high levels of competition.
As Section 2.1 explains, the regulatory design implies that in order to be allowed to receive
support, the biogas plant is dependent upon waste input (defined in this paper as agricultural
waste) and in order to receive support, the biogas plant is dependent upon a demand from an
energy converter. Both the agricultural and energy sectors are highly exposed to competition or
monopoly regulated.
Plant
Substrate
Farmer
Livestock
Farmer
Plant
Farmer
Energy
Converter
End
Product
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR BIOGAS VALUE CHAIN ENERGY SYSTEM
Figure 1: The biogas value chain and the ownership structure
The ownership structures of biogas value chains vary by plant, and in Denmark there are several
variations. For example in one, a group of farmers invested in a biogas plant and an upgrading
facility, i.e. Madsen Bioenergi (Madsen Bioenergi, 2017). In another, one owner controls inputs and
biogas production, while another owner controls the upgrading plant, i.e. Fredericia Wastewater
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and Energy (Wittrup, 2010). This is because specific ownership structure choices depend on several
factors; for example, heat and power plants are often restricted from investing in biogas plants as
regulators often consider such investments as high risk. Moreover, some farmers have limited access
to low interest rate capital as they have significant amounts of capital invested in their farms. A
solution to these issues is to have both farmers and external investors, such as the energy companies
E.ON, Nature Energy and Ørsted, as investors in biogas plants. It should be noted that some value
chains are vertically integrated in ownership, while others are not; for value chains with limited
integration, the strategic considerations with regard to profit allocation are particularly interesting.
2.1. Regulation
Danish biogas regulation spans several sectors and different priorities. Biogas support and the
regulatory set-up are designed in an energy focused mindset, while at the same time considering
the need of sustainability and, therefore, the need of using manure for biogas production. These are
the focal points of the Danish biogas policy and they have a significant influence on the importance
of each owner in the value chains. Two aspects of biogas regulation are presented in this section,
and described in more detail in Appendix A:
• Input: In order to receive biogas support, a large share of the inputs for biogas production
must consist of waste—preferably manure or waste water. Waste products from slaughter-
houses and dairy production can also be used; however, these sources are limited. Moreover,
biogas production can be supplemented with other waste products, such as straw and deep
litter. Finally, limited amounts of energy crops may be used.
• Output: Biogas support is primarily given at the end of the value chain, i.e. to the energy
converter. The energy converter can be an upgrading plant, a CHP, a heat producer, industry
or transport.
The regulation regarding energy production and consumption is extensive in Denmark, where
the general principles are that renewable energy is taxed as little as possible while electricity and
fossil fuels are taxed heavily. Denmark and the surrounding countries have a highly competitive
power market. Therefore, fuels used for electricity production are not taxed; rather, electricity
consumption is taxed. Furthermore, if electricity is not used for processes, then consumption taxes
and fees are limited—the highest fee being the Public Service Obligation (PSO), which will be
phased out in 2022 (Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate, 2016).
In contrast, gas is highly taxed and considered a rather expensive fuel. However, gas is a
common fuel in decentral CHP production in Denmark, for which only gas used for the heat share
of the production is taxed. Heat is not subject to competition in the same way as gas and power;
instead, it is monopoly regulated.
Energy prices vary over time, and though electricity prices vary more than gas prices across
day, month and years, gas prices can also change significantly, being for example twice as high in
5
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Figure 2: The historical prices of electricity, natural gas, and heat in Denmark, (Pool (2018), Gaspoint Nordic1 and
Danish Energy Regulatory Authority (2017)).
2013 as in 2016. Similarly, heat prices can vary from year to year, as shown in Figure 2; notice
that the heat price is for one specific heat plant, and that the prices vary across heat plants.
A large share of the heat supply in Denmark is covered by local heat production plants and
distributed through a local grid. These local plants are natural monopolies and therefore monopoly
regulated. The regulation is a cost-of-service regulation, with which the profits of producers must
be zero, i.e. hvile-i-sig-selv, in Danish. The principle is that heat production costs are covered by
the consumers, who are often co-owners. In order to ensure costs are as low as possible for the
heat consumers, heat producers are obliged to produce heat at the lowest possible costs, and this
is monitored by the Danish Energy Regulatory Authority. One implication of this regulation is
that profit allocation within the biogas value chains can be affected by the regulation, if the energy
converter produces heat.
3. Modelling the optimal choice of value chain
In this chapter, we follow the track of Blair et al. (1989) and consider a situation with joint
profit optimisation, assuming perfect information between owners.
1Personal communication
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3.1. Plant level model
The model used to find the optimal biogas value chain, is based on a model by Jensen et al.
(2017), where a mathematical optimisation model for the biogas supply chain was presented. The
aim of the model is to find the optimal chain, from the farmers to the energy demands, by finding
the optimal choice of e.g. plant inputs and technologies for utilising the biogas. The modelled
chain can be seen in Figure 3. The supply chain is modelled such that the input side, i.e. all
processes until the plant, uses a weekly time scale, while the output side, i.e. all processes from
the plant, uses an hourly time scale. This allows us to capture the fluctuations of energy prices
but keeping the model as small as possible. The model combines both strategic decisions regarding
process sizing and tactical decisions, e.g. how much manure to use as input and when to store the
biogas.
Other
input
types
Manure
Pre-
treatment
Plant
Upgrade
Natural
gas
Metha-
nation
Boiler Heat
CHP ElectricityDigestate
Week Hour
Week Hour
INPUT SIDE MODEL OUTPUT SIDE MODEL
Figure 3: The biogas value chain from farmer to energy demand with the input side using a weekly time scale and
the output side using an hourly time scale. The small circles represent the possibility of storages.
When biogas has been produced, the biogas plant has two products: digestate and biogas. The
digestate is send back to the farmers, whose primary reason for participating is the fertiliser value
of the digestate, which is better than that of manure. The biogas is sold to an energy converter.
The possible energy converters in the chain include a CHP, a heat boiler, an upgrading plant, and
an upgrading plant that upgrades through methanation. A traditional upgrading plant removes
CO2 from the biogas so that the methane content of the resulting biomethane is similar to that of
natural gas. However, an upgrading plant upgrading through methanation adds hydrogen produced
through electrolysis so the CO2 from the biogas is converted to methane. Aside from the extra
amount of biomethane generated during the methanation process, unlike traditional upgrading
plants, process heat is generated, which can be sold for district heating.
The objective function used by Jensen et al. (2017) was profit maximisation. In this paper,
the objective function is slightly different. In (Jensen et al., 2017), farmers were only included by
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receiving money for delivered manure or crops. In this paper, farmers are potential owners, and
their costs must therefore be included in the total costs of the chain. For practical reasons related
to profit allocation, see Section 4.3, it was decided to move transportation costs for biomasses from
the biogas plant to the biomass producers.
The full model can be found in Appendix B.1; only a simplified explanation of the objective
function is given here. The objective function is now to maximise the sum of profits for owners:
Max
∑
o∈O
pio, (1)
where pio is the profit for each owner, o, in the project. It is found using:
pio = INCo − Co ∀o ∈ O, (2)
where INCo and Co are the income and total cost of each owner in the project. The income for
each owner is found using:
INCo =INC
energy
o + INC
support
o + INC
digestate
o ∀o ∈ O, (3)
where income from selling the energy produced is denoted by INCenergyo , support received by an
owner is denoted by INCsupporto , and income from selling digestate is denoted by INC
digestate
o .
The total cost of each owner is found using:
Co =C
OPEX
o + C
CAPEX
o + C
trans
o + C
tax
o + C
digestate
o ∀o ∈ O, (4)
which comprises operational expenditures, COPEXo ; capital expenditures, C
CAPEX
o ; transportation
and handling costs, Ctranso ; taxes paid, C
tax
o ; and an extra cost for buying fertiliser if an agreed-upon
amount of digestate is not delivered to the livestock farmers, Cdigestateo .
3.2. Assumptions
In our calculations, we follow the recommendations for socio-economic analyses of Denmark
with an interest rate of 4% for all capital expenditures (CAPEX) (Danish Energy Agency, 2013),
and the depreciation time is set according to data sources. If no data were available, we used a
depreciation time of 20 years. Data on input and output process costs can be found in Appendix
C in Table C.3 and Table C.6, and a graph on the overall CAPEXs used in the model can be seen
in Figure C.1. We assume economy of scale for the biogas plant, and a constant return to scale in
regard to energy converters and pretreatment of substrates.
Moreover, we assume that the farmers cover transportation costs to and from the plant. Data
for transportation can be found in Table C.5. We also assume that the pretreatment of straw and
deep litter is completed at the biogas plant, while the ensilage of maize and washing of the sugar
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beets is completed by the farmers, and the cutting and ensilage of sugar beet is completed by the
plant. For inputs to the plant, we set the maximum dry matter content of the total feedstock to
be 13% (Jørgensen, 2013). Data for the inputs can be found in Table C.4. Finally, we assume
that excess digestate can be sold for e8.85 per tonnes (Birkmose et al., 2013) and is transported
according to the costs given in Table C.5.
The geographical position of the plant is set to be Northwest Denmark. Additionally, we assume
that the modelled plant can expect a demand from the local heat plant in the town Vinderup that
corresponds to approximately 36,000 MWh/year (Vinderup Varmeværk, 2014). Thus, this is the
heat demand we use in the model, and we apply the heat price set by Vinderup Varmeværk as
given by the Danish Energy Regulatory Authorities, see (Danish Energy Regulatory Authority,
2017).
Finally, 2016 is the base year for the model, which means that all prices for power, heat, and
natural gas are actual prices from 2016, as are the regulatory tariffs. The power price is from the
Nord Pool Spot market, which is the trading place for the Nordic power market, while the natural
gas price is from Gaspoint Nordic. We apply the regulation given in Appendix A in Table A.1 and
Table A.2.
4. Profit allocation method
In Section 5.1, we confirm the results in (Skovsgaard and Jacobsen, 2017) and (Jensen et al.,
2017); the results were that biogas production can be profitable with current Danish regulation;
however, value chains can be fragile without proper profit allocations between owners. We limit
the cooperative in the value chain to necessary owners, with the assumption that receiving the
subsidies Table A.1 and Table A.2 is preferred. These owners are livestock farmers (no waste—
no support), the plant (no plant—no biogas) and the energy converter (no energy converter—no
support), as shown in Figure 1. However, substrate farmers are excluded, because support can
be achieved without adding substrates to the manure and substrates can be substituted. Instead,
substrate farmers are paid a fixed amount for substrates corresponding to the production costs of
substrates transported to the plant, plus 10% of the costs. It should be noted that there are other
ways of determining prices. Examples include a method discussed by Giannoccaro et al. (2017),
with which availability is handled based on biomass prices in a region, and a method discussed by
Bai et al. (2012), which considered 10% too low for some substrates. However, investigating these
methods was not the main focus of this paper.
4.1. Allocation choice considerations
Applying cooperative game theory is a way to include strategic considerations in cost and
profit allocations (Tijs, 1986). Cooperative game theory was first presented by Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944), who, with other game theorists, found it difficult to determine one unique
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solution to allocation problems. Nash (1953) proposed an axiomatic approach with which a set
of conditions were stated for an appropriate allocation mechanism, and suggested that allocation
mechanisms be evaluated according to this method. This approach is similar to the fairness criteria
discussed in allocation literature. Formal examples of fairness criteria can be found in (Tijs, 1986)
and (Hougaard, 2009). Moreover, as aforementioned, Bogetoft and Olesen (2007) presented a long
list of potentially relevant criteria depending on cooperative; for example, a cooperative of pig
farmers could try to avoid low market prices with an incentive that limited pig production.
In this paper, we focus on two fairness criteria: equality and individual rationality. These
properties are considered in most cooperative game theoretic literature related to cost allocation
(see, e.g. (Tijs, 1986; Bogetoft and Olesen, 2007; Frisk et al., 2010; Schmeidler, 1969; Megiddo,
1978; Hougaard, 2009)). However, other fairness criteria are considered as well, such as value chain
risks and the risk of adverse selection.
Equality can be interpreted in many ways. Denmark has a long tradition of cooperative mo-
vements in the agricultural sector, and ’one man, one vote’ was a general principle of many coope-
ratives. In contrast, non-cooperative game theory follows the hypothesis that a rational agent in
a one-shot ultimatum game2 would offer another agent a zero share, which a rational agent would
accept. However, several empirical studies show that most agents would not take an entire share,
and if they did other agents would retaliate and such offers. McCain (2008) presented this as
an argument for including social norms and reciprocity motives into cooperative game theory to
obtain theoretical findings closer to empirical findings. Hougaard (2009) argued that equality in
some form can be found in most large religions and thereby in most social norms. Therefore, we
consider this fairness criterion as crucial for our evaluation of the allocation mechanisms.
An important element of homo economicus is individual rationality; an agent may query, ’Does
it make sense to join the cooperative? Are there better alternatives?’. Therefore, we have chosen
to focus also on individual rationality. Truett and Truett (1993) argued that one specific price
between two parties could be found, and the bargaining powers of the two parties could contribute
to determining this price. The bargaining powers could depend upon levels of information between
the parties in the value chain (Radhakrishnan and Srinidhi, 2005), or, perhaps more importantly
was the participant’s dependence upon the collaboration. This dependency could be approximated
by determining the best alternative for each participant.
Indeed, best alternatives (often referred to as stand-alone profits) are highly relevant to profit
allocation. With individual rationality, an allocation mechanism is unstable if a profit allocated
to a coalition is below an agent’s stand-alone profit. Furthermore, a profit allocation is stable if it
is within the core that is a set of allocations with which profits are more beneficial for all group
members than stand-alone profits or profits from another coalition (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2007).
2A one-shot ultimatum game is a game in which two agents share, for example a pie. The first agent decides the
division of the pie, and the other agent decides whether to reject or accept the division; this game can be extended
so that if the second agent rejects the division, he or she can suggest a new division, etcetera (Gibbons, 1992).
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In Section 4.4, we present how individual rationality is taken into the evaluation.
4.2. Payment schemes
A basic principle for profit allocation is to ensure feasibility for all participating owners in the
value chain—that is, to ensure that overall profits are greater than zero. However, ensuring this
may be insufficient for motivating the owners, so in order to find a way to share the maximised
profit between the three overall owners in this study’s value chain, i.e. livestock farmers, the biogas
plant and energy converters, we use the overall principles of cooperative game theory in regard to
cost allocation. The owners are heterogeneous producers with large degrees of interdependence,
and this implies that each party is as relevant as the others, even though one of the parties could
take initiative and gain an upper hand in the negotiations. We imagine, this party could be the
plant, which has the single purpose of producing biogas.
In this context, many of the allocation schemes presented in the introduction become irrelevant;
however, some principles from the schemes can be reused. In Section 4.3, relevant versions of the
egalitarian method, the proportionality principle, and a method inspired by the nucleolus, i.e.
individual rationality, are presented. We try to understand the strategic considerations related
to profit allocation and choices made by the owners when the value chain is designed, instead
of considerations related to the optimal allocation mechanism. We investigate three allocation
mechanisms suitable for the value chain, with which profits are distributed through prices in the
chain. In Section 5, we evaluate the results of using the the model and relate these results to
individual rationality. Then, we assess the potential implications in regard to possible preferred
value chain and profit allocation choices.
4.3. Allocation mechanism modelling
After using the plant level model, profit allocation is performed. To allocate the profit between
the owners, a mathematical model is used to determine the price of the products sold by each
owner. The price is set using the following constraint:
piCAo = pi
∗
o −
∑
o′∈OT O(o′,o)
ρCAo′,o +
∑
o′∈OT O(o,o′)
ρCAo,o′ ∀o ∈ O (5)
The profit of each owner using the cost allocation method, piCAo , is calculated as profit obtained
with the plant level model, pi∗o , minus a price paid for buying inputs, ρCAo′,o, plus money obtained
by selling outputs, ρCAo,o′ . Moreover, as substrate farmers are not considered necessary in the chain,
their profit is fixed to a percentage of their costs, but a price is also set using Equation 5.
Each of the three profit allocation mechanisms are applied using a feasibility constraint; these
constraints are presented in Sections 4.3.1-4.3.3. For the proportionality and the individual ra-
tionality mechanisms, λ is maximised. However, the interpretation of λ is different in the two
mechanisms and is described in the corresponding sections.
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4.3.1. Full equality
The full equality method has many names, e.g. the egalitarian method and direct equality.
The principle is that all owners share the total profit equally, regardless of their total costs. The
feasibility constraint for full equality allocation is:
piCAo =
1
|o ∈ O \ Osub|
∑
o′∈O\Osub
piCAo′ ∀o ∈ O \ Osub (6)
The profit of each owner, except substrate farmers, will be a share equal to that of each owner after
payments for substrates are deducted. The share equals the total profit divided by the number of
owners. The owner with the highest cost has the highest risk using this mechanism, which most
likely will not be considered fair by this owner. Furthermore, there is a challenge with adverse
selection as full equality requires all owners to report their costs honestly; this implies the risk that
an owner would report a higher cost than what he or she actually has in order to increase his or
her profit.
4.3.2. Proportionality
Proportionality is not as simple to consider as full equality. One needs to determine which
elements profit needs to be proportional to, e.g. total costs, CAPEX or OPEX. Considering
the three primary parts of the value chain, i.e. the livestock farmers, the plant and the energy
converters, it is difficult to find one common parameter or variable for all parts of the value chain
that does not present knowledge-sharing challenges. In this paper, we chose to use the cost of each
owner from the plant level model. This choice implies that each owner has a cost assigned, and
this is why transportation costs are added to the farmers, unlike in (Jensen et al., 2017).
The feasibility constraint for proportionality allocation is:
piCAo = λC
∗
o ∀o ∈ O \ Osub, (7)
where λ is the percentage of the cost that can be covered for each non-substrate owner. This
mechanism has a higher risk of adverse selection, as it gives an incentive to owners to boost their
own costs in order to achieve a higher share of the total profit. Moreover, the method does not
reflect that all three parts of the value chain are necessary for achieving support.
4.3.3. Individual rationality
The final mechanism that we apply is inspired by the maximin profit allocation, the nucleolus
mechanism. In the traditional nucleolus mechanism, all combinations of participating owners and
their alternative profits are used for the allocation, and the profit for each owner is found by
maximising each distance from each obtained profit to each alternative profit for all subsets of
participating owners. Nucleolus allocation is per definition in the core. The owners when applying
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the traditional nucleolus mechanism are typically all the same type; see, for example, (Frisk et al.,
2010), and the operability of the collaboration is therefore not one in which each owner is relied
upon individually. In regards to this study, the owners rely on each other to ensure the biogas
chain operating, so the nucleolus mechanism can not be directly applied.
Instead of considering all possible coalitions, as in the nucleolus mechanism, we consider the
revenue gain of each owner independently by maximising each distance from each obtained profit
to each alternative profit that could be obtained through a lack of participation. This ensures that
the obtained solution is within the core, which means that all owners benefits the most as part
of the chain. The allocation mechanism ensures that all owners get the same revenue gain. This
is in contrast to the nucleolus mechanism, where coalitions with the smallest revenue gains get
the greatest revenue gains, which means that not necessarily all coalitions end up with the same
revenue gain.
The feasibility constraint for individual rationality allocation is:
piCAo − piALTo = λ ∀o ∈ O \ Osub, (8)
where λ is the participation gain for all non-substrate owners, and piALTo is a reported alternative
profit for each owner, o. This allocation mechanism may seem fair as it is more equal than
the proportionality mechanism and considers more individual properties than the full equality
mechanism; however, costs are not directly considered. Moreover, there is a lack of transparency
and a necessarily high level of information is needed in order to calculate the allocation; the latter
allows dishonest reports regarding each owner’s best alternative.
4.4. Inclusion of individual rationality
In the value chain, the sample space of best alternatives is large; in order to decrease it to a
reasonable amount of calculations, we exploit having reduced the owner group to the three parties.
Some of the owners can, to some extent, be replaced after investments, though this is done at
the expense of the overall profit. The approach is to consider the alternatives for the individual
owners and the entire value chain. As capital costs are extensive parts of total costs in biogas value
chains, both choices before investments (ex ante) and after investments (ex post) are considered,
as ex post bargaining power can affect the preferences of each owner in regard to both the value
chain configuration and the preferred allocation mechanisms before investments. We evaluate the
alternatives in Section 5, starting with the results presented in Table 1. In the calculation for
individual rationality profit allocation, the results presented in Table 5 are also applied.
For livestock farmers, we assume that the best alternative is to deliver manure to another
biogas plant. The farmers could choose to apply manure directly to the fields, but this would not
provide the additional fertiliser value from the digestate. A common payment for manure is one in
which the biogas plant collects manure and delivers digestate for free; in Table 5, this alternative
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Before investments After investments
Livestock farmer Deliver manure to another biogas
plant
Deliver manure to another biogas
plant
Plant Invest capital with a 4% interest rate Sunk costs
Energy converter, CHP Biomass-based heat boiler Sunk costs and a biomass-based heat
boiler
Energy converter,
upgrade
Invest capital with a 4% interest rate Sunk costs
Table 1: The stand-alone profits
is presented as a zero profit, as the fertiliser value is not included in the calculations.
For the biogas plant, several options exist, but for this analysis, it is assumed that the plant
invests its capital in safe investments at an interest rate that corresponds to the socio-economic
interest rate before investments, and that the plant has sunk costs after investment. However, it
is just as likely that the plant would try out other options, especially ex post.
In order to determine the best alternatives for the energy converters, we need to make some
overall assumptions. The plant level model in Section 3 allows different technology choices: up-
grading technologies, a heat and power plants, and a heat boiler. With current regulation, it is
unlikely that the optimal choice is to produce heat with biogas, so this alternative was not conside-
red further. Moreover, with regard to coverage of heat and power demands, there are two different
markets that need to be considered. As the power market is highly competitive in Denmark, a
CHP is, in many cases, only a viable option if it is fuelled by a supported fuel. In most cases,
the energy converter would have to find an alternative to the heat production if the biogas-based
CHP is dismissed. Therefore, we assume that the best alternative to a biogas-based CHP is a
biomass-based heat boiler, both before and after investments. Finally, for upgrading, we assume
that the energy converter can freely choose to either supply or not supply the heat demand.
Before investments After investments
Livestock farmer Longer transportation distance Longer transportation distance
Substrate farmer Other substrate Other substrate and sunk costs in pretreatments
Energy converter Other energy converter Other energy converter and new investments
Table 2: The alternative profits for the value chain if an owner retracts
The overall principle for alternatives in the value chain is that the plant cannot be substituted,
if the value chain should remain. This gives the plant a good position with regard to bargaining
power. We assume that all other parties can be substituted at the expense of total profits in the
value chain.
The content of Table 2 is derived using the plant level model. For the livestock farmers, the
assumption that the farmers are a cooperative, and not a single farmer, is exploited. It is therefore
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realistic that some farmers in the cooperative could decide to choose another alternative and not
join the value chain. For simplicity, we assume, that one third of the livestock farmers leave the
livestock farmer cooperative. New data on manure access is then fed into the model, and a new
optimal solution is found with a lower profit. Finally, for the substrate farmers and the energy
converters, the model is run with the restriction of not choosing the optimal choice, first for the
substrate and second for the energy converter. Thereby, a new optimal solution and corresponding
alternative profits are found.
5. Application and results
5.1. Optimal value chain
In this section, we consider a base scenario in which the model determines the optimal size of the
plant, the optimal substrates to use for production, and the optimal energy converter—considering
the substrate, transportation, and investment costs in relation to the potential income. The plant
level model is a detailed model, and in order to ensure a short calculation time, optimisation is
done for one year, and investment costs are estimated as yearly costs. Therefore, the model does
not consider price and cost variations over several years. As energy prices for both the input and
the output side of the model significantly influence the optimal investment choice, and these prices
can vary significantly, we run a number of sensitivity analyses.
First, we consider the electricity costs that can influence whether it is profitable to use metha-
nation. As the PSO is phased out in 2022, a scenario was created in which the PSO is zero. This
scenario is called PSO zero. Second, we consider the natural gas price. The natural gas price is
quite low in the base year, compared to previous years, so the optimal solution could change with
the natural gas price. Therefore, we use the time series for the natural gas price from 2013—when
the prices were almost double the prices in 2016—to see the effects of the natural gas prices. In
the scenario called NG high, we use the natural gas price from 2013 and all other data was set to
be equal to the data in the base scenario. An overview of the scenarios can be seen in Table 3.
Electricity cost Natural gas price Heat price
Scenario Average e/MWh Level Average e/MWh Level e/MWh Level
Base 26.5 High 15.2 Low 32.2 Low
PSO zero 15.1 Low 15.2 Low 32.2 Low
NG high 26.5 High 31.4 High 32.2 Low
2015 22.6 Medium 22.3 Medium 32.2 Low
2013 24.0 Semi-High 31.4 High 54.3 High
Table 3: The tested scenarios
The energy system is, to a great extent, interrelated; when natural gas prices are high, one
15
PART II. PAPERS A-E
180
can expect that this will be reflected in heat prices in areas where natural gas is used as fuel.
For example, as Denmark becomes more dependent on renewable energy, such as wind, solar, and
hydro power, it can be expected that the electricity price is less dependent on the natural gas
price—except when renewable energy is insufficient to meet the electricity demand. Therefore, we
expect less convergence between the natural gas and electricity price; however, due to variations
in weather conditions, we can also expect certain variations in the electricity price. Finally, in the
second group of scenarios, i.e. in the 2013 and 2015 scenarios, we test the model in regard to a
group of energy costs and prices. In these scenarios, we use the fundamental costs of technologies
and inputs from the base scenario, but use the electricity price + taxes and fees, and the natural
gas and the heat prices for 2013 and 2015.
5.1.1. Results and preliminary conclusions
The results from using the plant level model is seen in Table 4. The biogas plant is as large
as possible for all scenarios, i.e. 600,000 tonnes of biogas per year is produced, and the preferred
substrate for all cases is deep litter.
Unit Base PSO zero NG high 2015 2013
Netincome m e 6.31 6.31 9.56 6.72 8.05
Total cost m e 9.67 9.67 18.19 16.82 19.02
Total income m e 15.98 15.98 27.75 23.55 27.07
Support m e 11.41 11.41 13.44 13.43 13.44
Input
Cow slurry (manure) % of input 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Pig slurry (manure) % of input 69.4% 69.4% 69.4% 69.4% 69.4%
Deep litter % of input 30.6% 30.6% 30.6% 30.6% 30.6%
Output
Energy converter Type CHP CHP Methanation Methanation Methanation
Capacity of energy converter MW 9.9 9.9 19.8 20.3 20.4
Energy produced GWh 116 116 415 414 415
Table 4: The scenario results
In the base scenario, a combined heat and power plant (the combined cycle gas turbine) is
installed. The type of energy converter installed seems to depend mainly upon the natural gas
price as the PSO zero scenario results in a combined heat and power plant being installed as the
energy converter, while the upgrading using methanation is preferred for all cases with higher
natural gas prices than in the base scenario. Moreover, in the scenarios with higher natural gas
prices, the total profit is larger than in the base case.
The amount of support received in each scenario also depends upon the energy converter. The
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received support is lowest in the base scenario; however, the support received per unit of energy is
lower using methanation. In the scenarios using a CHP, the support is e97.93 per MWh, and in
the scenarios using methanation, the support is e32.41 per MWh, so for less support, more energy
is provided. The methanation process, besides receiving less support per unit of energy, also pays
taxes in the form of an electricity tax on used electricity and excess heat tax.
The decision of biogas producers to upgrade in later years, could be explained by an expec-
tation of higher gas prices in the future—an expectation shared by the Danish Energy Agency
(Danish Energy Agency, 2012b, 2017). One should be aware that although the model chooses the
methanation technology, this technology is not fully commercialised yet.
The NG high scenario gives the highest profit across all the scenarios by only changing one
parameter. We consider this scenario further as a relevant alternative to the base scenario in the
analysis presented in the following sections.
5.2. Results of applying the allocation mechanisms
In this section, we assess three profit allocation mechanisms in relation to viability. We then
consider the implications of these allocation methods with regard to the individual choices in the
value chain.
Based on the results from the plant level model, we use the base scenario and the NG high
scenario to discuss the effects of applying the following allocation mechanisms full equality, propor-
tionality and individual rationality. In order to calculate the individual rationality allocation, we
need to know the alternative profits for each owner in the chain.
Applying the assumptions stated in Section 4.4, we calculate the alternative profits for each
owner in the chain, should they decide not to participate in the value chain. The results are
presented in Table 5.
Before investments
Description Alternative profits
Livestock farmer Other biogas plant 0 e/ton
Plant
No investment, base scenario 0.07 m e/y
No investment, NG high scenario 0.07 m e/y
Energy converter, CHP Heat boiler, base scenario 0.53 m e/y
Energy converter, methanation No investment, NG high scenario 0.07 m e/y
Table 5: The ex ante alternative profits for the owners in the value chain
5.2.1. Results from the profit allocation
As seen in Figure 4, the profit is allocated quite differently depending on the chosen profit
allocation mechanism. For the proportionality mechanism, the allocation would most likely not be
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considered equal in any of the scenarios.
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Figure 4: The percentage of total profit for each owner in all scenarios
It is obvious that the plant owner would prefer the proportionality distribution in both scenarios
as this is where the highest percentage of profits can be gained. This is underlined by the results
presented in Table 6, showing the intermediate prices within the value chain and the profits for
each owner under the selected scenarios for each type of allocation described in Section 4.3.
We find that the biogas plant would prefer proportional allocation in both scenarios, while
the livestock farmer would always prefer full equality. More specifically, we find that in the base
scenario, the livestock farmer and the energy converter—as opposed to the plant owner—would
prefer the full equality or individual rationality mechanism, both of which would give them a
higher total profit. In the NG high scenario, both the biogas plant and the energy converter
would prefer the proportionality mechanism. The change in results for the energy converter’s
perspective can be explained by the higher costs related to methanation, which is only reflected
in proportional allocation. The livestock farmer would still prefer the full equality or individual
rationality mechanism.
In the base scenario, the highest biogas price is found using proportional allocation. This
is where the plant would gain the highest profit even though the total profit is lower compared
with the NG high scenario. In the NG high scenario, the proportionality mechanism results in
the lowest cost of biogas because the highest profit with this mechanism is given to the energy
converter, meaning that less money has to be paid to the rest of the chain.
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Base scenario NG high scenario
Unit FE PR IR FE PR IR
Netincome m e/y 6.31 6.31 6.31 9.56 9.56 9.56
- Livestock farmer m e/y 2.06 0.67 1.86 3.15 0.51 3.10
- Deep litter m e/y 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
- Plant m e/y 2.06 4.46 1.94 3.15 3.62 3.18
- Energy converter m e/y 2.06 1.06 2.40 3.15 5.32 3.17
Price per unit sold
Manure e/ton 7.18 3.83 6.70 9.79 3.45 9.66
Deep litter e/ton 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75
Biogas e/MWh 63.48 69.29 61.56 78.25 65.68 78.14
Table 6: Results from the allocation using the full equality (FE), proportionality (PR), and individual rationality
(IR) mechanisms
5.3. Ex ante considerations
Following the notions from Bogetoft and Olesen (2007) and Hougaard (2009) regarding indivi-
dual rationality in profit allocation, we examine whether our profit allocation can be considered to
be in the core.
The individual owners in the value chain are expected to consider their own gain from partici-
pating in the value chain rather than doing something else. In order to reach a viable value chain,
it is necessary to find a viable profit allocation, both to assure investments (ex ante) and to assure
that the most important partners stay in the value chain (ex post).
The owners also have to consider the risk that other owners will retract from the coalition, and
they must consider how this would affect profits in the value chain both before and after investments
are made. This risk influences both expected profits for the value chain and the bargaining power
of each owner when the allocation of the profits is negotiated.
Next, we distinguish between ex ante and ex post considerations, as risks change depending on
whether investments have already been made or not. If one owner retracts from the value chain
before investments, the remaining value chain will have to find an alternative owner, and profits
will be reduced in comparison with the results in Table 4. The new profits obtained are given
in Table 7 as the percentage of the optimal profit from the base and NG high scenarios that was
presented in Table 4.
We find that the effect of the livestock farmer on profits is small overall, as the profit for the
entire value chain would only be affected marginally if 1/3 of the optimal livestock farmers decided
to withdraw from the coalition. This puts the coalition of farmers in a weak negotiating position.
In a value chain with upgrading plants, the livestock farmers could face the risk that the other
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Base scenario NG high scenario
Description Percentage
of profit
Description Percentage
of profit
Livestock farmer Longer transport
distance
97% Longer transport
distance
98%
Substrate farmer Straw 55% Straw and sugar beet 75%
Energy converter Water scrubbing 63% Water scrubbing 56%
Table 7: The effects on profit in the biogas value chain when an owner retracts before investments
parties would agree on a proportional allocation principle, leaving the livestock farmers with a low
profit share since their costs are also quite low.
The relationship between the biogas plant and energy converter is more complicated, and the
risks are high on both sides. In the base scenario where natural gas prices are low, the preferred
solution for the entire value chain would be direct usage in a local CHP; the best alternative
(upgrading by water scrubbing) would result in a significantly lower profit. The CHP has a fairly
good alternative to biogas in the form of a biomass-based heat boiler. This could put pressure on
the biogas plant to turn away from proportional allocation towards full equality or the individual
rationality profit allocation preferred by the CHP.
In the NG high scenario, upgrading with methanation is the preferred choice for the energy
converter, and the best alternative is water scrubbing, with a total profit just above the result
from the base scenario (approximately e5.35 million per year). This is, however, quite a reduction
compared to the profits from methanation, so the value chain has an interest in methanation.
5.4. Ex post risks affecting investment decisions
When investments have already been made, both the biogas plant and the energy converter
will lose money due to sunk costs if one member of the value chain decides to withdraw from
the collaboration. As it is displayed in Table 8, the biogas plant risks the largest sunk costs if
investments are made for direct consumption in a local CHP. At the same time, sunk costs are
lower for the CHP investor.
If instead the biogas plant has made a coalition with an upgrading plant, the energy converter
will face the highest sunk costs. Furthermore, the upgrading plant needs biogas to operate, while
the biogas plant will probably be able to find alternative options. This leaves the biogas plant in
a better negotiating position before and, in particular, after investments.
The livestock farmers would have no direct costs from leaving the coalition unless they had
signed a contract ex ante that imposed a cost in cases of ex post defection. If a proportional
allocation mechanism was decided ex ante, resulting in low profit shares for the livestock farmers,
there would be a credible risk that the livestock farmers would find this distribution of profits too
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After investments
Description Alternative profit
Livestock farmer Other biogas plant 0 e/ton
Plant
Sunk cost, base scenario -1.82 m e/y
Sunk cost, NG high scenario -1.67 m e/y
Energy converter, CHP Sunk cost CHP plus heat boiler profit -1.26 m e/y
Energy converter, methanation Sunk cost -1.84 m e/y
Table 8: Ex post alternative profits for the owners in the value chain
unequal and unfair. This could bring a risk of defection, as a cost-effective option for the livestock
farmers; or, if defection costs were increased due to contracts, there could be a risk of adverse
selection, where farmers might pretend that costs were higher than they were or might be more
likely to deliver manure at a lower dry-matter content than promised.
Base NG high
Description Percentage
of profit
Description Percentage
of profit
Livestock farmer Longer transport
distance
97% Longer transport
distance
98%
Substrate farmer Straw and sunk costs 51% Straw, sugar beet and
sunk costs
72%
Energy converter Water scrubbing and
sunk costs
47% Water scrubbing and
sunk costs
45%
Table 9: The effects on profit in the biogas value chain when an owner retracts after investments
The best alternative to deep litter is to use straw as an additional substrate. This would result
in a significantly lower profit for the value chain, especially if investments have already been made.
Since the deep litter farmer is faced with no costs for defecting and may not even be bound by
any contracts, a reasonable payment to the deep litter farmer is necessary even though cheaper
alternatives than straw might be available. Hence, the 10% cost coverage may not be sufficient.
6. Policy insights
Danish biogas production has increased to a remarkably extent the later years, and there have
been two tendencies: 1) most plants decide to upgrade, and 2) the larger plants especially have
difficulties in finding enough farmers who will commit to delivering the manure needed as input.
We argue that our results can help to explain these tendencies.
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6.1. Implications for farmer involvement
The best alternative for livestock farmers, given in Tables 5 and 8, is a payment commonly
used for the farmers to deliver manure to the biogas plant. They get their manure treated at no
cost, and in return, they are paid nothing (Lemvig Biogas Plant, 2017). This alternative profit
is lower than the profit they could achieve by staying in the value chain using any of the profit
allocation mechanisms we have chosen to investigate. Furthermore, an individual farmer is often
replaceable at low costs, cf. Tables 7 and 9. This leaves the farmers in a bad negotiating position
and might prompt them as a group to accept something in line with the proportionality allocation
mechanism, even if it seems unfair. Alternatively, they may try to become co-owners of the plant
to attain more of the profit, and this corresponds well with observable trends in Denmark, where
it is common for farmers to be co-owners. If the farmers find it difficult to raise capital to become
co-owners, they may not be interested in committing themselves to deliver manure at a low price,
simply because they find the profit allocation to be unfair and, therefore, not worth any risk.
Policy makers could affect these challenges by moving some of the support from energy conver-
ters to the beginning of the chain. While Danish biogas support is currently focused on the energy
output, regulators in Norway, for example, have focused some of the support on the input side by
giving support to the manure treatment (Lyng et al., 2018). This could increase the alternative
profit for the farmers, and thereby their bargaining power, in cost allocation discussions.
6.2. Implications for the choice of value chain design
From the results in Section 5, we find that several considerations should be taken for the choice
of value chain design. First, it is relevant to make sure there is an actual heat demand. The fact
that new investments have been made primarily in upgrading plants could be due to a low heating
demand. Similar arguments could apply for existing plants, combined with disagreements on the
profit sharing when existing contracts are to be renegotiated.
The next few considerations involve the expected profits for the total value chain. Our results
have shown that high gas prices would make upgrading the preferred choice, while low gas prices
would favour a value chain ending with a CHP. As the prognosis for the natural gas price shows an
increase, it is logical to assume that new investments in biogas plants could be based on positive
projections for the natural gas price, implying that upgrading would be the preferred choice (Danish
Energy Agency, 2012b, 2017).
The actual development in the natural gas price has, however, shown a downward trend in
recent years due to the financial crisis, shale gas (primarily in the US) and an increase in renewable
energy substituting gas-driven CHPs. It is therefore likely that some biogas producers would be
inclined to choose the CHP solution. A reason why so few have actually made that decision could
be strategic considerations. An analysis including both ex ante and ex post considerations shows
that the owners of a biogas plant using backward induction would most likely prefer to join a value
chain design with upgrading, even if expected profits for the total value prove to be higher with a
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CHP. This can be understood by examining how profits can actually be expected to be allocated
based on the value chain design when both ex ante and ex post bargaining powers are accounted
for.
If a CHP is installed to satisfy a heat demand, the best alternative to biogas is to install
a biomass-based heat boiler. This alternative gives the CHP good ex ante bargaining power.
After investments are made, both the biogas plant and the CHP will lose if one of the parties
chooses to defect and break the chain; however, the energy monopoly regulator, the Danish Energy
Regulatory Authority, may force the energy converter to pay less for the biogas than first agreed
upon, thereby reducing the opportunities for profit for the biogas plant (see, for example, (Danish
Energy Regulatory Authority, 1999)).
This means that a biogas plant will be reluctant to involve itself in a value chain with direct
consumption in a CHP, even though the resulting feed-in tariff on produced electricity could yield
the highest potential profit for the value chain at the lowest risk. Backward induction shows that
the proportional allocation will most likely be discarded either ex ante or ex post for the benefit
of an allocation mechanism more in line with full equality or individual rationality, following the
preferences of the energy converter.
Conversely, if the value chain ends with an upgrading plant, it will be the biogas plant that has
the upper hand. For an investor, an upgrading plant could be very profitable, particularly if a 4%
discount rate is the best alternative, while from the perspective of the biogas plant, an upgrading
facility could add good profits with the right profit allocation. An ex post deviation from the value
chain would result in significant sunk costs for the upgrading plant’s owner, as the capacity cannot
be used for anything else than biogas. The biogas plant would also have a risk of sunk costs, but
but its chances are better than those of the upgrading plant for finding a good alternative usage
of the capacity, such as for heat and power production or another upgrading plant. This puts the
biogas plant in a much better ex post negotiating position, compared to the negotiations with a
local CHP. Furthermore, it is more likely that the biogas and the upgrading plant can agree on a
profit allocation principle in line with the proportional allocation, as this is the preferred allocation
for both. All of these arguments are in favour of upgrading when looking from the perspective of
the biogas plant, which is likely to be the initiator of the project.
If policy makers intend to increase the number of value chains ending with direct consumption,
a policy implication from this analysis is that they can consider decreasing support for upgrading
(or increasing support for direct consumption). If they instead give preference to upgrading, this
analysis indicates that the status quo in regulation may not change the pattern in value chain
designs even, if natural gas prices continue to stay low in the near future.
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7. Conclusion
Danish biogas production has developed remarkably since regulation was changed so upgraded
biogas was supported at the same level as biogas applied directly in a local CHP. Several new plants
have been built, where most plant owners have chosen to upgrade the biogas, and older plants are
also upgrading. New biogas plants, however, tend to face barriers in achieving enough contracts
with livestock farmers who will supply the biogas plant with manure.
We have combined the optimisation of the biogas value chain with applied game theory to
understand these observations. We started with profit allocation, focusing on the fairness criteria
og equality and individual rationality, and we then discussed the application of backward induction
to analyse the strategic approaches to the investment options.
We have found that this approach broaden the perspective of the strategic considerations made
by the essential parties in the biogas value chain but also on the empirical evidence we found. To
our knowledge, the approach has not yet been applied to a biogas value chain analysis; in fact, the
best example we could find for an applied analysis was the study of Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011),
which considers the bargaining power in the Eurasian gas market transit. Hubert and Ikonnikova
(2011) apply allocation mechanisms as an indicator of bargaining power, whereas we consider the
results as possible outcomes of a negotiation. The likelihood of these outcomes depends on the
bargaining power of each participant, which is assessed through the potential alternatives before
and after investments—assuming individual rationality.
The optimal configuration of the biogas value chain is found using a mixed integer optimisation
model. The optimal solution is to build a large biogas plant with a high share of manure and a cheap
supplementary input substrate—in our case, deep litter. The optimal choice of energy converter
is a local CHP when natural gas prices are low and an upgrading facility using methanation when
natural gas prices are high.
Using the optimal configuration, we implemented three mechanisms for allocating the profit:
full equality, proportionality, and individual rationality. Comparing the solutions between using a
CHP and an upgrading facility as the energy converter, the following conclusions are drawn.
First, farmers have low bargaining power, which can result in low profit shares and, eventually,
a lack of attendance or defection if the farmers have already agreed on attendance. Policy makers
could overcome this obstacle by moving some of the support from the energy converters to the
farmers, thereby increasing the bargaining power of the farmers.
Second, the negotiating position of the biogas plant is the best if the energy converter is an
upgrading plant and is relatively bad if the energy converter is a CHP. It is also likely that the
plant will be able to agree on the allocation mechanism with an upgrading plant; at least, they
could do so by looking at the three mechanisms applied in this study. These points can help to
explain the clear preference for upgrading we find empirically. If policy makers were to change this
development, they could decrease the support given to biogas upgrading relative to the support
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given for direct consumption of biogas.
Overall, we have found several arguments, based on theory and our modelling, that support
the observations found regarding the choices made by Danish biogas value chains in recent years.
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Appendix A. Regulation
Appendix A.1. Regulation related to inputs
The primary input for biogas production must be waste in order to achieve support for biogas
in Denmark. Waste can be waste water, manure, or e.g. other agricultural waste products such as
waste products from dairy production or from slaughterhouses. While some of these waste products
give a high biogas yield, other inputs such as manure will only give a low yield, and as some waste
products are limited biogas plants have experimented with energy crops in a mix of manure.
However, in order to keep a sustainable biogas production authorities have set restrictions on the
level of energy crops (e.g. maize and sugar beet) which can be added in the biogas production.
By 2018 this limit will be on a maximum of 12% energy crops that can be added (Danish Energy
Agency, 2012a).
Agricultural output is dependent on the amount of nutrients in the soil, and in conventional
farming it is common to add a proper amount of fertilisers to the soil. These fertilisers would
typically be a combination of manure and mineral fertilisers, however not all the added nutrients
are used by the crops and are instead washed out into the ground water. In 1985, with the first
Danish waste water action plan, it was decided to set restrictions on the amount of manure and
mineral fertilisers that could be used on Danish soils (Environmental Protection Agency, 1985).
A property of digestate (de-gasified manure) is, that nutrients become more usable for the
crops, which decreases the need for extra mineral fertilisers in order to achieve the same yield.
With the current regulation farmers have been allowed to fertilise the soil in the same way with
digestate as with untreated manure. This means that the crops are more fertilised with digestate
than with untreated manure. Besides a potential profit from the biogas plant, the primary gain
for a participating livestock farmer is an improved fertiliser.
Appendix A.2. Regulation related to output
Biogas support is given to the energy producer from the value chain. Until 2012, the Danish
regulation followed some of the same principles as used elsewhere in Europe, where support was
given to the produced electricity (EuroObserv’ER, 2014; Lantz et al., 2007; Brudermann et al.,
2015). Since the Energy reform in 2012 (Danish Government, 2012), regulation have changed so
that biogas upgraded to biomethane and sold on the gas market (through the gas grid) is put on
the same regulatory footing as biogas used locally for heat and power production.
The support tariffs for 2016 can be seen in table A.1. The support will last until 2023, however,
a part of the support will be phased out from 2016 to 2020 and another part of the support depends
negatively on the natural gas price, and thereby reduce the risk of price variations for natural gas.
Appendix A.3. Regulation for methanation
As methanation is a new technology, it has not been implemented in the current support scheme,
but following the fundamental principles of the support structure where production of renewable
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Regulation type and description value
Feed-in tariff on electricity based on Biogas 164.9 Euro/MWh
Feed-in premium for heat-only based on Biogas 55.8 Euro/MWh
Feed-in premium for Biomethane from biogas 59.2 Euro/MWh
Fuel tax on biogas for heat 0 Euro/MWh
Fuel tax on natural gas for heat 34.3 Euro/MWh
Table A.1: Support and tax for upgrading and biogas-based CHP, in 2016-prices
energy is supported and not energy conversion (according to personal communication with Bodil
Harder, Danish Energy Agency), we assume that the extra biomethane gained from electrolysis
will not gain any support. The support and taxes for methanation are shown in table A.2.
Regulation type and description value
Feed-in premium for Biomethane from biogas 59.2 Euro/MWh
Feed-in premium for Biomethane from electrolysis 0 Euro/MWh
Fuel tax on electricity for heat based on electrolysis 22.9 Euro/MWh
Tax and transport tariffs on electricity for electrolysis 42.8 Euro/MWh
Table A.2: Support and taxes for methanation, in 2016-prices
Electricity is taxed even more than fossil fuels when electricity is used by private households
and for heat production. This also counts for surplus heat. The tax is considerably lower, when
electricity is used for industrial production, however any surplus heat from this production used
for heating will then be taxed heavily afterwards, this in effect means, that a potential income
from the heat generated through electrolysis is close to zero, when the tax is deducted.
A part of the electricity tax is the PSO (public service obligation), which basically is a way
to make electricity consumers pay for the development of renewable electricity. The PSO fee is
high and even though it is reduced a bit for large consumers it increases total electricity costs
significantly. The PSO is phased out from 2017 to 2022 (Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and
Climate, 2016), which will reduce the electricity cost significantly for industrial production such as
methanation.
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Appendix B. Mathematical models
Appendix B.1. Plant level model
Parameters
AMi,n′ Accumulated amount of biomass for biomass
type i in breakpoint n′
Aj Area of circle j
T Hours on the input side
T Number of weeks in a year
∆Aj Average area of circle j and circle j − 1
∆di,n′(∆d
dig
n′ ) Average transportation distance for bi-
omass i (digestate) in breakpoint n
∆rj Average distance from center to the biomasses
in circle j
ΓDM Allowed dry matter content in the mix
ηEC Percentage energy crops allowed in input mix
ηavailable Amount not flared
ηplant Mass after biogas plant %
ηi,p′,p/ηp′,p Mass left after process p coming from pro-
cess p′
γDMi Dry matter content of input i
γ Percentage of mass of supplied manure that can be
returned as digestate
ηi Initial biogas yield of biomass i
ρp,t Price of end product p in time t
ctaxp,p′ Tax applied on amount flowing from process p
to process p′
ρdig Price of digestate
ρsupportp Support process p
ami,m(am
dig
m ) Amount of biomass (digestate) trans-
ported on segment m
ami,n′(am
dig
n′ ) Amount of biomass (digestate) in the
annulus between n′ and n′ − 1
bplantn Max. capacity of plant in breakpoint n
bi,t Biomass i available at time t
cHANDLING,dig Handling cost of digestate
cOPEX,SOS2n /c
CAPEX,SOS2
n OPEX/ CAPEX in bre-
akpoint n for the plant
cOPEX,vari,p,t /c
OPEX,var
p,t Variable OPEX for biomass
(gas) process p for input type i and time t
cOPEXi,p /c
CAPEX
i,p (c
OPEX
p /
cCAPEXp ) OPEX/CAPEX for biomass (gas) process
p for input type i
cTRANSi,m (c
TRANS,xdig
m ) Transport cost for biomass
type i (digestate not sent to the manure supplier)
on each segment m
cprodi Production cost of biomass type i
cloadi /c
unload
i (c
load,dig/cunload,dig) Cost of loa-
ding/unloading biomass i (digestate)
ctrucki (c
truck,dig) Cost of using truck for biomass i (di-
gestate)
cTRANSi,n′ Cost of each biomass type transported to the
plant in each breakpoint n′
cTRANS,xdign′ Transportation cost for digestate not de-
livered to the manure suppliers in breakpoint n
dp,t Demand of end product in hour t—only defined
for heat
fp Fixed amount going to process p from a PK −
process
ktrucki (k
truck,dig) Capacity of the truck used for trans-
portation of biomass i (digestate)
rj Radius of circle j
tmini,p Minimum process time of process p for input
type i
tloadi /t
unload
i (t
load,dig/tunload,dig) Time used for loa-
ding/unloading biomass i (digestate)
vi(v
dig) Velocity of truck used for transportation of
biomass i (digestate)
To include ownership in the model, we have included a new set of constraints to run the model
with in order to see this effect. We also identified two more neccessary constraints that were not
in the model from Jensen et al. (2017). The changes to the model are presented first, and after
this, the rest of the model is presented.
The objective function is now to maximise the sum of profit for the owners:
Max
∑
o∈O
pio
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Sets
A(v′, v)(A(v′, v)) Arcs from vertex v′ to vertex v
A−(v)/A+(v)(A−(v)/A+(v)) Input (output) side
arcs entering/leaving vertex v
A−cap(v)(A−cap(v)) Arcs to vertex v used in capacity
constraint
Aproc(v, v′′)(Aproc(v, v′′)) Process time arcs from ver-
tex v to vertex v′′
E The set of possible energy content
IO(i, o) Owner o producing biomass i
IEC Subset of biomasses that are energy crops
I Biomass types
M Line segments
N breakpoints
OP(o, p) Processes p owned by owner o
O Owners in the chain
P(P) Input (output) processes
PF Farmer processes
PI(PI) Inner processes
PP (PP ) The plant process on the input (output) side
PS Livestock farmer processes
PT Transportation processes
T /T Input (output) time steps
V(V) Input (output) vertices
VF Vertices of farmer processes
VI(VI) Vertices of the inner processes
VM Vertices of the manure farmer’s process
VP (VP ) Plant vertices on the input (output) side
VT Vertices of the transportation processes
A+decide(v) The set of arcs leaving vertex v which de-
fines the capacity of the process it leaves
A+extra(v) The set of arcs with origin in vertex v but
not of the main type
A+main(v) The set of arcs leaving vertex v and arriving
in a process that are of the main type
PE End processes
PH End process for heat
PJ Processes on the output side with capacity speci-
fied on output
PK Processes where the inflow is fixed
Pm
3
Methanation processes
VE Vertices of the end processes
VH End vertex for heat
VJ Vertices on the output side with capacity specified
on output
VK Vertices where the inflow is fixed
Variables
Co Cost of owner o
INCo Income of owner o
pio Profit of owner o
kSOS2n If the size of the plant is near breakpoint n
ki,p/kp Capacity of biomass/gas process p for biomass
type i
xleftp,t Not sold due to lack of demand
x¬manure Digestate not sent to manure suppliers
xheattax Tax paid for excess heat production
xshould Amount of digestate that should have been to
manure suppliers
xtrans,xdigm Extra digestate transported on segment m
xSOS2n Biomasses to the plant in breakpoint n
xa/xa Flow on biomass/gas arc a
xtransi,m Biomass i transported on segment m
Where pio is the profit for each owner, o, in the project and is given by:
pio = INCo − Co ∀o ∈ O
Where INCo and Co are the income and cost for each owner in the project. The income for each
owner is described by:
INCo =
∑
v=(p,t)∈
VE∩(PE×T )
|OP(o,p)
(
∑
a∈A−(v)
(xa − xleftp,t ) ηpricea ρp,t ηavailable (B.1a)
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+ ρsupporto +
∑
p∈Pplant
|OP(o,p)
x¬manure ρdig ∀o ∈ O (B.1b)
Here line B.1a is the income from selling the energy. This is only earned if owner o owns the end
process as given by the set OP(o, p). The amount produced on the arc a, xa, is reduced by the
amount that cannot be sold, which is only relevant for heat as the heat demand is the limiting
factor. Then the result is multiplied by a price parameter, ηpricea , which reduces the price obtained.
This reduction is only applied when biomethane is produced to reflect the heating value of the
produced biomethane compared to that of natural gas. Last, we multiply with the price of the
end product, ρp,t, and an expected percentage of which the production can occur, η
available. Line
B.1b is the amount of support received by owner o, ρsupporto , and the income, ρdig, from selling the
digestate, which cannot be send back to the livestock farmers, x¬manure.
The cost is given by:
Co =
∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈
V∩(I×P×T ×E)
|OP(o,p)
∑
a∈A−(v)
xa (c
OPEX
i,p + c
OPEX,var
i,p,t ) +
∑
v=(p,t)∈
V∩(P×T )
|OP(o,p)
∑
a∈A−(v)
xa (c
OPEX
p + c
OPEX,var
p,t )
(B.2a)
+
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈P
|OP(o,p)
ki,p
T
tmini,p
cCAPEXi,p +
∑
p∈P
|OP(o,p)
kp c
CAPEX
p (B.2b)
+
∑
p∈Pplant
|OP(o,p)
(∑
n∈N
xSOS2n c
OPEX,SOS2
n +
∑
n∈N
kSOS2n c
CAPEX,SOS2
n ∀o ∈ O (B.2c)
+
∑
m∈M
xtrans,xdigm c
TRANS,xdig
m +
∑
v∈VP
∑
a∈A-(v)
(xa η
plant − x¬manure) cHANDLING,dig
)
(B.2d)
+
∑
i∈I
|IO(i,o)
∑
m∈M
xtransi,m c
TRANS
i,m +
∑
p∈PH
|OP(o,p)
xheattax +
∑
p∈PS
|OP(o,p)
xshould ρdig (B.2e)
Line B.2a and B.2b are the OPEX and CAPEX of each process and is added to the cost of the
owner if he owns the process as defined by the set OP(o, p). Line B.2c-B.2d is the OPEX and
CAPEX of the plant and the transportation and handling costs of digestate. Line B.2e contains
three elements. First, the transportation cost of all biomasses, which must be paid by the producer
of the biomass as defined by the set IO(i, o). Second, the tax on excess heat delivery to the district
heating network is added for the owner of the heat process. This is only relevant in the case of
methanation where heat is generated as excess heat. In the model from Jensen et al. (2017), heat
tax was not included. The primary reason for livestock farmers to send their manure to a biogas
plant is the gains of having their manure treated and thereby a better fertiliser. If the livestock
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farmers do not receive the digestate, it represents a loss in the value chain corresponding to the
digestate value, ρdig. This cost is added as the final element in line B.2e.
The livestock farmers may take up to a certain percentage of the digestate, γ. The amount
that is not sent back to the livestock farmer but should have been, according to the amount he is
willing to take, can be calculated as:
xshould ≥
∑
v∈VM
∑
a∈A+(v)
xaγ − (
∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈
VP∩(PP×T ×E)
∑
a∈A-(v)
xaη
plant − x¬manure)
Where the first term on the right hand side represents the amount the farmer is willing to take, and
the second term is the amount of available digestate minus the amount of digestate sent elsewhere.
The heat tax is the amount of heat generated and delivered to the heat demand, p′ ∈ PH , from
the methanation process p ∈ Pm3 , i.e. excluding the heat produced which cannot be sent to the
demand, xleftp′,t . The total heat tax is calculated by the following equation:
xheattax ≥ ctaxp,p′
(( ∑
v=(p,t)V∩(Pm3×T )
∑
a∈A+(v)
xa
)
−
∑
t∈T
xleftp′,t
)
∀p ∈ Pm3 , p′ ∈ PH
In the model from Jensen et al. (2017), the amount of dry matter allowed in the total mix was
not modelled. However, this is necessary to consider the problems obtained by the biogas plants
as the dry matter content of inputs differs significantly and there is a limit on the total dry matter
content of the mix. Therefore, we add another constraint that sets a limit on the dry matter
content of the input mix by using the allowed dry matter content of the input mix, ΓDM, and the
dry matter content of each input, γDMi . The constraint is given by:∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈
VP∩(I×PP×E)
∑
a∈A-(v)
γDMi xa ≤ ΓDM
∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈VP
∩(I×PP×E)
∑
a∈A-(v)
xa ∀t ∈ T (B.3)
The remaining constraints are the same as in Jensen et al. (2017), and is briefly explained
below.
Ensuring that the flow through the chain is remained, is accounted for by the flow conservation
constraints:∑
v′=(i′,p′,t′,e′)∈
V∩(I×P×T ×E)
∑
a∈A(v′,v)
xa ηi,p′,p =
∑
a∈A+(v)
xa ∀v = (i, p, t, e) ∈ VI ∩ (I × PI × T × E)
∑
v′=(p′,t′)∈
V∩(P×T )
∑
a∈A(v′,v)
xa ηp′,p =
∑
a∈A+(v)
xa ∀v = (p, t) ∈ VI ∩ (PI × T )
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Minimum process time for each process is ensured through:∑
v′=(i,p′,t′,e′)∈
V∩(P×T ×E)|p 6=p′
∑
a∈A(v′,v)
xa ηi,p′,p ≤
∑
v′′=(i,p′′,t′′,e′′)∈
V∩(P×T ×E)|p 6=p′′
∑
a∈Aproc(v,v′′)
xa
(ηi,p,p)t
′′−t
∀v = (i, p, t, e) ∈ VI ∩ (I × PI × T × E)∑
v′=(p′,t′)∈
V∩(P×T )|p 6=p′
∑
a∈A(v′,v)
xa ηp′,p ≤
∑
v′′=(p′′,t′′)∈
V∩(P×T )|p 6=p′′
∑
a∈Aproc(v,v′′)
xa
(ηpp)
t′′−t ∀v = (p, t) ∈ V
I ∩ (PI × T )
The capacity of the processes are not to be exceeded. This is ensured by the following capacity
constraints:∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈V∩E
∑
a∈A−(v)
xa +
∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈V∩E
∑
a∈A−cap(v)
xa ≤ ki,p ∀(i, p, t) ∈ I × P × T
∑
v=(p,t)∈V
∑
a∈A−(v)
xa +
∑
v=(p,t)∈V
∑
a∈A−cap(v)
xa ≤ kp ∀(p, t) ∈ P × T
The following constraint ensures that not more than the available input is used:∑
a∈A+(v)
xa ≤ bi,t ∀v = (i, p, t, e) ∈ VF ∩ (I × PF × T × E)
The maximum percentage of energy crops allowed in the mix is handled by:∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈
VP∩(IEC×PP×E)
∑
a∈A-(v)
xa ≤ ηEC
∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈VP
∩(I×PP×E)
∑
a∈A-(v)
xa ∀t ∈ T
The following constraints set the SOS2-variables to account for OPEX and CAPEX using
stepwise linear functions for the biogas plant:∑
v∈VP
∑
a∈A-(v)
xa =
∑
n∈N
bplantn x
SOS2
n∑
n∈N
xSOS2n = 1
∑
n∈N
bplantn k
SOS2
n =
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈PP
T
tmini,p
ki,p∑
n∈N
kSOS2n = 1
bplant1 ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈PP
T
tmini,p
ki,p ≤ bplantend
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Change of time resolution between input and output side from week to hour is done by:∑
v=(p,t)∈
VP∩PP
∑
a∈A+(v)
xa =
∑
v=(i,p,b t
7·24 c+1,e)
∈VP∩(I×PP×E)
∑
a∈A-(v)
xa ηi e
7 · 24 ∀t ∈ T
For processes where the capacity is determined by the output amount, the following constraint
is necessary: ∑
a∈A+decide(v)
xa ≤ kp ∀v = (p, t) ∈ VJ ∩ (PJ × T )
For the methanation and the CHP processes, a fixed range of the two outputs are ensured by:
xa = fp
∑
a′∈A+extra(v)
xa′ ∀v = (p, t) ∈ VK ∩ (PK × T ), a ∈ A+main(v)
If the demand of heat is lower than the produced demand, the excess cannot be sold. This is
ensured by the following demand constraint:∑
a∈A(v)
xa ≤ dp,t + xleftp,t ∀v = (p, t) ∈ VH ∩ (PH × T )
The transportation constraints related to input substrates are:∑
m∈M
xtransi,m =
∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈
VT∩(PT×T ×E)
∑
a∈A+(v)
xa ∀i ∈ I
xtransi,m ≤ ami,m ∀i ∈ I, m ∈M
The transportation constraints related to digestate are:
x¬manure ≥
∑
v=(i,p,t,e)∈
VP∩(PP×T ×E)
∑
a∈A-(v)
xaη
plant −
∑
v∈VM
∑
a∈A+(v)
xaγ
xtrans,xdigm ≤ amdigm ∀m ∈M∑
m∈M
xtrans,xdigm ≤ x¬manure
Finally, restrictions on the variables are given by:
xa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A
xa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A
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xleftp,t ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T
ki,p ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, p ∈ P
kp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P
xSOS2n , k
SOS2
n ∈ SOS2 ∀n ∈ N
xtransi,m ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, m ∈M
xtrans,xdigm ≥ 0 ∀m ∈M
x¬manure ≥ 0
xheattax ≥ 0
xshould ≥ 0
pio ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O
INCo ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O
Co ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O
Appendix B.2. Profit allocation
The general allocation model is given below, where constraint B.5 is mechanism specific as
given for each of the used allocation mechanisms.
Max z = λ (B.4)
S.t. Feasibility constraint ∀o ∈ O \ Osub (B.5)
piCAo = γ
feasC∗o ∀o ∈ Osub (B.6)
piCAo = pi
∗
o −
∑
o′∈OT O(o′,o)
ρCAo′,o +
∑
o′∈OT O(o,o′)
ρCAo,o′ ∀o ∈ O (B.7)
λ ≥ 0 (B.8)
piCAo ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O (B.9)
ρCAo,o′ ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O, o′ ∈ OT O(o, o′) (B.10)
The objective function B.4 is to maximise the decision variable λ, which is specific for each of the
used allocation mechanisms. Constraint B.6 sets the profit of each of the substrate owners equal
to a parameter, γfeas, representing the percentage of its costs from the plant level model, C∗o , that
should be covered. In constraint B.7, the profit for each owner using the cost allocation method,
piCAo , is calculated as the profit obtained from the plant level model, pi
∗
o , minus the price paid for
buying input to the process plus the price obtained from selling the output from the owner.
For the full equality allocation, λ is not used in the feasibility constraint. This means that there
is no upper bound on λ and the problem gets unbounded. To avoid this, we simply set λ = 0.
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Appendix C. Data
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Cost 
Size of plant, tonnes 
OPEX: Euro/tonnes
CAPEX: Euro/tonnes/year
Figure C.1: OPEX and CAPEX for the biogas plant is based on a fitted trendline on the OPEX and CAPEX reported
by plants applying for financial support in 2012 in Denmark through the Danish Energy Agency and model plants
in the same time. To linearise it, we have used the same break points as in (Jensen et al., 2017).
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Cow slurry, manure
Process CAPEX OPEX fix OPEX var Min. process time Max. process time
storage 1 0.12 0 0 1 4
storage 2 0.12 0 0 1 4
Pig slurry, manure
Process CAPEX OPEX fix OPEX var Min. process time Max. process time
storage 1 0.12 0 0 1 4
storage 2 0.12 0 0 1 4
Deep litter, substrate
Process CAPEX OPEX fix OPEX var Min. process time Max. process time
storage 1 0.07 0 0 1 52
storage 2 0.07 0 0 1 52
pretreatment 0.01 0 0.13 1 1
Maize, substrate
Process CAPEX OPEX fix OPEX var Min. process time Max. process time
ensilage 0.00 0 0.78 26 52
storage 0.30 0 0 1 17
Straw, substrate
Process CAPEX OPEX fix OPEX var Min. process time Max. process time
storage 1 1.72 0 0 1 52
pretreatment 3.61 0 10.19 1 1
storage 2 0.86 0 0 1 52
Sugar beet, substrate
Process CAPEX OPEX fix OPEX var Min. process time Max. process time
storage 1 0.26 0 1.61 1 16
Washer 0.00 0 2.14 1 1
storage 2 0.26 0 1.61 1 4
cutter 0.00 0 2.14 1 1
ensilage 0.17 0 1.61 26 52
storage 3 0.17 0 1.61 1 4
Table C.3: Data for the case study—input side. OPEX are in e/ton and all CAPEX are annualised with a rate of
return of 4% and the given lifetime of the process (20 years are used when no data) and are in e/ton/year. All data
are from Abildgaard (2017) except for sugar beet that are from Boldrin et al. (2016).
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Biomass type Production cost and Biogas yield Dry matter Extra CAPEX Extra OPEX
transport to farm e/ton Nm3BG/ton percentage e/ton/year e/ton
Cow slurry 0 18 7.5% 0 0
Pig slurry 0 17 5.5% 0 0
Deep litter 0 92 30.0% 1.54 7.51
Maize 30 138 34.0% 0.49 2.41
Straw 27 308 89.0% 4.24 15.42
Sugar beet 26 115 22.0% 0.49 2.41
Table C.4: Production costs and biogas yields of the biomass types. The biogas yield, dry matter percentage
and production costs, i.e. without any storage costs etc., as well as transportation costs to the farm are given by
Abildgaard (2017), where we assume a transportation distance to the farm from the field of 1.5 for maize, sugar beet,
and straw. The extra CAPEX and OPEX for the feedstock are from ”EA Energianalyse” (2014).
Cow slurry Pig slurry Deep litter Digestate
Radius ami,n′ c
TRANS
i,m ami,n′ c
TRANS
i,m ami,n′ c
TRANS
i,m ami,n′ c
TRANS,dig
m
10 75489 1.20 138548 1.20 16298 3.44 51320 1.20
20 543450 2.20 279770 2.20 56260 5.39 109521 2.20
30 690273 3.31 767346 3.31 259280 7.56
40 819144 4.43 1032999 4.43 83638 9.76
Maize Sugar beet Straw
Radius ami,n′ c
TRANS
i,m ami,n′ c
TRANS
i,m ami,n′ c
TRANS
i,m
10 8004 2.55 1771 2.55 45363 6.72
20 50609 3.44 6539 3.44 94926 8.73
30 72005 4.43 8741 4.43 126407 10.96
40 96998 5.44 9949 5.44 173821 13.23
50 88888 6.46 14241 6.46 186082 15.52
60 99251 7.47 11504 7.47 152538 17.81
70 143800 8.49 13085 8.49 172816 20.10
80 167910 9.52 17224 9.52 280636 22.39
Table C.5: Data for the case study—transportation. All costs are in e. Further, the handling price of digestate,
cHANDLING,digall , is 0.40e/ton. Data for the last radii is kept out for the types where it is not needed due to too
large costs etc. The amount of input in each circle are data from Maabjerg Energy Center (2017), and transportation
costs for all substrates as well as amount of digestate delivered in each circle is from Abildgaard (2017).
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Process CAPEX OPEX fix OPEX var Min. process time Max. process time
gasstorage 2.16 0 0 1 12
ironadsorption 25.90 162.4 0 1 1
bioscrub 54.74 32.5 0 1 1
biothrick 44.81 8.1 0 1 1
waterscrub 110.37 30 0 1 1
orgphysscrub 125.09 34 0 1 1
pressswingabsorp 110.37 75 0 1 1
chemscrub 110.37 45 0 1 1
methanation 1471.64 430 0 1 1
boiler 3840.72 2000 1.1 1 1
scgt 38407.18 20000 4.5 1 1
ccgt 57610.77 30000 4.5 1 1
gasengine 64011.96 10000 8 1 1
7to40 52.61 20 0 1 1
1to40 105.22 40 0 1 1
heatstorage 11.92 1.13 0 1 12
Nm3ToMWh 0.00 0 0 0 0
flaring 8093.99 0 0 0 0
Table C.6: Data for the case study—output side (Danish Energy Agency, 2012c; Evald et al., 2013; Pizarro, 2014).
All costs are in e, and all CAPEX and fixed OPEX are annualised with a rate of return of 4% and the given lifetime
of the process (20 years are used in case of no data). For Boiler, Single-cycle gas turbine (SCGT), Combined-cycle
gas turbine (CCGT), and Gas engine CAPEX and OPEXfix are in e/MW/year and OPEX in e/MWh. For the
other technologies, CAPEX and OPEXfix are in e/Nm3/h/year and none of these has any assigned variable OPEX.
We have used a higher heating value of methane of 39.8 MJ/Nm3 and a lower heating value of 35.9 MJ/Nm3 and
assume the methane content of biogas to be 65%, while the methane content of biomethane differs depending on the
upgrading technology used.
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